I don’t have the right frame of mind, let alone the stamina, today to do a really detailed treatment of Shadi Hamid’s latest piece in Democracy, but everyone should take a read. I’d say I agree with about 90% of what he has to say.
I have two problems. The first is that he utterly fails to tackle the issue of present American policies (or should I say, designs), in the Middle East. This is the Karen Hughes fallacy: that the solution to Middle Eastern problems is somehow controllable through managing perceptions rather than changing policy. Hamid does provide a modicum of lip service here, but it is not enough.
The de-polarization of the region can be achieved by, among other steps, apologizing for the Iraq war, emphasizing the war on terror’s non-military aspects, and recommitting to hands-on diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These measures would create a reservoir of goodwill and give reform-minded Islamists political cover to move to the center and take positions that may be unpopular with their more conservative supporters.
It means little to apologize for the Iraq War if we don’t simultaneously disavow permanent military bases and address other legitimate grievances of the Iraqi people (such as, possibly, the Oil Laws). And it is helpful to be engaged actively in the Israel/Palestine conflict but it won’t do much if we are perceived as taking Israel’s side.
The second problem I have is with this section:
Second, a new policy should entail establishing a U.S.-Islamist “dialogue” to explore areas of tension and misunderstanding. Due to sensitivities with existing regimes, this would require flexibility on the part of the United States, using intermediaries and back channels. Nevertheless, a structured, focused engagement would force Islamists to more clearly explain their positions on contentious issues. As trust develops, there could be a more frank discussion about how moderate Islamists can help us, and vice versa. In the context of the dialogue, policymakers would seek to extract several “concessions” from rising Islamist parties. For example, Islamists in strategically vital countries would have to pledge that they would not suspend or cancel their countries’ peace treaties with Israel should they come to power. In return, the United States would exert pressure on Arab regimes to accept Islamist groups as full, equal participants in the political process (a risky move on America’s part, given that regimes like the Jordanian monarchy and the Mubarak government are unlikely to approve of U.S. rapprochement with Islamist opposition groups).
I can support a covert program to establish relationships with Islamist political leaders (often against the wishes of the parent government). But it is unrealistic to think that popularly elected Islamist governments in, say, Jordan, can make good on a promise to respect peace treaties with Israel. It’s precisely this difficulty that makes it impossible to get any bipartisan support for putting the status quo in Egypt and Jordan at risk.
This is a really strong essay. But it argues for destabilization in the interests of democracy. We just tried that (at least, rhetorically) in Iraq. I have a very hard time seeing the risk/reward ratio that would justify further destabilization in the region at this time.
The Middle East is held together by U.S. hegemony…essentially U.S.-trained praetorian guards and intelligence (internal security) agencies, combined with subsidies, and reciprocal financial arrangements. If we were to lift our hand off the region it would become very unpredictable. Yet, that should be a long-term goal. In the meantime we must work to create the preconditions that would allow us to lift our hand. They include a permanent settlement of the Palestinian question, as much oil independence as possible, less anti-Arab policies and anti-Muslim rhetoric, and, yes, a dialogue with Islamists. As Hamid says:
In any case, Islamists are here to stay. The United States can no longer delude itself into thinking that it can build non-existent liberal-secular parties from scratch and somehow lead them to electoral victory. Arab liberals are in disarray and in no position to seriously contest elections, much less win them. Only Islamists have the mobilizing capacity and grassroots support to pressure Middle Eastern regimes to democratize.
Recognizing this requires an ability to distinguish between Muslims and Islamists, and between Islamists that have renounced violence and those that have not. But, the most important thing remains a self-awareness that our policies have to change. The current system is not sustainable either militarily or financially.
