I really hate it when people set their (.pdf)’s so that you can’t cut and paste. But that is exactly what the Senate Intelligence Committee has done with their Prewar Intelligence Reports on Post-War Iraq report. It’s frustrating because I’d like to make some points about their conclusions without having to freaking type out huge chunks of their text.
The report details what the intelligence community (IC) told our policy makers about the likely landscape of a post-Saddam Iraq. And, perhaps not too shockingly, the IC got it mostly right.
For example, the IC concluded that democracy in Iraq was a long-shot:
“an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult and probably turbulent process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq’s tradition of authoritarianism.”
“Although the idea of free and democratic elections probably would be a popular concept with the vast majority of the Iraqi population, “the practical implementation of democratic rule would be difficult in a country with no concept of loyal opposition and history of alternation of power.””
They knew that the exile community would not be able to take control of the government.
…noted that opposition parties [ed note: read Chalabi’s INC and Allawi’s INA] did “not have the popular, political or military capabilities to play a leading role after Saddam’s departure without significant and prolonged external economic, political and military support.”
They knew that al-Qa’ida would go into Iraq and make trouble.
In January 2003, the Intelligence Community stated that al’Qa’ida “probably would try to exploit any postwar transition in Iraq by replicating the tactics it has used in Afghanistan during the past year to mount hit-and-run operations against US personnel.”
The Intelligence Community assessed that, “If Baghdad were unable to exert control over the Iraqi countryside, al-Qa’ida or other terrorist groups could operate from remote areas.”
They predicted that sectarian or tribal disputes would give cover for foreign terrorists, and that former Ba’athists might make common cause with terrorists.
“Use of violence by competing factions in Iraq against each other or the United States…probably also would encourage terrorist groups to take advantage of a volatile security environment to launch attacks within Iraq.”
Additionally, rogue ex-regime elements “could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerrilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces.”
They predicted that terrorism would increase and that it would become hard to isolate al-Qa’ida.
The Intelligence Community assessed that al-Qa’ida probably would see an opportunity to “accelerate its operational tempo and increase terrorist attacks during and after a US-Iraq War.” The lines between al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups around the world “could become blurred”…
They predicted that civil war was a major risk.
In January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that “a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so.
The threat of Shia reprisals for their oppression under Saddam was a “major concern to the Sunni elite and could erupt if not prevented by an occupying force.”
They predicted that the Sunnis would not accept a democratic government.
Although some Sunni who had extensive contact with Shia in urban life might be open to a representative political system, some reporting indicates that elements of Sunni society would oppose a regime change that did not allow the Sunnis to continue to prevail in the military security services and government.
They predicted that the Kurds would go after the oil fields in Kirkuk.
Kurds could try to take advantage of Saddam’s departure by seizing some of the northern oilfields, a move that would elicit a forceful response from Sunni Arabs.
Again, they predicted the war would increase anti-Americanism and radicalism.
In January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that a “US-led defeat and occupation of Arab Iraq probably would boost proponents of political Islam” and would result in “calls from Islamists for the people of the region to unite and build up defenses against the West.” Assessments concluded that “funds for terrorist groups probably would increase as a result of Muslim outrage over US action.”
They predicted electoral success for radical Islamists (see Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Egypt). Also, see Musharraf’s current problems in Pakistan.
The Intelligence Community also underscored that “in some countries an increase in Islamist sentiment also probably would take the form of greater support for Islamic political parties that seek to come to power through legitimate means.”
They predicted that Iran would cause trouble if not constructively engaged, or if threatened.
The Intelligence Community assessed that “the degree to which Iran would pursue policies that either support or undermine U.S. goals in Iraq would depend on how Tehran viewed specific threats to its interests and the potential US reaction. The Intelligence Community assessed that the “more that Iranian leaders perceived Washington’s aims did not challenge Tehran’s interests or threaten Iran directly, the better the chance that they would cooperate in the post-war period, or at least not actively undermine US goals.”
The Intelligence Community assessed that “guaranteeing Iran a role in the negotiations on the fate of post-Saddam Iraq might persuade some Iranian officials to pursue overt and constructive means to influence reconstruction in Iraq.”
They predicted that the invasion would not result in other countries voluntarily disarming, but likely the opposite. We can debate Libya’s decision, but this has largely borne out.
The Intelligence Community cited several reasons that other regional states would not give up WMD, including the need “to survive in a dangerous neighborhood, enhance regional prestige, compensate for conventional military deficiencies, and deter threats from superior adversaries.” The Intelligence Community said, “states also would be driven to acquire WMD capabilities of accelerate programs already in train with the hope of developing deterrent capabilities before the programs could be destroyed preemptively.”
They predicted problems with electricity, water, looting, and health care, e.g.:
The Intelligence Community noted that “cuts in electricity or looting of distribution networks could have a cascading disastrous impact on hospitals at a time when casualty rates are likely to be high.
In a dissenting addendum to this report, Senators Warner, Bond, Burr, and Hatch dismiss the importance of this pre-war intelligence with the following argument:
We had many concerns about this report, some of which we were willing to set aside in the spirit of compromise. One of our concerns, for example, was that we believe this report exaggerates the significance of the Intelligence Community’s prewar assessments about postwar Iraq. Because collected intelligence reporting did not play a significant role in developing these assessments they were based largely on the regional and country expertise of intelligence analysts and outside experts. As a member of the Kerr study groups described it, “it’s speculation based on informed analysis.”…
…The lack of a unique intelligence fact base behind the Intelligence Community’s assessments means that they were no more authoritative than the many other educated opinions that were available in the same time frame.
Let me translate this for you. Sens. Bond, Warner, Burr, and Hatch are saying that any informed person (say, Douglas Feith) was just as qualified to predict what would happen in post-war Iraq as the collective wisdom of our Intelligence Community. And, therefore, no one listened to the Intelligence Community before the war because, after all, what the fuck do they know that a Hudson Institute intern doesn’t know better?
And that might well be a good explanation for what happened, but it is hardly a defense.
Bush didn’t read any of this stuff, obviously, because in January 2003 he still didn’t know the difference between a Sunni and a Shi’ite.
