It will surprise nearly everyone in the U.S. to learn that the single greatest direct cause of Iraqi deaths are the foreign fighters of the United States military and their allies, known as the “coalition”. That is what the authors of both of the Johns Hopkins/Al Mustansiriya mortality studies (aka the “Lancet report”) found. It is also what the reality on the ground in Iraq demonstrates, though that information is not easily available if one is dependent on the U.S. government, their military, and the American mainstream media as sources.
U.S. Greatest Cause of Iraqi Deaths
The first “Lancet” study, published in October, 2004, found that the single greatest source of Iraqi deaths was the United States military, with aerial attacks as the greatest cause of death. The second “Lancet” study, published two years later, found that around one third of the estimated 655,000 “excess” Iraqi deaths were caused directly by the United States military – aka the “coalition” occupation forces – once again making the “coalition” occupation forces the single greatest source of deaths. That was almost certainly a conservative figure since a death was not classified as caused by the “coalition” forces if there was any doubt at all on the part of the reporting household as to who was responsible for the death.
The number of deaths caused directly by “coalition” forces has risen steadily from March, 2003 to the present, as has the overall level of violence, and the overall number of deaths. There is no indication that this trend is going to change in the foreseeable future. In other words, the longer the U.S. stays, the more deaths they are likely to cause, and the worse the overall situation is likely to become.
Deaths caused directly by U.S. and “coalition” forces – about one third of the total “excess” deaths – are only one part of the mortality directly attributable to the actions of the occupation forces. Another large proportion of Iraqi deaths directly attributable to the occupation forces’ actions are those caused by resistance fighters defending against raids and attacks by the U.S. Other deaths take place during resistance strikes against the occupation and its proxies, agents, and collaborators. If the U.S. is the killer, civilian deaths are first denied, then dismissed as “collateral damage” and/or blamed on “insurgents”. If the resistance is responsible for civilian deaths it is labeled terrorism, or “sectarian violence”.
Iraqi deaths directly attributable to U.S. actions almost certainly constitute well over 50% of all deaths. It is reasonable to predict that if the United States withdrew, the death rate would immediately be reduced by at least the percentage of deaths directly attributable to U.S. actions. Even if deaths not directly attributable to U.S. actions were to increase, which is possible, but not certain, the net result would still be an overall reduction in violent deaths, and a significant relief for Iraqis.
U.S. Presence Has Destabilized Iraq
The United States presence in Iraq has from the beginning destabilized the country, and led to increasingly intense and widespread “ancillary” violence and killing – that is, violence that is not directly a result of U.S. actions, but is, nevertheless, a consequence of the U.S. presence, its creation of chaos, and its failure to either establish or maintain order. The U.S. has not only failed to restore stability at any point, it has been the primary source of an escalating downward spiral into greater and greater and more and more widespread instability at every level.
Many of the U.S. policies and practices in Iraq have driven wedges between Iraqis, encouraged and enabled divisive and extremist elements, and helped lead to and exacerbate the current deepening and widening sectarian violence in a region that has never before in its centuries of history experienced serious, widespread, or protracted sectarian civil conflict.
U.S. failure to establish and maintain order have enabled criminal gangs to operate openly and at will, kidnapping, raping, murdering, robbing, and generally terrorizing Iraqis.
The United States has failed to effectively control the portion of the violence and killing that may not be directly attributable to United States’ actions, yet results from its policies and practices, and from the constantly increasing instability caused by its presence, policies, and actions. It is at least arguable that if the United States withdraws, it will remove the single greatest cause of the ongoing instability, which would at least slow the downward spiral.
U.S. Military Responsible for Massive Destruction
The U.S. military is also directly responsible for the overwhelming majority of the destruction in Iraq. This is not surprising, of course, considering its capacity for massive destructive force, not to mention its willingness to use such force as a “solution”, or as punishment. Occupation forces have used collective punishment for all kinds of “offenses”, including failing to provide on demand information about “insurgents” (the assumption is nearly always that the person being questioned is withholding information, not that he doesn’t have it). For that failure Iraqis’ homes have been demolished, and farmers’ trees and field crops have been destroyed, partially or completely. If an entire villages have suffered similar collective punishment for refusal to “cooperate”.
Effects of Increasing U.S. Aerial Attacks
In recent months the United States has dramatically stepped up its use of aerial attacks on populated areas, and is currently rapidly increasing its aerial capability in Iraq. Aerial attacks are extremely indiscriminate and therefore result in high civilian casualties, and heavy destruction. Iraqis can expect to see more civilian deaths and destruction of homes and infrastructure as a result of the occupation forces’ increased use of aerial attacks.
According to an important NGO report released last month by Global Policy Forum, the United States military has flattened or rendered uninhabitable large portions of twelve major Iraqi cities, Falluja, a city about the size of Cincinnati being the best known. This kind of deliberate destruction of homes and infrastructure makes the U.S. military directly responsible for at least one million permanently displaced Iraqis who have no more homes to go back to. These displaced, homeless Iraqis are now more vulnerable than ever to death from all causes, including violence by the United States military, so-called “insurgents”, sectarian death squads, and criminal gangs.
Unlikely That Killing Would Increase if U.S. Withdraws
In order to justify the belief that the violence and killing will increase if the United States withdraws from Iraq, we must assume that in the absence of the U.S. the remaining violent elements would be capable of and have the will to commit more violence than the U.S. military and the resistance combined.
As you think about this bear in mind that the people who are expected to commit more violence than that caused directly by the U.S. military and the resistance combined do not have even a tiny fraction of the death-and-destruction-dealing equipment, technology, and firepower that the U.S. military possesses, and regularly uses, nor do they have the freedom of movement that the U.S. has had in Iraq. They do not have tanks or the weapons carried on tanks, they do not have humvees and apc’s with mounted large-caliber automatic weapons, they do not have missiles, they do not have attack helicopters, they do not have bombers, they do not have any kind of aerial firepower at all. Therefore, the capability simply is not there to replace the amount and magnitude of deadly violence the U.S. is directly responsible for.
In addition, the belief that the violence would increase if the U.S. were not there requires the clearly very questionable assumption that the U.S. is doing anything significant to quell the violence. The evidence points quite clearly in the opposite direction.
On-the-ground observation as well as studies have shown that an increase in violence tends to follow occupation forces’ arrival in an area. Naturally, wherever they are, occupation forces are a target for attacks by resistance and other groups vaguely and inaccurately characterized as “insurgents”. In addition their mere presence inspires fear and resentment among the population. And more often than not, occupation forces bring their own violence with them, which is met, of course, with violence from Iraqis defending their homes, and attempting to repel the occupiers.
The favoured occupier’s practice of trying to “pacify” an area by means of massive violence tends, not surprisingly, to consistently yield the opposite result, if not in the short term, then certainly in the long term. “House to house” actions in which they break down people’s doors and drag them out of bed at 3 AM do not make people feel more peaceful toward those who conduct the searches.
Falluja is a textbook example of how the U.S. occupation forces bring violence with them. That city, known not to be a pro-Saddam area, was quiet and free of the violence, chaos, and looting seen in many other Iraqi cities until the Americans occupied it in late April, 2003 and, through their own actions, turned it into a “hotbed” of resistance.
What Do Iraqis Want?
Polls have consistently shown that Iraqis themselves understand very clearly that the U.S. does far more to cause and provoke violence and death than it does to prevent it, and that the overwhelming majority believe that the violence would lessen, not increase, if the U.S. left.
Add to the above the fact that it really is in the best interest of the overwhelming majority of Iraqis to go back to what they have done successfully for millennia – living together with at least a reasonable degree of normal relations and cooperation.
In the current atmosphere of ethnic (or rather sectarian) cleansing, Sunni and Shi`a families facing sectarian violence and threats of ethnic cleansing in their neighborhoods have devised a system whereby they can help one another by exchanging homes temporarily in order to live, for the time being, in the “right” neighbourhood. This mutually beneficial practice has become common enough that there are now enterprising agents whose business it is to bring families together and coordinate the legal and practical arrangements. This kind of creative cooperation speaks loudly and clearly about the true nature of Iraqi society as well as its ability to repair itself if left to its own devices.
Certainly, Iraq would not suddenly turn into Shangri-la, or become the Switzerland of the Middle East as soon as the Americans left. It IS possible that the violence and killing not directly attributable to U.S. actions might increase somewhat in the beginning, but it is extremely unlikely that it could increase enough to exceed or even replace the violence and death caused by the “coalition” forces and the resistance. The capacity simply is not there, nor very likely is the will. In addition, the primary stimulus for much if not most of the violence would have been removed.
There is simply no chance of any improvement as long as the U.S. is in Iraq. On the contrary, as the past four plus years have shown clearly, as long as the U.S. is there the violence will continue to escalate and broaden, and the overall situation will continue to deteriorate.
Iraqis have been living together without serious conflict for millennia. Sunnis and Shi`as have lived together in Iraq for about 1500 years with no history of serious sectarian civil conflict. Iraqis are the only ones who have the history, the ability, and the will to repair their society and their country.
The United States must give Iraq a chance. It must get out now, and get out completely, and leave Iraq for Iraqis.
We have a deep misunderstanding of the dynamics involved…and a terribly egocentric view of what is going on in the Middle East. To misquote Carly Simon, “We’re so vain…we think this conflict is about us…”
The conflict between Sunni and Shi’a is 1000 years old. Yes, we are currently in Baghdad to prevent the genocide of Sunnis (at the Saudi’s bidding. But any sensible person would insist that without us, the obligation of any real Iraqui goverment would be to protect that minority.
The groups calling themselves “Al Quaeda in Iraq” are foreigners and very small minorities. They are using our presence as a recruiting tool. Their influence will be far, far less if we leave.
The solution? It’s a tenuous one…but an international group of Muslims who support a true local government that commits to protecting minorities is a good start.
There is absolutely nothing that our presence can do to prop up Al Maliki. He’s a failure…a puppet…and an incompetent fool.
“We have a deep misunderstanding of the dynamics involved…“
Indeed, but not the way you seem to think. :o}
“The conflict between Sunni and Shi’a is 1000 years old.“
I realize that it is the current “received truth” in the U.S. that Sunnis and Shi`as have been “slaughtering each other for centuries”, or some similar thing, but that is pure myth (and by the way, not to put too fine a point on it, but the conflict, which was purely political and not theological, began more like 1500 years ago). Iraq has no history of serious, protracted, or widespread sectarian civil violence prior to March, 2003. On the contrary, Iraqi Sunnis and Shi`is (along with all the other diverse groups that have made up Iraqi society) have a very strong and lengthy history of intermixing, cooperating, and intermarrying. As I point out several times in the diary on which you are commenting, Iraqis have always gotten along as well as any diverse society, and better than most, and even now are cooperating in finding ways to survive the current catastrophe.
“Yes, we are currently in Baghdad to prevent the genocide of Sunnis“
Oh, sorry, but the facts on the ground do not support that contention at all.
“But any sensible person would insist that without us, the obligation of any real Iraqui goverment would be to protect that minority.“
Are you referring to the make-believe Iraqi government of which Nouri Al Maliki is currently the make-believe prime minister (at least until George Bush gets fed up with his failure to get the onerous oil law passed and replaces him)? They cannot even take a potty break without approval from the Americans, signed in triplicate, and in any case it is difficult for them to do much because most of them spend most of the time in their real homes in London, Beirut Cairo, etc.
“The groups calling themselves “Al Quaeda in Iraq” are foreigners and very small minorities. They are using our presence as a recruiting tool. Their influence will be far, far less if we leave.“
We agree here. They are knock-offs of Al Qa`eda and have little or no connection with the real thing. They are very unpopular with Iraqis, who have been fighting them from the beginning. Once the Iraqis are freed from the need to fight against the occupying forces, they will make short work of the Al Qa`eda knock-offs.
“The solution?…but an international group of Muslims who support a true local government that commits to protecting minorities is a good start.“
It may sound like a good idea, but it is not. First, this is not about Muslims and non-Muslims, as tempting as it is to see it that way. It would not be helpful to replace one set of foreign occupation forces with another, regardless of the religious affiliation or lack thereof.
“There is absolutely nothing that our presence can do to prop up Al Maliki.“
Why would ANYONE want to prop up Maliki?
“He’s a failure…a puppet…and an incompetent fool.“
I am not a fan of Maliki, or of any element of the Iraqi make-believe government, but to be fair, when an allegedly sovereign government cannot wipe its nose without the approval of an occupying foreign power, what can you realistically expect of them?
By “conflict” I did not mean to imply constant violence over the decades. The conflict is more one of perception and dominance. It can’t be denied that it galls the Saudis to see Shi’a Iran come to dominance in “their back yard.”
And the long “peace” in Iraq? I’d argue it was based on a two-tiered social and economic system, that was enforced by the government. The gardens and parks in Sunni Baghdad were not equally accessible.
It was not my intention to stereotype a neighborhood support force by religion; after all, bringing in Muslims from Indonesia is not a solution. Perhaps a poor choice of words. But our continual failing is going into the Middle East as if we owned it. There is authentic interest in peace on the part of Jordan, Syria, Iran and even the Saudis…not because they agree, but because chaos in their backyards helps no one.
But I totally agree with your perception of the current government, and I think we agree that American efforts to impose our model of government are beyond hopeless.
“The conflict is more one of perception and dominance.“
I am not sure exactly what you mean, or how that applies to Iraq, which never experienced significant sectarian civil conflict prior to March, 2003. (And let us not conflate government repression of opposition groups with sectarian conflict.)
“It can’t be denied that it galls the Saudis to see Shi’a Iran come to dominance in “their back yard.” “
No doubt it does gall the Saudis (who are an embarrassment to most decent Arabs and Muslims), but I thought we were talking about historic relations between Sunnis and Shi`as in Iraq, and the current internecine violence in Iraq.
“And the long “peace” in Iraq?“
“Long peace” is not how I would characterize fourteen centuries of co-existence, interaction, cooperation, and intermixing of families by marriage.
Perhaps you know the following, but others probably do not:
– Most of the large Iraqi Arab tribes, and some of the small ones, are mixed Sunni and Shi`a.
-Kurds, who are predominantly Sunni, also include some Shi`as, and Turkmens, who are mostly Shi`a, also include some Sunnis.
– The intermarriage rate in Iraq has been estimated to be as high as 30%. (This is one of many reasons that partitioning Iraq would be a disaster.) Very few Iraqi families, particularly urban families, are purely one thing or another.
In other words, it’s all pretty mixed up in Iraq, and historically almost no one has ever really cared about either sect or ethnicity in deciding whom to associate with or trust (nor did Saddam, as a matter of fact). In fact, until recently you never asked anyone whether they were Sunni, or Shi`a, or Kurd, or Assyrian, or whatever – almost no one cared about those things.
“I’d argue it was based on a two-tiered social and economic system, that was enforced by the government.“
Enforced by which government? What did this two-tiered system actually look like? How was it structured? How was it enforced?
“The gardens and parks in Sunni Baghdad were not equally accessible.“
I do not understand anything in this statement.What is “Sunni Baghdad”? What gardens and parks are you referring to, and how were they made not “equally accessible”? Who was kept out, and by whom? How did they identify those who were kept out, and what means did did they use to keep them out?
There is a big hunk of Iraqi history that would be required to respond to your questions. The poverty and repression in which the Shi’a lived is missing from the diary and the questions. Whether infant malnutrition and death are violence is a matter of semantics. I can’t document the repression here, but will follow up with a later diary.
Michaela,
You do not need to educate me in Iraqi history. I am not only very well versed in it, I was there and experienced much of it. You can give me very simple answers to my questions, believe me.
I am particularly interested in understanding this statement:
“The gardens and parks in Sunni Baghdad were not equally accessible.“
I would appreciate your answering my questions, which will help me to understand what specifically you are referring to. They are intended as very simple, practical questions, so you can give simple, practical answers.
Specifically which gardens and parks are you referring to?
By what means were they made not “equally accessible”?
Who was kept out?
How specifically were those who were to be kept out identified?
Who kept them out?
By what means were they kept out?
I am referring to a series of reports and one very widely-viewed documentary pre-Iraq war, about the very congenial Sunni-only amenities in Baghdad. I certainly defer to your experience if you lived there, but there is so much documentation of economic prejudice in the society, and so much documentation that the kinfolk of Saddam had very significant economic advantage…
As I mentioned, I’m vacationing now and have only periodic access to the net. More later, if you’ll follow.
Thanks for replying, Michaela. I appreciate your taking the time during your travels.
I do not know to which reports and documentary you are referring, by whom they are produced, or what the specific contents/claims were, so I clearly cannot discuss them, which is too bad. I DO know that since the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and especially since September 11, 2001, quite a few reports, documentaries, etc. have been produced by various groups, including those affiliated with the U.S. government, for purely propaganda purposes. Some of those propaganda pieces start with a grain or two of reality and then run wildly with it into some very strange territory. Others have virtually no basis in fact or reality.
As for the “Sunni-only” amenities, unless these were private clubs with invitation-only membership – in which case, where is the problem? – it is difficult to see how they could exist. There is no even remotely reliable way to tell a Shi`a from a Sunni. Iraqi ID cards (unlike those for citizens of “democratic” Israel) have never included information about religious or ethnic identity, so those would be useless for determining whom to excluse. There is also no way to tell by looking at someone, or talking to them whether they are Sunni or Shi`a. Thus my questions as to the means of differentiating a Shi`a from a Sunni, and the means of exclusion.
This is not a simple question at all, things have varied a lot over both time and place, and it does require some discussion to see the overall picture. I WOULD be interested in the information you have, as well as its sources, so it would be interesting to continue this when you have more time and availability.
First quick reply:
The easiest way–and the way currently used by many death squads–is by the first names of males in the family. Many carry dual ID cards with alternate first names for that purpose.
Hurria: “There is no even remotely reliable way to tell a Shi`a from a Sunni.“
Michaela: “The easiest way–and the way currently used by many death squads–is by the first names of males in the family.“
As I said, there is no even remotely reliable way. There is only a tiny handful of names that identify a person even as more likely to be Sunni or Shi`a, and an even tinier handful that are considered definitive. The Muslim names most commonly used – Mohammand, Ahmad, Mahmoud, Hussein, `Ali, Hasan, etc. – are equally likely to be one as the other.
“Many carry dual ID cards with alternate first names for that purpose.“
Not THAT many, because not that many have names that identify them as to sect.
So, that brings us back to your statement that in “Sunni Baghdad” (I still would like an explanation of what that means) amenities were not equally accessible. How were those to be excluded from these amenities identified, and by what methods and means were they actually excluded from “gardens and parks” or other amenities?
“The poverty and repression in which the Shi’a lived is missing from the diary and the questions.“
There are several very good reasons for that, one of which is that it was not relevant to the point of the diary.
“Whether infant malnutrition and death are violence is a matter of semantics.“
Pardon me, but this seems to me a non sequitur. Can you explain the connection to either the diary or the discussion? I am sure it exists in your thinking, but I am not seeing it right now, and it is difficult to address it one way or the other until I can see the connection..
While I’m still away from my normal, 24/7 broadband, I’ll offer a few relatively serious analyses (links) to continue this important discussion. Because unless Americans understand the challenges in Iraq, they will never understand the eventual solutions. (Yes, I’m an optimist–although not at all with this administration.)The simple fact that most attacks against U.S. troops are by Sunni groups (including foreigners–mostly Saudi), yet the administration is beating war drums against Shi’a Iran is simply nonsense.
And further:
A scholarly analysis of the economic segregation:
That same source indicates that while there were certainly powerful Shi’a in the Bathist government, overall the economic status of the Shi’a was very fragile.
And in Baghdad, the poorest of the poor were invariably Shi’a:
American missteps have made the divide far worse than it was before.
Finally, I’m particularly impressed by Soumaya Ghannushi, who clarifies that this is not, deep down, a religious conflict but an economic one, exacerbated by U.S. ignorance and errors:
She’s worth reading.
Before I take the necessary time to consider and reply to the main substance of this – and thanks for all the references – I want to take a bit of a side trip, prompted by this:
“unless Americans understand the challenges in Iraq, they will never understand the eventual solutions.“
One of the things Americans really need to understand is that the solution(s) for Iraq are not up to them either to conceive of, to decide on, or to execute. The only positive actions the United States can possibly take in Iraq are to 1) make a rapid and complete departure, and the sooner the better (and by complete I mean complete, not just combat troops, not just troops, but every scintilla of offician presence, 2) refrain (or be restrained by a third party) from attempting to have any influence whatsoever in anything that goes on in Iraq, 3) pay reparations to be ordered, and administered by a third party who does not have a dependent or friendly relationship with the United States.
The bottom line is that the United States is no more qualified and has no more right to participate in Iraq’s future than a serial child abuser is qualified or has a right to participate in the futures of his victims.
.
(Oxfam) July 30 – The violence in Iraq is overshadowing a humanitarian crisis, with eight million Iraqis – nearly one in three – in need of emergency aid, says a report released today by international agency Oxfam and NCCI, a network of aid organizations working in Iraq.
The agencies’ report “Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq” says although the appalling security situation is the biggest problem facing most ordinary Iraqis, the government of Iraq and other influential governments should do more to meet basic needs for water, sanitation, food and shelter.
According to the report:
Jeremy Hobbs, director of Oxfam International, said: “The terrible violence in Iraq has masked the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Malnutrition amongst children has dramatically increased and basic services, ruined by years of war and sanctions, cannot meet the needs of the Iraqi people. Millions of Iraqis have been forced to flee the violence, either to another part of Iraq or abroad. Many of those are living in dire poverty.
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."
Thanks, Oui, for the very important comment from Oxfam.
What more can I say about it that hasn’t already been said?
Why do they hate you? Why will they hate you for a very, very long time? And this, friends, is not only the work of G.W. Bush and his insane regime, it is only the culmination of what has been going on for more than a decade under the GHW Bush and Clinton regimes. In a very real way Clinton spent his eight years in office preparing the way for George W. Bush to turn Iraq, a once emerging first world country, into the greatest humanitarian disaster the world has seen in decades.
We agree entirely on your “solutions.” We may be coming from different backgrounds, with different perceptions of how this mess evolved. My contacts (in addition to voracious reading of whatever seems scholarly) are Iraqi-Americans in the Detroit area, and I’m sure their perceptions are skewed, as are those of many others.
But I could not agree more that we don’t belong there, we don’t belong making decisions for another culture, and we need to apologize, exit swiftly and gracefully, and provide local authorities with what financial help we can to repair the damage. (Not that we could ever do that, but it wouldn’t hurt.)
In a practical way, to do that we must build an American energy plan that is based on our ingenuity, not our need for power and dominance. That might look somewhat like Brazil’s. But the urge to take what we want rather than build it ourselves must be completely eliminated from our national consciousness.
So while there are many pieces to “how we got there” and how the situation evolved, we both have the same goal.
(It’s helpful to remind Americans that the main reason bin Laden attacked us is that we were trying to interfere in his culture, his homeland, his religion, and what he perceived as his realm of influence–not that he was jealous of us!)