We often hear that there is no military solution in Iraq, but seldom hear anyone explain why that is. I doubt you’ll find any two military “experts” who agree on this subject (or anything else concerning warfare, for that matter), but here’s my take.
Matters of Gravity
“Center of gravity” is one of those warfare terms so ubiquitous, defined so broadly and so consistently misused that it’s almost meaningless. Nonetheless, I believe the center of gravity concept is critical to understanding our situation in Iraq.
“Center of gravity” is the common interpretation of the German word Schwerpunkt, which 19th century Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz described as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” He described major battles “…a collision between two centers of gravity; the more forces we can concentrate in our center of gravity, the more certain and massive the effect will be.”
The problem with most guerrilla style forces is that their weight is distributed so broadly they don’t present a “center” that can be defeated in a major, decisive battle. In Iraq, we don’t just face a guerilla force; we face several of them. Some of them are at war with each other, but all of them have one common enemy–us.
Every time we go after one militia or another, we expose ourselves to attrition in an effort that will not defeat the target group, but can create (and has created) a shift in the balance of power among rival factions that allows one or more of them to renew their destructive efforts on the faction we just weakened.
Some have referred to this phenomenon as “Whack-a-Mole.” I call it a “cat stampede,” and there aren’t enough cowboys in the world to herd all those critters back in the corral.
Initiave, OODA Loops and Moebius Strips
The OODA Loop model (observe, orient, decide, act) was devised by the late Air Force Colonel John Boyd. Boyd, considered brash even by fighter pilot standards, based his decision cycle model on his experiences in air-to-air combat, where the objective is to get inside the enemy aircraft’s “circle” and arrive at a point where you can shoot it down from behind.
At the operational and strategic levels of our war in Iraq, the enemy has stayed comfortably inside of our decision/action circle since the staged fall of Saddam Hussein’s statue. Whatever we do or don’t do, our dispersed enemy manages to maintain the initiative, and that, more than any other factor, is the key to success in warfare.
They adapt and we adapt and they adapt and we adapt, but at the end of the day, they make progress while we continue to track on a Moebius strip, constantly changing directions and orientations, but always arriving back at the same place.
The Decisive Point?
The New York Times reports that the kick off of the third Battle of Baghdad has been announced. The Iraqi general in charge of the security operation took command on Monday, but decided to wait until Wednesday to make an official announcement.
I noted on Tuesday that they appeared to have launched the operation without sufficient forces to execute. It look I’m not the only one concerned about that.
Delays have been numerous. Iraqi Army units from other parts of the country failed to arrive in Baghdad as scheduled. Iraqi politicians and military officers argued over who would command what units and control what parts of the city. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki began feeling political pressure to kick off the operation, but didn’t want to start it prematurely. Sadiq al-Rikabi, one of Maliki’s advisers, said, “It could be like an abortion for this operation, finishing it before it starts.”
But has Maliki gone off half-cocked? It will take time to phase in the additional 17,000 U.S. “surge” troops, and that’s assuming Congress doesn’t stop Mr. Bush from sending them.
Time will tell. I’d frankly like to see the Iraqi forces clear and hold the city on their own. That would be a major confidence builder, proving to themselves that they can actually execute operations and achieve their objectives.
But Baghdad is not a center of gravity in the Clausewitzean sense. Running the militias, terrorists and criminals out of town, if that can be done, won’t “win” the war. It will still be up to the various factions within the country to learn to live at peace with each other.
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Commander Jeff Huber, U.S. Navy (Retired) writes from Virginia Beach, Virginia. Read his commentaries at Pen and Sword.
Fine analysis, Commander. Even beyond your herding cats analogy which is really fine, there is I believe the fact that at no time in history has democracy been imposed from the outside. The use of force always generates an opposition force. In this instance the use of too little force applied in too many wrong ways has just allowed the opposition to increase in strength and ability over time. There truly is no military solution in this mess today. Never was seems to me.
I can’t think of an instance of enforced democracy working offhand.
One might argue that Japan and Germany are examples, but those countries already had experience with representative government.
Exactly. Both
Makes the argument too thin IMHO.
And both were utterly destroyed at the end of the war. Little food, little infrastructure left. Their cities were rubble piles, and they had been at war for 7 years (Germany) and over a decade (Japan).
The peoples on their borders were their enemies who had just been under a brutal occupation by their military forces. And both were very homogeneous societies. It was a completely different situation than Iraq in the Spring of 2003.
This was a fundamental error by DOD not to recognize and understand this early in the conflict. The on-the-ground efforts to “stamp out” the insurgency were entirely counterproductive. Nothing will win over the hearts and minds of the local populace like kicking in the doors to their homes at 2am in the morning, roughing up the men in front of their families and then hauling them off to prison. Putting them out of work in the first place and leaving them easy access to tens of thousands of tons of ordnance and explosive materials throughout the country wasn’t exactly productive either.
That’s the money quote, and this is the reason that we cannot (not will not, cannot) “win” militarily. Much like what was witnessed in Lebanon, imo, it will take years of fighting among these factions before any peace accord will be struck. It’s likely that one particular entity establishes dominance for this to happen.
Thanks.
I’ve been wrting about this center of gravity issue for over a decade. And I keep coming back to the same conclusion–if your enemy doesn’t have a center, you can’t defeat it, only contain it.
Well, defeating the resistance militarily would require to cut it from its supply lines and control the whole country. But it requires to seal the borders like the French army did in Algeria by fortifying the borders with Tunisia and Morocco (“la ligne Maurice”) and to send much more troops, which means a draft. And then, militarily defeated, the resistance wins politically…
Yep, and we can’t control that whole country. We couldn’t control South Vietnam with half a million troops.
The French army also had half a million troops in Algeria. And controlling Algerian borders was far easier than Iraq’s ones.
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FORT LEWIS, Wash. – The judge overseeing the court martial of an Army lieutenant who refused to deploy to Iraq declared a mistrial, saying the soldier did not fully understand a document he signed admitting to elements of the charges.
Military judge Lt. Col. John Head announced the decision after 1st Lt. Ehren Watada said he never intended to admit he had a duty to go to Iraq with his fellow soldiers — one element of the crime of missing troop movement. Head set a March 12 date for a new trial and dismissed the jurors.
Last month, Watada signed a 12-page stipulation of fact in which he acknowledged he did not go to Iraq with his unit, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, last June. He also acknowledged making public statements criticizing the Iraq war, which he believes to be illegal.
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."But can they do that on their own? US ground forces can’t do it on their own: they rely on air power. It is hard to be aware of that, because the press never discusses air power systematically.
A good piece about the air war in Iraq was put up today at TomDispatch: America’s Secret Air War in Iraq.
I have mixed thoughts about use of airpower in urban warfare operations. And I’m not sure how much the airpower used involves combat and how much involves logistics.
Whatever the case, we could probably provide whatever airpower is needed for the Baghdad battle (though it gets complicated when you factor in the role of forward air controllers).
The answer to your question about Iraqi’s handling the ground piece on their own is “I don’t know.” But it would be a good thing if they could.
Judging by that TomDispatch piece, air power is used not just for logistics. As for your final point, there is the old question of why Iraqis should be loyal to what amounts to a puppet regime.