David Ignatius actually has a good column in today’s Washington Post. It’s built on two pillars. The first pillar is a look back to an interview he did with Scoop Jackson during the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1980.

The year was 1980. The Iranian revolution had toppled the shah’s regime, the Soviet Union had just invaded Afghanistan and the United States’ president, Jimmy Carter, was widely perceived as a weak leader. Looking for a sharp-edged evaluation of the situation, I decided to interview Sen. Henry M. Jackson, a leading hawk.

What Jackson (D-Wash.) said was surprising, even at a distance of nearly 35 years. Rather than demanding tougher statements or more saber-rattling, he said he worried about “overreaction” to events: “We appear to be going from one crisis to another,” with Washington dispensing “red-hot rhetoric at least once a week about the dire consequences of this or that or something else.”

“We need to be prudent,” said Jackson, who was perhaps the most prominent Cold Warrior of his day. “There is a need for the U.S. to make careful decisions, stand by those decisions, and avoid sending false or conflicting signals” to U.S. allies or the Russians.

Jackson’s message, in essence, was “cool it.”

President Carter felt sufficiently egged on in an election year that he authorized Operation Eagle Claw, with disastrous results.

Ignatius’s second pillar is a contemporary interview with Robert Gates.

Gates said that Obama is correct to avoid loose talk about military options. “I’d even be cautious about sending warships into the Black Sea,” Gates explained. “It’s a threatening gesture, but if you’re not prepared to do something about it, it’s an empty gesture.”

I asked Gates what he thought about the criticism of Obama by McCain and Graham. “They’re egging him on” to take actions that may not be effective, Gates warned. He said he “discounted” their deeper argument that Obama had invited the Ukraine crisis by not taking a firmer stand on Syria or other foreign policy issues. Even if Obama had bombed Syria or kept troops in Iraq or otherwise shown a tougher face, “he still would have the same options in Ukraine. Putin would have the same high cards.”

This got me thinking about John McCain. He has recommended using military force repeatedly in situations where force (or his recommended level of force) was not ultimately used. He urged us to war in Georgia in 2008 when Bush was still the president, and he urged us to aggressively pursue regime change in Iran (2010), for greater involvement in Libya (2011), and to fight a war Syria (2012) .

Now he argues that Obama’s (and, by implication, Bush’s) refusal to use force (or adequate force) in those situations demonstrated fecklessness and sent a signal of weakness to Vlaidmir Putin which encouraged him to invade Crimea. Robert Gates completely dismissed that argument, but we ought to try to understand how it might be that McCain is correct. If we risked World War III by intervening in Georgia, perhaps Putin wouldn’t be so bold today (assuming he, and any of us were still alive). If we caused regime change in Iran, put boots on the ground in Libya, and occupied Syria, perhaps Putin would see us as crazy enough to push NATO into Ukraine, too.

But, think for a minute about how we would be perceived by the world if we had done all those things. Think about how strong our military threat would be if we were currently occupying Libya and Syria. If we had spent the last six years acting as lawless bloodthirsty madmen, maybe our foreign policy wouldn’t be considered feckless, but it wouldn’t have made us stronger or given us more loyal allies in Europe.