Historical events require time before their real impact can be judged accurately. Throughout the 1920’s the Allied nations thought that World War One, then known as The Great War, had brought victory. Yes, victory had come at an appalling cost, but it had wiped out the Romanov, Hollenzollern, and Habsburg monarchies and ushered in an era of collective security and disarmament. By the 1950’s history told another story about the outcome of The Great War. It had not defeated Germany. It had thrown Europe into a period of profound crisis and led to the rise of some of the most inhumane ideologies ever known to man.
The German people were not always sympathetic to National Socialism. Naziism grew out of the post-war settlement and the financial hardships of the Depression. If things had been handled differently by the victors of The Great War, National Socialism never would have come to power. If America had remained on the sidelines during The Great War it might still be known as The Great War, and not as the smaller precursor to the Second World War. One never knows. As things turned out, the United States developed nuclear weapons first and emerged from the Second World War as the undisputed hegemon of the West. In an alternate universe, we might have avoided the carnage of World War Two and a Nazified Europe only to see a rather militant and expansionist Germany in sole possession of a nuclear bomb.
When we look back at the first Persian Gulf War we can seem similar ambiguities. Yes, we won the war by liberating Kuwait. We did so at relatively little cost in lives and treasure. Combined with the peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union, the country emerged from the conflict with a sense of triumphalism. And those that had warned against the war were marginalized and considered to be suffering from alarmism and Vietnam-fatigue. Here is how the Washington Post put it on October 20, 2004.
When Kerry rose in the Senate to oppose authorization for war against Iraq in January 1991, his words conveyed a wary, Vietnam-haunted approach to the use of military force that contrasted sharply with his vote a decade later to go to war a second time against Iraq. He was on the losing side of the vote on that war, which turned out to be far less costly in human and financial terms than Kerry and most Democrats — 45 of the party’s 54 senators opposed it — predicted.
In a lengthy speech, Kerry touched on most of the arguments that other critics made against going to war: Sanctions had not been given enough time to work; the American people were not prepared for the heavy casualties that might result; the war might spawn further instability in the Middle East. But it was Vietnam — especially fighting a war that did not have the full backing of the American people — that appeared to influence Kerry as much as anything else.
The first Bush administration made a strategic decision not to march on Baghdad and remove the regime of Saddam Hussein. Part of the reason for that decision is that toppling Saddam Hussein would have splitered the international coalition that was cobbled together to liberate Kuwait. But part of the reason (and it is related) was that it would have led to instability. Poppy Bush and Scowcroft have written that they expected Saddam to be deposed in a coup, but they feared chaos if the entire Ba’ath regime fell. Looking at the country today, we can see the wisdom in their assessment. Rather than topple the regime (and we did encourage an Shi’a and Kurdish uprising) we settled on disarmament and containment.
Ironically, this policy did provide a measure of stability within Iraq and, therefore, the region. But it also led directly to the rise of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda objected to the permanent basing of American soldiers and airmen in Saudi Arabia. Those soldiers and airmen were in Saudi Arabia as part of our containment policy. Al-Qaeda also objected to the sanctions on Iraq, which caused immense hardship for Iraqi society. It is well established that Usama bin-Laden was personally radicalized by the House of Saud’s decision to allow Americans into the kingdom and, especially, their decision to let us stay. As a result, as 9/11 proved, the post Persian Gulf War’s stability was illusory. It was illusory in much the same way as the stability of post-Versailles Europe was illusory. So, when we revisit John Kerry’s warnings about the proposed Persian Gulf War spawning further Middle East instability, we have to conclude he was correct. In fact, it was only the failure of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing that allowed us to avoid that conclusion for a decade.
Our containment policy of Iraq did not make us safe. It protected us from Iraq, but Iraq was never a threat to the United States. While Saddam was contained, other Arabs were developing a virulent strain of anti-Western and anti-American ideology. And, while the Israel/Palestine conflict was a major influence in that ideology, the containment policy of Iraq was actually listed higher on their list of grievances.
Even as we began to experience blowback (1993 WTC bombing, Khobar Towers, African Embassy bombings, USS Cole) we comforted ourselves in a post-Persian Gulf War discovery. It turned out that Saddam Hussein had been closer to developing nuclear weapons before the war than we had suspected. We tried to convince ourselves that Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was a godsend that had allowed us to disarm him before he developed a nuclear capability. We might have argued that Hitler’s invasion of Poland was a godsend because without that provocation he might have developed nuclear weapons before the United States. This is the kind of reasoning George W. Bush used last night in his interview with Scott Pellet for 60 Minutes.
PELLEY: But wasn’t it your administration that created the instability in Iraq?
BUSH: Well, our administration took care of a source of instability in Iraq. Envision a world in which Saddam Hussein was rushing for a nuclear weapon to compete against Iran. My decision to remove Saddam Hussein was the correct decision in my judgment. We didn’t find the weapons we thought we would find or the weapons everybody thought he had. But he was a significant source of instability.
We must parse this reasoning because it doesn’t mean what it appears to mean. Bush isn’t arguing that Saddam Hussein had WMD or a functioning nuclear program when we invaded in March 2003. He is arguing that, with Iran currently pursuing a nuclear weapon, Saddam would have had no choice but to restart his nuclear program in response.
Therefore, Bush’s reasoning goes, by toppling Saddam we have pre-empted his plan to gain nuclear weapons. And, therefore, our invasion of Iraq may have caused one form of instability but it avoided another, more dangerous form of instability.
If we examine this hypothesis we will find numerous factual problems. It is not at all clear how Saddam could have successfully developed nuclear weapons as long as we had inspectors on the ground, no-fly zones, and sanctions in place. However, if sanctions had ever been lifted, Saddam may well have felt that national security demands dictated that he develop a deterrent to Iran’s nuclear program. The invasion of Iraq was intended to avoid an open-ended situation where we were obliged to contain Iraq indefinitely even in the face of rising terrorist reprisals.
Rather than argue over the merits of that decision (the facts on the ground in Iraq preclude the necessity for that) I want to go back, again, to the decison to liberate Kuwait. Or, rather, I want to go back even further. I want to go back to the decision to allow Saddam to make a limited annexation of Kuwait.
Below the fold, I will excerpt the exchange between Saddam Hussein and our ambassador April Glaspie, and the other signals we sent to Iraq prior to their invasion of Kuwait.
Before 1918 Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman province of Basra, and thus in a sense part of Iraq, but Iraq had recognised its independence in 1961. After the end of the Iran-Iraq War (during the course of which Kuwait lent Iraq $ 14 billion), Iraq and Kuwait had a dispute over the exact demarcation of its border, access to waterways, the price at which Kuwaiti oil was being sold, and oil-drilling in border areas.
It was in this context that Glaspie had her first meeting with Saddam Hussein on July 25, 1990. Glaspie herself had requested the meeting, saying she had an urgent message for the Iraqi president from US President George H. W. Bush (Bush Senior). In her two years as Ambassador to Iraq, it was Glaspie’s first private audience with Saddam Hussein. It was also to be her last. A partial transcript of the meeting is as follows:
US Ambassador Glaspie:
“I have direct instructions from President Bush to improve our relations with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As you know, I have lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country (after the Iran-Iraq war). We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. (pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your other threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship – not confrontation – regarding your intentions. Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait’s borders?”
President Saddam Hussein:
“As you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give negotiations only one more brief chance. (pause) When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death.”
US Ambassador Glaspie:
“What solution would be acceptable?”
President Saddam Hussein:
“If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab – our strategic goal in our war with Iran – we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But if we are forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq (which, in Iraq’s view, includes Kuwait), then we will give up all of the Shatt to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be. (pause) What is the United States’ opinion on this?”
US Ambassador Glaspie:
“We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasise the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.”
At a Washington press conference called the next day (July 26, 1990), US State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutweiler was asked by journalists:
“Has the United States sent any type of diplomatic message to the Iraqis about putting 30,000 troops on the border with Kuwait? Has there been any type of protest communicated from the United States government?”
To which Tutweiler responded:
“I’m entirely unaware of any such protest.”
On July 31, 1990, two days before the Iraqi invasion, John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, testified to Congress that the:
“United States has no commitment to defend Kuwait and the US has no intention of defending Kuwait if it is attacked by Iraq.”
The trap had been baited very cleverly by Glaspie, reinforced by Tutweiler’s and Kelly’s supporting comments. And Saddam Hussein walked right into it, believing that the US would do nothing if his troops invaded Kuwait. On August 2, 1990, eight days after Glaspie’s meeting with the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein’s massed troops invaded Kuwait.
One month later in Baghdad, British journalists obtained the tape and transcript of the Saddam Hussein-April Glaspie meeting on July 25, 1990. In order to verify this astounding information, they attempted to confront Ms Glaspie as she was leaving the US embassy in Baghdad.
Journalist 1:
“Are the transcripts (holding them up) correct, Madam Ambassador?”
(Ambassador Glaspie does not respond)
Journalist 2:
“You knew Saddam was going to invade (Kuwait), but you didn’t warn him not to. You didn’t tell him America would defend Kuwait. You told him the opposite – that America was not associated with Kuwait.”
Journalist 1:
“You encouraged this aggression – his invasion. What were you thinking?”
US Ambassador Glaspie:
“Obviously, I didn’t think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait.”
Journalist 1:
“You thought he was just going to take SOME of it? But how COULD YOU?! Saddam told you that, if negotiations failed, he would give up his Iran (Shatt al Arab Waterway) goal for the ‘WHOLE of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be.’ You KNOW that includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always viewed as a historic part of their country!”
(Ambassador Glaspie says nothing, pushing past the two journalists to leave)
“America green-lighted the invasion. At a minimum, you admit signalling Saddam that some aggression was okay – that the US would not oppose a grab of the al-Rumalya oil field, the disputed border strip and the Gulf Islands (including Bubiyan) – territories claimed by Iraq?”
(Again, Ambassador Glaspie says nothing as a limousine door closes behind her and the car drives off.)
Two years later, during the American television network NBC News Decision ‘92s third round of the Presidential Debate, 1992 presidential candidate Ross Perot was quoted as saying:
“…we told him (Saddam) he could take the northern part of Kuwait; and when he took the whole thing we went nuts. And if we didn’t tell him that, why won’t we even let the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee see the written instructions for Ambassador Glaspie?”
At this point he (Perot) was interrupted by then President George Bush Senior who yelled:
“I’ve got to reply to that. That gets to national honour!…That is absolutely absurd!”
Of course, it isn’t absurd at all. When Saddam took over all of Kuwait we did indeed go nuts. We started a war that has not yet ended. The current war is really just a part of the war that started the day April Glaspie told Saddam, “Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasise the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.”
And those that agreed with James Baker and said that we should not get involved in an Arab-Arab dispute have been proven right. Although, I must add…we should have told Saddam Hussein that we would defend Kuwait’s sovereignty if he attempted to annex it. If we had warned him, he might still be in power and have nuclear weapons today. But he wouldn’t be our sworn enemy and Iran would not be dominating Iraq.