I really hate it when people set their (.pdf)’s so that you can’t cut and paste. But that is exactly what the Senate Intelligence Committee has done with their Prewar Intelligence Reports on Post-War Iraq report. It’s frustrating because I’d like to make some points about their conclusions without having to freaking type out huge chunks of their text.
The report details what the intelligence community (IC) told our policy makers about the likely landscape of a post-Saddam Iraq. And, perhaps not to shockingly, the IC got it mostly right.
For example, the IC concluded:
“an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult and probably turbulent process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq’s tradition of authoritarianism.”
“Although the idea of free and democratic elections probably would be a popular concept with the vast majority of the Iraqi population, “the practical implementation of democratic rule would be difficult in a country with no concept of loyal opposition and history of alternation of power.””
…noted that opposition parties [ed note: read Chalabi’s INC and Allawi’s INA] did “not have the popular, political or military capabilities to play a leading role after Saddam’s departure without significant and prolonged external economic, political and military support.”
In January 2003, the Intelligence Community stated that al’Qa’ida “probably would try to exploit any postwar transition in Iraq by replicating the tactics it has used in Afghanistan during the past year to mount hit-and-run operations against US personnel.”
The Intelligence Community assessed that, “If Baghdad were unable to exert control over the Iraqi countryside, al-Qa’ida or other terrorist groups could operate from remote areas.”
“Use of violence by competing factions in Iraq against each other or the United States…probably also would encourage terrorist groups to take advantage of a volatile security environment to launch attacks within Iraq.”
Additionally, rogue ex-regime elements “could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerrilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces.”
The Intelligence Community assessed that al-Qa’ida probably would see an opportunity to “accelerate its operational tempo and increase terrorist attacks during and after a US-Iraq War.” The lines between al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups around the world “could become blurred”…
In January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that “a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so.
The threat of Shia reprisals for their oppression under Saddam was a “major concern to the Sunni elite and could erupt if not prevented by an occupying force.”
Although some Sunni who had extensive contact with Shia in urban life might be open to a representative political system, some reporting indicates that elements of Sunni society would oppose a regime change that did not allow the Sunnis to continue to prevail in the military security services and government.
Kurds could try to take advantage of Saddam’s departure by seizing some of the northern oilfields, a move that would elicit a forceful response from Sunni Arabs.
In January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that a “US-led defeat and occupation of Arab Iraq probably would boost proponents of political Islam” and would result in “calls from Islamists for the people of the region to unite and build up defenses against the West.” Assessments concluded that “funds for terrorist groups probably would increase as a result of Muslim outrage over US action.”
The Intelligence Community also underscored that “in some countries an increase in Islamist sentiment also probably would take the form of greater support for Islamic political parties that seek to come to power through legitimate means.”
The Intelligence Community assessed that “the degree to which Iran would pursue policies that either support or undermine U.S. goals in Iraq would depend on how Tehran viewed specific threats to its interests and the potential US reaction. The Intelligence Community assessed that the “more that Iranian leaders perceived Washington’s aims did not challenge Tehran’s interests or threaten Iran directly, the better the chance that they would cooperate in the post-war period, or at least not actively undermine US goals.”
The Intelligence Community assessed that “guaranteeing Iran a role in the negotiations on the fate of post-Saddam Iraq might persuade some Iranian officials to pursue overt and constructive means to influence reconstruction in Iraq.”
The Intelligence Community cited several reasons that other regional states would not give up WMD, including the need “to survive in a dangerous neighborhood, enhance regional prestige, compensate for conventional military deficiencies, and deter threats from superior adversaries.” The Intelligence Community said, “states also would be driven to acquire WMD capabilities of accelerate programs already in train with the hope of developing deterrent capabilities before the programs could be destroyed preemptively.”
The Intelligence Community noted that “cuts in electricity or looting of distribution networks could have a cascading disastrous impact on hospitals at a time when casualty rates are likely to be high.
