After 9/11, billions of dollars were appropriated in order to modernize and update the Coast Guard’s fleet of patrol boats and other ships. It was an ambitious plan, but one everyone agreed was necessary to enhance our nation’s coastal security. However, four years later, this major effort to bring the Coast Guard into the 21st century is a disaster. Only one new ship has been added to the fleet, and it’s considered structurally unsound by by the Coast Guard’s own engineers. Costs have soared from the initial appropriation of $17 billion to over $24 billion. The New York Times has the story:
WASHINGTON, Dec. 8 — Four years after the Coast Guard began an effort to replace nearly its entire fleet of ships, planes and helicopters, the modernization program heralded as a model of government innovation is foundering. […]
That has compromised the Coast Guard’s ability to fulfill its mission, which greatly expanded after the 2001 attacks to include guarding the nation’s shores against terrorists. The service has been forced to cut back on patrols and, at times, ignore tips from other federal agencies about drug smugglers. The difficulties will only grow more acute in the next few years as old boats fail and replacements are not ready.
What happened? Privatization happened …
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The modernization effort was a bold experiment, called Deepwater, to build the equivalent of a modest navy — 91 new ships, 124 small boats, 195 new or rebuilt helicopters and planes and 49 unmanned aerial vehicles.
Instead of doing it piecemeal, the Coast Guard decided to package everything, in hopes that the fleet would be better integrated and its multibillion price would command attention from a Congress and White House traditionally more focused on other military branches. And instead of managing the project itself, the Coast Guard hired Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, two of the nation’s largest military contractors, to plan, supervise and deliver the new vessels and helicopters.
Many retired Coast Guard officials, former company executives and government auditors fault that privatization model, saying it allowed the contractors at times to put their interests ahead of the Guard’s.
“This is the fleecing of America,” said Anthony D’Armiento, a systems engineer who has worked for Northrop and the Coast Guard on the project. “It is the worst contract arrangement I’ve seen in all my 20 plus years in naval engineering.”
In other words, the Coast Guard outsourced the oversight function to the defense contractors responsible for the program. Ignoring past practice, which featured oversight by the the service or agency which was to benefit from the program, followed the standard Bush administration solution for every government function: Let the private sector do it! Considering how much we spent in Iraq, this may seem like small potatoes, but the Coast Guard actually is responsible for protecting the Homeland (as opposed to our troops in Iraq whose principle mission seems to be protecting themselves at this point). The result was as predictable as any other Bush rebuilding program from Iraq to Katrina:
Insufficient oversight by the Coast Guard resulted in the service buying some equipment it did not want and ignoring repeated warnings from its own engineers that the boats and ships were poorly designed and perhaps unsafe, the agency acknowledged. The Deepwater program’s few Congressional skeptics were outmatched by lawmakers who became enthusiastic supporters, mobilized by an aggressive lobbying campaign financed by Lockheed and Northrop.
And the contractors failed to fulfill their obligation to make sure the government got the best price, frequently steering work to their subsidiaries or business partners instead of competitors, according to government auditors and people affiliated with the program.
Privatising government doesn’t just cost more, it achieves less: less services to help Americans in need, less law enforcement and less national security. The only ones who get more out of this scam perpetrated on the American taxpayers are the corporations which were awarded these contracts (more profits), their lobbyists (more fees) and corrupt Republican politicians (more campaign contributions). For them it was a sweet deal all around. For the US Coast Guard, and everyone else, it’s a catastrophe.
I read this the day it came out, Glad to see it on the front page. Do you feel safer yet?
I haven’t felt safe since Clinton left office.
I read this also the other day and am glad to see it frontpaged. The looting of taxpayer money continues. This administration has nothing on the robber barons of old. Just chalk this up again to making us less safe and now Trillions of dollars in debt.
I have yet to read of one program put in place after 9/11 that is actually working..this is the same as the FBI spending or giving some company over 300 million dollars to make the FBI’s computer syster a techo marvel and after several years it turned out when they were doing some testing it didn’t work at all. I of course didn’t hear that the company had to pay the money back.
Thanks for putting this on the front page, Steven. My dad was in the Coast Guard for 20-some odd years, so this one hits close to home for me.
The guy who started the Deepwater program, Greg Giddens, is now in charge of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program, which I wrote about back in June: For Whom “The Wall” Profits III: The Deepwater Model.
Ya know, I have been noticing an unusual number of hits to my site from gov offices. Their search terms were either Deepwater or Greg Giddens. Now I know why, it sure wasn’t about SBI, it was about their failed Deepwater program.
I guess this is what we can expect from SBI’s virtual wall from Boeing.
Why not just turn the Government over to the highest bidder…oh yeah, Bushco has already done that!
What strikes me is how long it takes for powers-that-be to publicly admit the drastic need for change. The NYT article linked to reference documents, such as the GAO’s June 2006 report on the status of Deepwater.
In fact, Congress knew of substantial problems the year before, in June 2005.
To be fair, the Coast Guard has earned respect otherwise, considering its aging fleet and limited resources, in search and rescue missions, for example. In FY 2005, as reported at a September 2006 hearing in the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, the Service met nearly all of its performance goals in its traditional non-homeland security missions. So, it’s a shame when its reputation and capabilities are so compromised by outsourcing decisions.
The Deepwater contract, awarded to ICGS (“Integrated Coast Guard Systems” — a joint venture of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, the Navy Secretary’s alma mater) in June 2002, has been renewed through 2011. Will Congress seek penalties for ICGS’ shabby performance?
As to the other defense contracts with Lockheed and Northrop, what kind of waste can be found — and how soon can it be stopped?
Just don’t put us on hold too long, Congress.