Progress Pond

In which I invoke Noam Chomsky on behalf of a two-state, end-of-conflict peace settlement

I take it as uncontroversial that, following the Six-Day War of June 1967, Palestinians have suffered greatly from Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Palestinians live under Israel’s often brutal military-colonial rule. And, they face an even bleaker future unless the occupation is brought to an end. I am not aware of any DKos members who disagree. But if you do, this diary is not for you.

Another (I hope) uncontroversial point is that we take seriously being a ‘reality-based’ community. Noam Chomsky makes the point in Advocacy and Realism that “Attention to feasible programs of action is sometimes dismissed as ‘realism’ or ‘pragmatism,’ and is placed in opposition to ‘acting on principle.’ That is a serious delusion. There is nothing ‘principled’ about refusal to pay attention to the real world and the options that exist within it . . . . Those who ignore or deride such ‘realism’ and ‘pragmatism,’ however well-intentioned they may be, are simply choosing to ignore the consequences of their actions.”
What can we say about “the real world and the options that exist within it” in relation to the Palestinians and Israel? We can start by noting the existence of an international consensus in favor of a two-state settlement, blocked for many years by the US and Israel.

UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted after the Six-Day War, expressed an international consensus including

UNSCR 242 does not mention the Palestinians. Nor does it or  UNSCR 338, adopted to end the 1973 war, call for a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Following the 1973 war, however, the international consensus changed to include support for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Chomsky dates this new consensus to January 23, 1976, when the US vetoed proposed Security Council resolution S/11940, which affirmed, among other things,

“That the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable national right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”

“In contrast,” as Chomsky also notes, “there has been no support for a one-state solution from any significant actor throughout this period.” At one time, the Palestine Liberation Organization called for a ‘democratic secular state’ in all of Palestine. But the substance of that call involved, in Chomsky’s words, the “liquidation of all Jewish political, social, and cultural institutions within an ‘Arab nation.'” In Chomsky’s view, it is “virtually unimaginable” that “some meaningful international support would develop for such a plan,” and were it to occur, “Israel would oppose it by any possible means: that includes the ultimate weapons, which Israel has available and can use.”

What stand can a person concerned for the Palestinians take that makes use of the potential, and respects the limits, of the real world? One stand is for a genuine two-state peace settlement in accordance with the international consensus.

In a 2004 interview published in ZNet as Justice for Palestine?, Chomsky argues that, in deciding what compromises should or should not be accepted, “The closest we can come to a formula — and it is pretty meaningless — is that compromises should be accepted if they are the best possible and can lead the way to something better.” In Chomsky’s view, “The Geneva Accord approximates the criterion, and therefore should be accepted[.]” The Geneva Accord, or Initiative,

“gives a detailed program for a 1-1 land swap and other aspects of a settlement, and is about as good as is likely to be achieved — and could be achieved if the US government would back it, which is of course the one issue that we can hope to influence, hence the most important for us.” (map of proposed final borders reproduced below)

In Advocacy and Realism, Chomsky adds that, “For the first time, they open the doors to a 1-1 land swap that could be meaningful, and they break from the cantonization programs of earlier proposals.” (In Justice for Palestine?, Chomsky also mentions approvingly the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Plan. He does not discuss the Clinton Peace Parameters, which I discuss here.)

Even the Geneva Initiative, Chomsky believes, still has “objectionable features, but the operative question is whether they can be taken as a serious basis for negotiations [Chomsky affirms that they can], and whether there is an alternative that is likely to offer more for the Palestinians than proceeding on this basis.” Chomsky says not.

Is a Geneva Initiative-based, two-state peace settlement attainable? For several reasons, with which I agree, Chomsky believes that it is attainable, at least if US policy supports it.

Chomsky denies the existence of a feasible alternative to a two-state peace settlement. “If there is such alternative, let’s by all means hear it. Those who do not want to undertake that responsibility are choosing, in effect, to take part in an academic seminar among disengaged intellectuals on Mars.”

A one-state solution is not feasible because, as Chomsky puts in Justice for Palestine?,

there is virtually no possibility of organizing public opinion in the US, or anywhere else, in favor of a settlement that entails elimination of Israel in favor of a Palestinian state with a Jewish minority — quite a small and scattered minority if refugees return. This is entirely fanciful. And as I mentioned, it would of course be opposed by virtually all Israelis. In this case they would be very likely to resort to their ‘ultimate weapon’ — which they possess — to prevent what they would plausibly regard as their destruction.”

Let’s pause nevertheless to consider the implications of supporting a one-state solution. Here, I touch on a point that Chomsky does not discuss.

Presumably, what people of good will who support a one-state solution have in mind is something along the lines of the former PLO slogan of a democratic secular state throughout all of Palestine, that is, both Israel within the Green Line and the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. I take it that people hope and expect that Palestinians and Israeli Jews will live together peacefully as equal citizens of that one state.

Following Chomsky, we must ask the feasibility question, how is such a goal to be realized? How can we so radically change the course of history? I see only two possibilities: voluntary and involuntary.

Israeli Jewish voluntary agreement to dissolve their state and society is unimaginable as an immediate proposition. One can entertain a longer-term vision, but it passes through the two-state solution. That is, as Chomsky argues in Advocacy and Realism, successful implementation of “a two-state settlement in accord with the international consensus, and reversing the escalating cycle of hostility, hatred, violence, repression, and dispossession,” may open up possibilities for further federal, bi-national, or one-state developments. According to Chomsky, “two states in cis-Jordan [that is, west of the Jordan River,] make little sense, and both communities have good reasons to seek further integration.” But this is not an option Israeli Jews are going to choose voluntarily in the foreseeable future.

So, a supporter of a one-state solution either must begin by making common cause with supporters of a two-state peace settlement, or, must seek somehow to impose a single state on Israeli Jews. Chomsky raises the specter of Israeli resistance, extending to the use of nuclear weapons, but let’s put that objection aside for the moment. Who might be able to impose a one-state solution? The only imaginable candidates are the Arab states, possibly with the assistance of Iran.

So, starting with the pacific desire of Arabs and Jews living together as equal citizens in a single state, one is led to rely on Syria, Egypt, possibly Iraq, possibly Iran, and other Arab states, to, first, defeat Israel and, then, magnanimously create a secular, democratic state in Palestine. In the name of peace, one arrives at a policy that requires war and depends on the victors creating the kind of peaceful, democratic society none of them has succeeded in creating for itself. (See also, Sean Matgamna, Letter to an advocate of the ‘secular democratic state’).

But what about the Palestinian refugees and their claims for justice, the application of (a certain conception of) international law, and the like? According to Chomsky in Advocacy and Realism, “Much the same [as applies to the one-state proposal] holds with regard to the ‘right of return.'” Implementation of a Palestinian ‘right of return,’ at least within the state of Israel, is unimaginable: “Israel would resort to its ultimate weapons to prevent it,” and “Those who have any concern for the fate of the refugees will not dangle before their eyes hopes that will not be realized. And they can hardly claim that to do so is a moral stance.”

On the other hand, according to Chomsky, “Palestinian refugees should certainly not be willing to renounce the right of return.”

How are these two points to be reconciled? While I’m not entirely sure how Chomsky would do so, in my view, the late Israeli strategist Yehoshafat Harkabi, a professor of international relations at Hebrew University and formerly Chief of Military Intelligence, pointed the way in his 1988 book Israel’s Fateful Hour:

“The settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict can only be settled on this principle: One cannot persuade Palestinians that Jaffa, Haifa, and Nazareth are not part of ‘Palestine.’ One cannot persuade Diaspora Jews and Israelis that Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) are not part of Eretz Yisrael. The solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict requires that both Israelis and Palestinians resign themselves to the arrangement that their respective states in which they will be citizens will occupy only part of their homeland, to which they will both bear sentimental allegiance.” (p. xviii).

In this vein, regarding Palestinian refugees and the ‘right of return,’ the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Plan provides:

“4. Right of return: Recognizing the suffering and the plight of the Palestinian refugees, the international community, Israel, and the Palestinian State will initiate and contribute to an international fund to compensate them.

  • Palestinian refugees will return only to the State of Palestine; Jews will return only to the State of Israel.

  • The international community will offer to compensate toward bettering the lot of those refugees willing to remain in their present country of residence, or who wish to immigrate to third-party countries.”

The Geneva Initiative, which is more detailed (being a model peace treaty), devotes an entire Article to the subject. Article 7 has two parts that are of present significance: one declarative, the other substantive.

From Chomsky’s approving references to the Geneva Initiative and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Plan, I surmise that Chomsky accepts the necessity of such a compromise as part of a two-state peace settlement. As he writes in Advocacy and Realism, “Those who have any concern for the fate of the refugees will not dangle before their eyes hopes that will not be realized.”

Reality-based friends of the Palestinians also should be concerned by Chomsky’s contention that calling for a one-state solution serves the interests of Israel and US rejectionists. In Justice for Palestine? Chomsky writes:

“The call for a ‘democratic secular state,’ which is not taken seriously by the Israeli public or internationally, is an explicit demand for the destruction of Israel, offering nothing to Israelis beyond the hope of a degree of freedom in an eventual Palestinian state. The propaganda systems in Israel and the US will joyously welcome the proposal if it gains more than even marginal attention, and will labor to give it great publicity, interpreting it as just another demonstration that there is ‘no partner for peace,’ so that the US-Israel have no choice but to establish ‘security’ by caging barbaric Palestinians into a West Bank dungeon while taking over the valuable lands and resources. The most extreme and violent elements in Israel and the US could hope for no greater gift than this proposal.”

In general terms, I suppose, I am advocating applying to the Israel-Palestine conflict what Max Weber, in Politics as a Vocation called an “ethic of responsibility.” Weber explains:

“[A]ll ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented to an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ or to an ‘ethic of responsibility.’ . . . [T]here is an abysmal contrast between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of ultimate ends–that is, in religious terms, ‘The Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord’–and conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one’s action.”

From this perspective, I sincerely assert, that the only way to be a true friend of the Palestinians is to stand for a true two-state peace settlement. To stand effectively for a two-statement requires, I believe, seeking to broaden coalitions, not narrow them.

As one who believes in the importance of changing our Nation’s course in many political areas, and who sees the Democratic Party as the only available vehicle, I take comfort from the fact that support for two states for two peoples expresses a broad consensus within the Democratic Party.

As people concerned for the terrible condition of the Palestinians and — speaking for myself and I trust many others — also for the longterm well-being of Israel as a democratic, Jewish state, our tasks include

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