In assessing the administration’s case against the Assad regime, I am of two minds. The first is based on my own personal assessment of the motives and integrity of key administration figures, and the second is based on my assessment of how the world at large assesses their motives and integrity.
I’m satisfied that John Kerry and President Obama believe that they have sufficient proof to express high confidence in the regime’s culpability for the attacks. But I do not believe they have even come close to proving their case to the wider world that has not forgotten Colin Powell’s presentation in front of the United Nations in which he presented trumped up evidence against the Iraqi regime.
The evidence that the administration claims to have has not been shared or explained in a compelling way.
The body of information used to make this assessment includes intelligence pertaining to the regime’s preparations for this attack and its means of delivery, multiple streams of intelligence about the attack itself and its effect, our post-attack observations, and the differences between the capabilities of the regime and the opposition. Our high confidence assessment is the strongest position that the U.S. Intelligence Community can take short of confirmation.
Here is the introductory summary that Secretary Kerry provided during his presentation of the evidence:
We know that for three days before the attack, the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons personnel were on the ground in the area, making preparations.
And we know that the Syrian regime elements were told to prepare for the attack by putting on gas masks and taking precautions associated with chemical weapons.
We know that these were specific instructions.
We know where the rockets were launched from, and at what time. We know where they landed, and when. We know rockets came only from regime-controlled areas and went only to opposition-controlled or contested neighborhoods.
And we know, as does the world, that just 90 minutes later all hell broke loose in the social media. With our own eyes we have seen the thousands of reports from 11 separate sites in the Damascus suburbs. All of them show and report victims with breathing difficulties, people twitching with spasms, coughing, rapid heartbeats, foaming at the mouth, unconsciousness, and death. And we know it was ordinary Syrian citizens who reported all of these horrors.
This would all be very compelling if the United States government still maintained even a small bit of credibility on the international stage, but that is sadly not the case. If they want to convince people, they need to show us the evidence that the Assad regime began mixing chemicals three days before the attacks, and show us the explicit orders, and show us the gas masks, and show us how they know that rockets were used and how they know where and when they were launched and where and when they landed.
I understand that some evidence is being withheld to protect sources and methods, and that’s legitimate up to a point. But their argument so far is really still relying on people to trust them because they aren’t Bush and Powell. That’s enough, perhaps, for domestic consumption, but it is not enough for the global audience.
It should be noted that, despite all the rhetoric, the American intelligence community has only expressed “high confidence” in their case. That is the highest grade they can give themselves short of certainty, but it isn’t certainty. If they won’t show more of their work, the world is not even going to have “high confidence” let alone certainty that the United States is justified in attacking the regime. And I’m setting aside, for the moment, that the world could very well be convinced that the Assad regime is guilty and deserving of punishment and still not agree that the United States should deliver the punishment in the absence of a broad consensus rooted in international law. Without the approval of the UN Security Council, NATO, the Brits, the Arab League, or even Congress, the need for certainty is much greater.
I don’t think the administration in lying, and I think they are probably correct in their assessment, although I also believe it is possible that they are wrong. But it’s not me who matters. They haven’t even come close to satisfying the world that they’ve made their case. They need to do more work.
