If you do a basic study of Shi’a Islam (as opposed to actually studying to be a religious leader of the religion), you’ll quickly come to terms with the basic beliefs and the history, including the traditional quietism of the faith in all political matters. Shi’a Islam has almost always been on the defensive and rarely has enjoyed sustained periods of security from political leaders. There is a strong sense in the religion that politics is a worldly affair that is beneath the dignity of a religious scholar. Iran is probably the only place on earth where the Shi’a have felt secure enough from Sunni domination to contemplate exerting a form of political Islam. So, it’s no real surprise that Iran is where the experimentation occurred.
When Ayatollah Khomeini introduced the innovation of velayet-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists), it broke centuries of precedent. And most Grand Ayatollahs have never accepted the principle of velayet-e faqih as valid. In Iraq, for example, Grand Ayatollah Sistani did not embrace the principle. He did not ask that Islamic jurists be put in control of the Iraqi government. But Iraq is different from Iran because, even though the Shi’a make up a plurality (maybe even a majority) of the population, they have not enjoyed political representation there for centuries.
What makes Iran’s internal politics so difficult to understand is this unique and unprecedented experiment in political Shi’a Islam. For example, take Neil MacFarquhar’s assertion in today’s New York Times:
One of the country’s most influential clerics, Mr. Rafsanjani has been notably silent since Mr. Ahmadinejad was declared the winner last week, and there has been speculation that Mr. Rafsanjani is in Qum trying to muster clerical opposition to the country’s leaders. But those reports are difficult to confirm with any authority.
Now, Mr. Rafsanjani is a cleric, but he doesn’t have many credentials as a religious authority. Ordinarily, he wouldn’t, and couldn’t, be one of Iran’s most influential clerics without being seen as expert in religious matters. But the system of political Islam in Iran has changed things. Mr. Rafsanjani is one of the richest people in the world, and he’s been a political figure in Iran for thirty years. Because of this, he really is one of the most influential people in Iran, although his religious education has little to do with that.
In Iraq, a low level cleric like Rasfanjani would be much less influential, despite his wealth. It’s precisely the politicalization of Islam within Iran over the last thirty years that makes it so hard to predict what will happen now. The Grand Ayatollahs in Qom never really believed in velayet-e faqih, but they also didn’t exactly oppose its implementation. If they come out against the Supreme Leader, as some of them have already started to do, they will be reasserting their position as the ultimate authorities in religious matters, but they will be undermining the principle of velayet-e faqih.
The degree to which the theocracy in Iran is in true jeopardy is hard to assess. The reason? It’s hard to know how much thirty years of theocracy has changed the basic tenets of Shi’a Islam in Iran. If they return to their roots, the Grand Ayatollahs in Qom will scrap the theocracy and emulate the role of Sistani in Iraq.
“But Iraq is different from Iran because, even though the Shi’a make up a plurality (maybe even a majority) of the population, they have not enjoyed political representation there for centuries.“
Iraq is not a good example because Iraq has not had a sectarian-based political system until recently, so sectarian-based political representation made no sense. Between 1958 and 2003 Iraqi politics has been based on ideology, not ethno-sectarianism, and Shi`as, Christians, and “others” who shared the ideology of the ruling party have held very powerful positions. The Ba`th party, in fact, provided more opportunities to Shi`as than any previous parties had. Saddam’s regime had a very high proportion of Shi`as in powerful positions.
you are doing somewhat the same thing I am doing. You are talking about the way things were traditionally in Iraq before the invasion changed everything. I am talking about the way things were in Iran before the Revolution changed everything.
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As a prelude, Mousavi has already bypassed the Supreme Leader, sending an open letter to the powerful mullahcracy in Qom asking them to invalidate the election. Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, head of the election vote-monitoring committee, has officially requested that the Council of Guardians void the election and schedule a new, fully monitored one.
One of the stalwarts of Qom power, the moderate Grand Ayatollah Sanei, who had issued a fatwa against vote rigging, calling it a “mortal sin”, has already declared the Ahmadinejad presidency “illegitimate”. His house and office are now under police siege. Iranians eagerly expect a public pronouncement from Grand Ayatollah Muntazeri, the country’s true top religious figure (not Khamenei) and a certified anti-ultra-right wing.
Even more strikingly, a group of Ministry of Interior employees sent an open letter to the chairman of the Council of Experts (Rafsanjani), the president of the parliament (Majlis), former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, the heads of the legislative and the judiciary, and many other government agencies. The crucial paragraph reads: “As dedicated employees of the Ministry of Interior, with experience in management and supervision of several elections such as the elections of Khamenei, Rafsanjani and Khatami, we announce that we fear the 10th presidential elections were not healthy.”
The Islamic Combatant Clergy Association (ICCA), close to Khatami and supportive of Mousavi, said on its website that the counting process was “widely engineered [manipulated]”, and there was enough evidence to prove it. So for the ICCA, the election should be nullified.
Mohsen Rezai, who ran as a conservative and who is nothing less than a former head of the IRGC, also sent a letter to the Council of Guardians saying the election was illegitimate.
Understanding Iran: People, Politics and Power (pdf)
The Supreme Leader of the Revolution is the ‘ruling jurist’, or vali-e faqih , of the Islamic Republic, and his office is by far the most powerful institution in Iran. It was established by the pro-Khomeini Shiite clerics, who dominated the Assembly of Experts at the time of the revolution, and who drafted the new constitution, which was endorsed by a popular referendum in November 1979.
However, while the Supreme Leader still wields extraordinary power as a virtual dictator, the present incumbent of 17 years, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei does not have the same authority as his predecessor Khomeini. Nobody could challenge Khomeini’s leadership between 1979 and 1989. Khamenei, on the other hand, lacks personal clout and does not have the religious credentials to neutralise the rival camps among the mullahs. As a result, he has to work much more actively to maintain a conservative coalition that supports his overarching role in Iranian society.
"But I will not let myself be reduced to silence."Maybe it is because I am dense, but what is it gonna take to settle this mess? I simply have difficulty understanding this whole thing..:o)
you aren’t dense. No one knows what will happen.
The beginning point is to at least understand the characters in the play and the power structures.
as booman says, you’re not dense. iranian politics is incredibly opaque. a lot of stuff is happening, but it’s hard to figure out exactly what that is. understanding the players is good, but even then there’s really no telling how this will end.
I still can’t understand how it was ever possible for the Supreme Court to declare Bush president. What went on behind the scenes then may not ever become public knowledge. And all this happened amongst my own people in a language I understand. Or at least I thought so.
The optimistic resolution is that Iranian theocracy evolves into a more democratics constitutional theocracy, much like many monarchies have become democratic constitutional monarchies. Restoring the clerics to a cultural unifying role instead of a political role.
That, however, is not the most likely resolution.
Very well done, BooMan, and, Oui, thanks for your continuing excellence in providing relevant material on the expanding Iranian situation. (Pepe Escober is marvelous.) Gosh, I love this site and deeply appreciate the many denizens of the pond. Their contributions are much appreciated.
while i basically agree with you, you may have overstated it a bit when you present khomeini as a radical break from shia tradition. there were precursers to khomeiniism. the one i am most familiar with is mohammad baqir al-sadr (father-in-law of muqtada) wrote treatises about the ideal shia-based state back in the 1960s. he was executed by saddam in 1980.
the islamic revolution in iran may have been the first time that shia-based political islam was put into practice, but the idea had been in the air for a few decades.
Excellent post, Mr. Boo.
Just for information Rafsanjani is not a low level cleric he is an Ayatollah and the chairman of the assembly of experts: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafsanjani
Just before Ali Khamenei was elected Supreme leader of Islam, he was not an Marja and not even an Ayatollah. He had the rank of Hojjat Al-Islam and was elevated to the rank of Ayatollah. A very much disputed desition amongst some high ranking Ayatollahs: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Khamenei