Max Fisher’s nine questions about Syria you were afraid to ask is well worth reading if you don’t feel like you’ve got a firm grip on what’s been going on there. I had only minor quibbles, but overall I think he explained the conflict very concisely and also made some prognostications that are, sadly, going to be accurate.
I suppose we could try to fill in any blanks. Do you know anything about Syria that you’d like to share? Have any questions? We can figure it out.
About six months after the repression of the Arab-Spring-inspired protests in Syria began, defection started in the Syrian army and the defectors constituted themselves as the Free Syrian Army. As the revolution in Libya came to a close, Libyan rebels began supporting the Free Syrian Army and shipping weapons from Libya to them. Some sources claim this was a CIA operation from the station in Benghazi; others claim that it was sponsored by Qatar; others that it was strictly Libyan-Syrian solidarity in overthrowing a dictator. It could very well be all three. So that would be Fall 2011. By December 2011, the Free Syrian Army was attempting to form a political national council.
By the summer of 2012, foreign al-Nusra fighters began appearing in Syria with rumors of support from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or at least some prominent Saudis. There were increasing reports of the US CIA involvement in what was becoming a substantial civil war. And there were reprorts of arms shipments to the rebels from the CIA, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. By December 2012, the US government became worried about the presence of al-Quaeda-related forces among the rebels and had held two conferences with rebel-related groups in an attempt to isolate them.
That is among the instances of outside interference that Max Fisher completely ignores. Turkey, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan–they all have had a hand in making a complicated situation more complicated and deadly.
For an article that tries to address many of the simpler questions, I thought that was quite good. Since it starts at “What is Syria?” and I kinda knew that already I didn’t expect a lot. Still by the end it provoked a couple of thoughts.
Thanks Booman.
I don’t understand why securing Syria is so goddam important that we’re willing to make a Cruz administration a real possibility.
I simply cannot believe what I am seeing.
Hell, I wish we were securing Syria, but that’s not possible.
Who’s talking about “securing Syria”?
I was in a hurry for a verb and couldn’t think of one that explains whatever it is they think they’ll accomplish by doing whatever it is they think they’re going to do.
So I’m guessing you were unmoved by Secretary Kerry’s presentation or President Obama’s statement from earlier today?
Haven’t seen Kerry’s presentation because I am dealing with family issues today. I did just read the declassified intelligence assessment. While underwhelming, it’s better. Why on Earth didn’t the British Parliament wait until the public had seen it?
I don’t understand British politics enough to say. I have a hard enough time with our own.
Laurie Penny in the New Statesman says that it is because the vote was not about Syria. See the link I posted in the previous thread.
If it is any help here is a link to the intelligence assessment made available to British MPs before the vote.
The statements are in fact parallel documents to their respective legislatures. The UK version says that the MPs have had access to the intelligence underlying the summary. It is not clear how widely Congress has seen the the US intelligence that backs up the summary’s claims.
Yeah, I agree. I found the British document a bit thin, frankly. The US one is considerably better in scope without speaking to its credibility or accuracy.
So I read both the linked article and the declassified intel, and of course I find it highly suspect. Since they basically say over and over and over again “we have information” and “we think” because they can’t give us any hard information on their sources.
BUT.
Even assuming their assumptions are both honest and correct, that still doesn’t explain why we need to be involved.
Iraq 2.0?
I feel a lot more comfortable with those, like yourself, who simple argue we should not get involved than those who need a conspiracy theory smokescreen for what is basically a civic question of pragmatism and morality.
“A civic question of pragmatism and morality”: Precisely.
Jim Wright has taken a long hard look at those issues:
http://www.stonekettle.com/2013/08/red-lines.html
Though I disagree with what seems to be his conclusion. I look at these things through the prism of history, such as it is.
It seems to me that in thousands of years of human history our species has apparently managed to erect credible social taboos against three things; human sacrifice, slavery and the use of human pesticides on each other. As a matter of pragmatic self-interest I am worried about the consequences of letting one of those prohibitions slip.
“I am worried about the consequences of letting one of those prohibitions slip.”
Do you have any decent links on this theme? There is a thought rising in a few places that “death is death no matter what the method is”. Markos appears to be of that opinion although I don’t see where he took on any of the strongest arguments for chemical weapons control in the Syria context.
All the many decades of international collaboration that went into getting nearly universal support for controls of chemical weapons has to be worth SOME effort to sustain.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:CWC_Participation.svg
I also think some people aren’t seeing that the rationale is also about containment and security of chemical stockpiles so that non-state militants don’t get license or access to use them.
http://www.courierpress.com/news/2013/aug/25/risk-of-al-qaida-with-chemical-weapons-forcing/
Anyway, thanks for sharing your thoughts and links. Like you I’ve found the MSF statements have been exceptionally important to the discussion.
I understand the “dead is dead” mantra but I’m not in the mood to argue with it. It misses the point. I agree with you completely that the point is “containment and security of chemical stockpiles so that non-state militants don’t get license or access to use them.” And more than that.
I lived through the hydrogen bomb air raid drills in primary school; I don’t wish that kind of daily insecurity on anyone. People forget what it was like.
It’s not just non-state actors. Every two-bit, tinpot tyrant will be back to cooking up a chemical weapons program if it appears to provide geopolitical clout or deterrence. That was always the point about the chemical weapons prohibitions after the Second World War; that it is an issue of proliferation.
It is bad enough trying to enforce the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty without having the chemical weapons ban get away from us. I don’t think people realise what a complex messy world it would be if another dozen or so petty dictators were in a position to play blind-man’s bluff with weapons of mass destruction; those G-series nerve agents are a poor man’s neutron bomb.
I’m fairly annoyed with the progressive left on this point; we really need to continue manning the barricades in favour of non-proliferation as generations have done before us. A shoulder shrug at this point will have regrettable consequences.
I would be happy to discuss the non-state actor risks further in another comment.
Good points all. I was using the non-state militants as just one example.
I also notice often when people talk about the turbulence of the 60s, many continue to leave out that undertone of anxiety we had every day about being vaporized by nuclear weapons.
Every 40 years or so it seems American society must relearn lessons it should have remembered better from previous generations.
I find it difficult to believe that we are still assuming we don’t know much “about the nature of the chemical that was used, as well as the delivery system.”
The video evidence is abundant and the bulk of it was publicly available within twenty-four hours, the initial reaction by some that these videos were fakes is easily discounted by the sheer volume and scope of the coverage.
On the 24 August, three days after the attack, the MSF report was issued on the medical affects of the agent used. I have not seen even an attempt at a rebuttal to this credible, balanced, professional report from an impartial and trusted source which strongly indicated “mass exposure to a neurotoxic agent.”
This eliminates most chemical agents with the exception of the G-series nerve agents tabun (GA), sarin (GB), soman (GD), and cyclosarin (GF) or VX. Of these reportedly manufactures Sarin, Tabun, and VX. That the sites were not toxic within a short period of time after the attacks eliminates VX as it is a persistent agent.
As for the delivery system, we also had credible images of the warheads from multiple sites by 24 August at the latest. There are at least two sites which have since been doing amateur analysis of these warheads ever since with a credible degree of transparency, honesty and skill. It appears very likely that these are relatively low-technology rockets mass produced locally by a military-industrial state; probably Iran or Syria. There are even photos and videos of these rockets being launched from truck-mounted tubes very similar to the Falaq-2 used by Iran to fire a different type of rocket.
Argue that the rebels captured and used these weapons if you must but let’s not pretend we don’t know enough about the circumstances to apply our critical thinking to the issues before us.
Neurotoxic agent can also apply to some Schedule 3 compounds. Some insecticide precursors for example.
Iranian Artillery Rockets
Hizballah Rockets
Washington Institute: Syria’s Rebels Gain Heavy Weapons (FWIW)
Haven’t found info on Syrian artillery rocket types. Some of the videos showed artillery shell-sized CW delivery devices. Problem with the videos is provenance-place/date/time and chain of custody to the web. (i.e. no videoediting to change info)
Regarding the, “Problem with the videos is provenance-place/date/time and chain of custody to the web,” sure, that’s an issue. But under the circumstances we can’t really expect the archivists to be among the first responders; if it weren’t for some dedicated activists we probably wouldn’t have any videos at all. And if you clicked through you would see that there are scores and scores of videos which appeared overnight so if someone was faking them they’ve made a Cecil B deMille scale effort. Subsequent analysis has seemed to authenticate them, at least as far as locality and medical evidence is concerned. And there is the MSF report, also linked to above.
It also is now being reported that some of those who made the videos you are disclaiming paid with their lives to do so. I wasn’t aware that anyone was still doubting the integrity of the videos and hinting they were part of a broader conspiracy but as Booman has been at great pains to point out, anything is possible in the ‘smoke and mirrors’ of the dark underworld of intelligence.
I have liked to some of the Syrian rocket artillery information in the comment above. As for the videos of the suspected warheads, the sheer number of them which just happened to appear coincident with the time and place of the neurotoxin attacks suggests something, don’t you think? Not quite sure what you are saying, frankly, but it seemed you might be suggesting the discovery of these warheads overnight at the attacked locations was more fakery or a coincidence.
I totally agree with your comment about the agents, however, and apologise for the omission. I appreciate the work you have done in these threads to document the treaties regarding chemical weapons and their classification; I have found it valuable. You may be interested to know that some household insecticides can register as false positives when field identification is performed on chemical weapons residues. Something worth bearing in mind when assessing all of these claims.
If they are YouTubed, there is at least one date/time stamp, the datetime of upload. Warheads can be convention or chemical on the same delivery vehicle. Most scenarios proposed for Syrian responsibility are that the chemical rounds were launched in the midst of a general artillery attack. You would have to find residues associate with particular warheads to determine the vehicle, which I imagine is what the UN team was doing and why it is helpful to wait for their report before judgement of the chemical agent or delivery vehicle.
And those household insecticides can create significant symptoms, regardless of how they test as “chemical weapons”. Bhopal was precursors of insecticides, but you get the point.
Part of trying to get as much provenance and custody information as possible is in showing the evidence to the world.
There was sufficient evidence presented to the Russians and Chinese of Gadhafi’s actions that they stood aside for a UN resolution. But Russia has to posture to defend their allies like Gadhafi and the Baath Party in Syria. For the sake of other allies not abandoning them. Which is why I’m not buying the stories that have been coming through their media outlets.
But the US dismissal of the possibility of rebel attacks is too unsupported to be credible either. There is something more going on there that the public needs to be aware of.
Are you saying the videos don’t have time stamps? Not sure what you are getting at there. Are you still disputing the videos of victims of the attacks?
As for the rockets, are you are dismissing the evidence of these warheads out-of-hand? Are we still disputing that the attack even occurred or have we crossed that bar? In the event we accept the attack occurred those warheads are probably a good place to focus our inquiry.
If you clicked through to the links above you would see that these warheads have been associated with previous conventional and chemical attacks and that we even have a bit of information on the variations in their construction and filling where conventional HE payloads are suspected versus chemical payloads, right down to the colour and type of stencilling on the rocket motor body. I would say it isn’t rocket science but I guess in this case it is…
I accept you really don’t seem to want to go into the details unless an authoritative agency like the UN has made their report, which is fair enough. But given they aren’t going to assess culpability or delivery I think we will still need to put on our thinking caps.
As far as chain of custody is concerned it seems to me that all the sites are hopelessly compromised already, wouldn’t you agree? I’m not even arguing that this evidence necessarily proves anything, just that it is evidence, even if circumstantial. If you just don’t care whether Assad or the rebels or the CIA did this and believe we shouldn’t attack under any circumstances just say so and spare us both a lot of further effort.
I’m saying that the upload time to YouTube creates a default timestamp. The videos of the victims of the attack prove that they were exposed to something that caused the symptoms that they manifest in the video and that a substantial number of people were exposed. They also show multiple locations. That’s all they show in and of themselves. Medical personnel have to evaluate the symptoms (and just from a video that is difficult).
Yes, the facts that all of the sites are hopelessly compromised already is a huge obstacle to making any sort of determination of culpability.
Even if Assad did do this, that doesn’t mean that a retaliatory attack is the wisest response. “That’ll larn ya darn ya” military actions have poor records of success, most only temporary.
Culpability does not constrain the type of response required. Culpability is a separate issue entirely.
And it does not require the US either lead or participate in the response. The US government is presumptively assuming that role. That is not necessarily a guarantee of success in enforcing the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is the stated US interest.
As one who argued that the imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya was reasonable but the initial US bigfooting PR was stupid, I am not saying we shouldn’t attack under any circumstances.
I just not seeing any circumstances in which attacking anything in Syria makes actual sense.
In the greater scheme of things, my sense is that it would be better to duck this one, negotiate normalization with Iraq, cool our jets about Snowden with Russia, negotiate another round of nuclear arms reductions with Russia, call off the Saudi and Qatari support of the rebels, let Syrians sort out their own government, and come back and with Russian and Iranian help (and Israeli ratification and implementation of the CWC) bring pressure on that future Syria to sign and ratify and implement the CWC. That’s a bit of diplomatic heavy-lifting, but its about time the folks in Foggy Bottom did more work than the folks in Hells Bottom.
Well said. I think we actually agree about most of this. I am adamant that the perpetrators of this violation be pursued and prosecuted but it doesn’t matter when as long as the violation is not repeated in the meantime which it seems would change the calculus of a response in any case. I just don’t believe that a Russian or Chinese veto in the Security Council which protects Assad is acceptable.
I wish I knew who leaked the Bandar/Putin story, however. That would explain a lot.
There seems a reasonable assumption that Russia and Iran have closed ranks with Syria, and superficially that seems true, yet it may be worth considering a bit of discomfort with Syria’s action, Assad’s reasoning and what the future holds.
Assuming the mandate of Iran’s new president embraced reducing their crippling sanctions he may be finding himself in a difficult position:
Sounds like an opportunity for some ‘wedge’ diplomacy might emerge if we played our cards right. As for Russia, beyond the bluster, one wonders at the accuracy of this, with the usual caveats for Debka disinformation:
Perhaps another opportunity? It would explain, in part, the delay in acting.
Neither Iran or Russia is on very sturdy ground backing a tyrannical state in conflict with its own citizens and the similarities between Assad’s apparent indifference to his people and their own, especially Russia’s with ethnic minorities within and adjacent to her borders, casts a dark shadow over the leadership of both nations.
This kind of thing might prove useful:
I think that kind of diplomacy offensive would be Assad’s worst nightmare and with a bit of luck could seriously restrict his freedom of action in a meaningful way.
I would say that your observation that Russia and Iran have closed ranks with Syria is correct. Russia has dispatched two ships to the Mediterranean (in addition to whatever is based in Syria).
Iran has made statements threatening Israel in the event of a US attack.
The first is gunboat diplomacy. The second is chestbeating.
I said that superficially that seems true; and then posted citations, of varying reliability, which subtly challenged that view. But suit yourself.
Both gunboat diplomacy and chestbeating are diplomatic moves. If Kerry can pull off Geneva-2, that would be the biggest diplomatic success since the Dayton accords.
At least there are backchannel discussions at the foreign ministry level with Russia. That speaks of some cordiality and reduces the military show on both sides.