… had sent a letter to North Vietnam at the height of the December 1972 Christmas bombings?
That’s the question I’d like to consider in light of the recent letter 47 Republicans sent to the government of Iran while President Obama is negotiating with that country over their nuclear program.
Let’s go back a nearly a half-century to imagine a counter-factual historical event: the sending of a letter by Democrats to the leader of North Vietnam while President Nixon was engaged in peace talks to bring an end to the war.
The Vietnam war was controversial to say the least. It divided this country in ways that are still having aftershocks to this day. Yet during that time, despite criticism by some Democratic politicians – not a majority by any means as a large number of Democrats were defense hawks – President Nixon was given the ability to prosecute the war and ongoing peace talks with North Vietnam as he saw fit.
In December 1972, the talks were at a standstill. North Vietnam wanted an unconditional withdrawal of all US troops, while the Nixon and Kissinger insisted on a mutual withdrawal including all North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops from South Vietnam. At one point in October, an agreement in principle had been reached between Kissinger and North Vietnam’s lead negotiator, Lee Duc Tho, but the South Vietnamese government led by Nguyen Van Thieu immediately rejected the proposed agreement.
A more compliant Le Duc Tho suggested to Kissinger that North Vietnam was willing to consider an agreement recognising the government of South Vietnam, so long as it included processes for free elections and political reform. The pair drafted a treaty, which was completed in late October 1972 and unveiled by Kissinger, with much fanfare, at a White House press conference.
Kissinger and Le Duc Tho’s treaty was enthusiastically received around the world. After almost five years of impasse, it appeared as if a workable peace for Vietnam was in sight. But the South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu, was outraged by the draft treaty, believing it placed his country at the mercy of the Viet Cong.
Theiu was suspicious of the Kissinger/Le Duc Tho agreement on several grounds. One, it left North Vietnamese troops in place during the period while the Viet Cong and the Theiu government negotiated a final settlement. Second, it required that a final settlement be negotiated by three parties: Theiu’s government (the “Republic of Vietnam”), the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the “PRG” a/k/a the Viet Cong) and a third party to be selected by agreement Perhaps his deepest concern, however, was that his government would not survive without a continued American military presence in South Vietnam. Whatever his ultimate reasons for rejecting the accord, demanding over 100 changes to the proposal, and then on October 26th he broadcast a speech detailing his opposition to the accord, painting its provisions in the worst light possible.
President Nixon was furious with Theiu. Kissinger’s efforts to obtain an agreement with Tho had been fast tracked in order for a peace treaty could be announced prior to the November election. Theiu, however, refused to back down. Theiu’s rejection of the treaty naturally led the North Vietnamese to suspect that Kissinger had hoodwinked them for political gain. They saw Theiu as an American puppet, and so came back with new demands of their own. The breakthrough announced by Kissinger and Tho was now perceived as a failure, with both sides making further demands and changes and both accusing the other of negotiating in bad faith.
Nixon then made a fateful decision. He ordered Operation Linebacker II – an all out bombing campaign of North Vietnam to begin during the during the month of December, 1972. Also known as the “Christmas Bombing” and among the USAF as the 11 Day War, B-52 bombers and other aircraft began the largest and heaviest bombing campaign against North Vietnam during the course of the war.
During these operations, Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft and B-52s commenced an around-the-clock bombardment of the North Vietnamese heartland. The B-52s struck Hanoi and Haiphong during hours of darkness with F-111s and Navy tactical aircraft providing diversionary/suppression strikes on airfields and surface-to-air missile sites. Daylight operations were primarily carried out by A-7s and F-4s bombing visually or with long-range navigation (LORAN) techniques, depending upon the weather over the targets. In addition, escort aircraft such as the Air Force EB-66s and Navy EA-6s broadcast electronic jamming signals to confuse the radar-controlled defenses of the North. The Strategic Air Command also provided KC-135s to support the in-flight refueling requirements of the various aircraft participating in Linebacker II operations.
Between December 18th – 29th, over 1,500 night time sorties were flown by the USAF against targets in North Vietnam, with the greatest focus on Haiphong and Hanoi. During the airstrikes major protests were held throughout the country. Nixon may or may not have feared what the new Congress would do, as Democrats, despite losing the Presidential race and regained control of both the House and Senate.
Certainly their was widespread sentiment among both dovish Republicans and Democrats alike that the war must come to an end. During 1972, a number of bills had been proposed to cut off funding for the wars in Southeast Asia, though they generally were contingent on a return of American prisoners of war. Imagine, however, that a group of Democratic Senators and/or Representatives had chosen to take further action, especially in light of what appeared to be a failure of the peace talks and the resumption of massive bombing campaigns. And this was no ordinary bombing campaign. There was no great discrimination between civilian targets and military ones, no surgical drone strikes. This was carpet bombing in the extreme, and its effect on the civilian population in North Vietnam was horrific.
During the 12 days of Christmas bombing, 200 B-52s flew over 700 sorties, and fighters and smaller bombers flew over 1,200 additional missions. Those planes dropped over 20,000 tons of bombs. The B-52s were used for “carpet bombing” the two cities. “Carpet bombing” involves multiple planes, flying in formation, laying down figurative “carpets” of bombs that flatten everything within the area bombed — like a carpet lying on a floor. […]
During the Christmas bombing, as throughout the war, the United States flatly denied that we were bombing civilian targets. This was an out-an-out lie. We bombed schools, hospitals, and civilian population centers. Indeed, carpet bombing is uniquely well suited to targeting civilians who, in military parlance, present less “hardened” targets than do military facilities.
To take but one specific example, during the Christmas bombing — on December 19 and again on December 22 — B-52s bombed the Bach Mai Hospital in Hanoi. At 1150 beds, Bach Mai Hospital was the largest civilian hospital in the DRV. We substantially damaged or destroyed the entire hospital. This was not an isolated example, either. The Bach Mai Hospital had been previously bombed by the United States on June 27, 1972; many other hospitals in the DRV were destroyed during the Christmas bombing.
The primary bombing campaign only ended after North Vietnam agreed to return to the peace negotiations in Paris. In the end, a the peace treaty that was signed by the parties was nearly identical in all important respects to the agreement Kissinger and Tho had reached in October, 1972.
But what if before Operation Linebacker II ended, my aforementioned group of Democratic elected officials had taken it upon themselves to denounce the policy of the US government in a letter to the leader of North Vietnam? And what if that letter stated that they would cut off all funding for the war, regardless of whatever terms the Nixon administration proposed at the peace negotiations in Paris, should they resume?
Now we know that no such thing ever happened. But what if it had? What would have been the reaction of the American public, war weary by all means, but one that had just re-elected President Nixon in a landslide of epic proportions? I suspect that any Democratic Senator or representative foolish enough to have taken such an extreme stance would have been prosecuted for treason by the Nixon Justice Department with the full support of a majority of the American people. Of course, we will never know, since the Congressional members of that era did not interfere directly in matters of US foreign policy. They operated constitutionally. In fact, the War Powers Resolution of 1973, whatever you may think of its effectiveness, was a direct result of the proper use of Congress’ constitutional authority as the Legislative Branch of our government. Congress passed it over President Nixon’s veto on November 7, 1973.
My how times have changed. The Republican-controlled Congress refuses to stay within the bounds of its lawful constitutional authority when it comes to its relentless opposition to anything President Obama proposes (the TPP excepted). Not only did they invite the sovereign head of a foreign government to address Congress for the sole purpose of attacking the current negotiations with Iran, but now 47 of these “servant of the people” have taken it upon themselves to directly contact the head of the government of Iran to inform him that any agreement Obama reaches with them will be undone. I can’t recall a time in out history when members of Congress have taken it upon themselves to go beyond their own constitutional role and both usurp and undermine the power and authority of the Executive Branch to conduct foreign affairs.
And yet not one of these Republicans will be prosecuted or charged with any violation of the Constitution or the law. Perhaps that is the better result from a strictly practical and legal standpoint. But if any members of the Congress in Nixon’s day, or even during the last Bush administration, had taken it upon themselves to interfere directly in diplomatic relations with a foreign government, I can easily imagine that those Republican administrations would have found legal grounds for indicting the elected officials who dared to take such steps in opposition to the President.
And we would have never heard the end of the tale of the Democratic traitors and “backstabbers” from our “liberal media.” On the other hand, does anyone doubt these 47 Republican Senators will not suffer any long term consequences, whether individually or to the reputation of their party. No, they will not. Of that you can be certain.
Didn’t Nixon do something like that in ’68 and derailed the peace talks until after the election?
1968: Sent Claire Chennault to talk Thieu out of the peace talks LBJ was trying to arrange.
His widow who “arranged the contact with South Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem whom Richard Nixon met in secret in July 1968 in New York”; Lieutenant General Claire Lee Chennault died in 1958.
This was arguably treason. That mutherf**ker shoulda been hung then and there.
Skirted “giving aid and comfort to the enemy” definition of treason because they made a deal with the US ally.
An obvious violation of the Logan Act, but no politician wants to open up and use that can of worms.
LOL, I knew it was the widow. I assumed Claire was her name…
Team Nixon did successfully thwart the peace negotiations with N. Vietnam, but did it 1) covertly, 2) with the ally and not the enemy 3) with carrots and not sticks.
I also read somewhere that LBJ knew it happened and didn’t release the info because he didn’t want HHH to win the election
Probably the only reason why we learned of it later. Doubt those in on the plot would ever have talked.
Damn hard call LBJ had to make and impossible to say that he made the wrong one.
I don’t know much about HHH, do we have any idea what kind of President he would have been?
HHH was a decent man, but ethically compromised by the Vietnam War and possibly by having served as LBJ’s VP. Had he been able to shirk off his insecurities and quickly bring that war to an end, he could have been one of the better presidents. ’69-73 was an optimal economic time to institute a national health care system. Even Nixon knew that which is why he dicked around with it.
Interesting, I should probably do more research about him. He’s always seemed like a footnote in history but I know a lot of liberals/progressives like him
A solid, meat and potatoes New Deal guy. Wouldn’t rate him as highly as McGovern and a few others who were around during those years, but for working folks, he was far superior to the subsequent Democratic Presidents.
I don’t think McG ever had a job as remotely difficult as Hubert had in just being Lyndon’s VP or in Hubert trying to be the party’s nominee with his own FP views while also not running afoul of The Sensitive One in the WH..
Humphrey had to suck up mightily to Lyndon for four years, or else resign and see his political career finished. McG when he got his chance as party nominee embarrassed and diminished himself generally as an incompetent candidate, including trying futilely and unnecessarily to suck up to Lyndon for his endorsement.
Agree wrt to the amount of crap LBJ dumped on HHH. Unknown is whether HHH let it all run off his back with no serious and long-term damage to his psyche or it had diminished him forever. Debatable as to whether HHH or McGovern had to work harder to get the nomination. Primary elections are grueling and HHH didn’t have to do much of that in ’68.
Four points to keep in mind in comparing HHH and McGovern.
That’s not to say that I think McGovern’s VP choice was inspired. It was workmanlike and pragmatic and not cynical.
While on the topic of an ambitious VP, would also note that while never publicly humiliated nor denigrated, Gore was sidelined/marginalized by Clinton. Difficult to transition into being a leader after spending eight years being a flunky.
I hadn’t mentioned the nomination process, but on that McG had it easier than it would have been, owing to the secret special help arranged by Nixon — knocking by out the favorite Muskie w dirty tricks — including as u note help from pro-Nixon Dems especially in TX , Gov Connally and that party pol insider who would soon become DNC chair.. For sure, in 68 Hubert didn’t have to do much other than work the phones to get the nom.
Darn — completely lost my original point as to why I rank McGovern higher than HHH. One word: “vision.” On that measure, HHH was pedestrian. McGovern could extend his thoughts from now to there. It’s not a common quality. That’s somewhat odd because it’s not all that inaccessible if one begins with “doing the right/best thing for all concerned.”
Vision? Ok, but what about VN?
Hubert, despite later moral lapses owing entirely to having to placate his boss Lyndon, was an early visionary on avoiding further US military entanglement in VN. E.g., his 5-pg memo to the boss as VP, early in ’65 on the eve of escalation, calling forcefully for Johnson not to escalate. For his efforts, LBJ excommunicated him from further consults on the issue, and had his office bugged. Disloyal you see.
McG, later a strong antiwar advocate, had a chance to step up to the plate in 1964 when it counted, and count himself as one of the few senate heroes willing to challenge Lyndon’s blank check authorization clearly intended as a congressional declaration of war. And he wasn’t a VP, having to cut and trim his beliefs to suit the boss’s whims. Just one of 100 senators, at a time when the public was hardly clamoring for war 8000 miles away in a tiny country.
But he didn’t step up. Nor did he in 1971 when Ellsberg approached him to read the Pentagon Papers into the Congressional Record.
And vision: HHH had it in spades on civil rights, going back to 1948 and 1964 on the CR bill, compared to McG who was hardly the vocal public leader on that issue that Hubert was.
Not to entirely diss McG — he did lead on other important things like poverty and hunger. I mean, it wasn’t for nothing that Bobby Kennedy called him the most decent man in the senate.
It’s so difficult to compare the records and strength and weaknesses of two men based on different points in time and different issues. By 1968, there weren’t obvious signs that HHH retained “vision” other. IMHO he lost some of himself as VP and lost more in his loss to Nixon. As I’ve already stated that had he won in ’68 he would likely have been one of our better Presidents and better than those elected from 1968 on, not sure why we’re debating. (While I was too young to vote in ’68, Nixon’s election filled me with a sense of dread and foreboding.)
By ’72 HHH either wasn’t the man he’d once been or his time had passed. McGovern was over a decade younger and that gave him an advantage in that year over HHH on the vision thing.
Ambition focused on the single goal of becoming POTUS has tripped up many decent and competent candidates. Neither HHH and Gore were well served by being VPs — and both seemed to be more ruthless in getting the nomination than they did in running in the general election. Sad considering the outcomes of those two elections. (Although it’s difficult for me to pine for the historical absence of a VP Lieberman.)
Oh no question, by 1972 Hubert was perceived to be well past his sell-by date. (and bitter, or something, too: recall he phoned Nixon after the 1972 massive re-elect, and seemed almost giddily ebullient over Nixon’s victory). Even in 1968, because of association w/Johnson’s War (having to publicly defend it as penance for his earlier sin of opposing it), many liberals only reluctantly decided to vote for him despite his opponent being the well known shifty-eyed Dark Prince Dick Nixon.
Emasculated by Lyndon from mid-65 to probably Sept 68 over the War. Still, even with that, and some unfortunate overstepping in defending Johnson on the war against skeptics, he had generally enough sense to know what was right. He just found it hard in 68 to get out from beneath Johnson’s malign influence.
And he certainly at no point — unlike Lyndon — was ever considered by insiders to have mentally gone over the edge. LBJ was unbalanced. Humphrey was just a bit emasculated.
Our little discussion has left me feeling very sad. LBJ was a tragic figure. HHH missed out by not being in the right position at the right time.
Blind ambition and we all lost. Imagine if LBJ had continued to run the Senate. HHH elected in 1960. JFK in 1968. McGovern in 1976. Would have been a different world.
In 1968 there wasn’t bitterness but a sourness that wasn’t present earlier in character. Might have healed from the wounds inflicted upon him by LBJ if he’d won in ’68. Then having come so close in that election, he felt entitled to a rematch in ’72.
In 1972 HHH was only 61 years old and beyond his prime for a first term Presidency. Think about that.
Right, but he’d been in the national spotlight since 1948, or age 37(?), as Minneapolis mayor and CR advocate, and had either been in the running or had his name on the ticket for every presidential election in the 60s.
Then his VPcy with the grandfatherly Lyndon and his public embrace of the war made him seem older. And with the rise of the youth movement of the 60s, he just seemed clearly to belong to the older generation young people were beginning to despise or distrust. Certainly compared to Bobby he looked old and out of date, a shopworn pol. Bobby and McCarthy and McG with their bold antiwar stance, connected with young people. Hubert connected with their parents.
All true. But LBJ was only 56 years old in 1964. If that’s grandfatherly why are Democrats interested in Biden who will be 76 and Clinton who will be 69 in 2016? Yes, Biden and Clinton were physically healthier in middle age than LBJ and HHH were, but they’re now both old.
A President should be not too young (before wisdom develops), not too old (after the biological clocks are running down), but just right (50-64). Remember how old and out of touch GHWB appeared in 1992? Reagan was embalmed and ga-ga and USians were too lame to notice.
It’s in the perception, rather than strictly chronological age.
In LBJ’s case, he was always old, even when young. Look at the face, the kind of corny personality and speaking style, his political friends and allies, all or most conservative geezers and pols from the establishment. And his personal biological clock, as he well knew, indicated, at least from his pappy’s side, that he was much older than mere chronological age would suggest. A (cranky, kinda crazy) grandfather figure, like Ike, particularly as he’s placed against the backdrop of the young, hip world that was prominent in the 60s.
Nixon had similar young fogey qualities as he was coming along in the 50s and early 60s. He was only 4 yrs older than JFK in 1960, but looked and acted much older. A (harsh, uptight) father figure.
JFK and Bobby: both (cool, youngish) Brother figures who represented the exception to your rules about age and governing. Both had plenty of wisdom by their 40s. Gene McC was an interesting, distant Uncle figure. McG was a benign Robert Young/Father Knows Best Father figure.
He would have gotten us out of VN within his first year or so and avoided the massive carpet bombing of the country that Nixon so loved. No Watergate too.
I’d be interested, Marie, to see your reasoning as to why LBJ didn’t make the wrong decision and why Johnson saying nothing publicly, let alone declining to call for a prosecution, served the interests of the electorate and our democracy.
Now you’re asking me to think really hard and also to articulate my thoughts (which isn’t my strong suit).
In the abstract and from a big, wide, long-term perspective, the interests of the electorate and democracy weren’t well served by LBJ’s call. However, this happened in the real world at a particular point in time.
From the perspective of political pragmatism, LBJ received the information only days before what was going to be a very close election. The info was solid but not concrete. As in a document that could be released and easily and quickly absorbed by the public. (We later saw how slow the public was to grasp only partially Nixon’s role in all the Watergate crimes. (Many didn’t believe it until Nixon resigned.)
Had LBJ thrown caution to the wind and publicly accused Nixon of nefarious interference in the peace negotiations (the only option available to him given the time constraints), the outcome was unpredictable. Nixon had already demonstrated that he was politically adept at defusing allegations against him. There was nothing in writing and Chennault, Thieu, and Kissinger would have screamed that the charge was outrageous. Nixon would have gone on to claim that it was a last minute political stunt by LBJ to get HHH elected. For all his faults, LBJ understood that the US electorate doesn’t reward what seems to be unfair. (The GOP doesn’t get that and still can’t figure out how Clinton and Obama survived their relentless and unfair attacks.) Far from helping HHH, LBJ could have turned a squeaker election into an easy win for Nixon.
Prosecuting Nixon would have been a political act. The information was obtained illegally and therefore, not admissible. Nixon and the GOP didn’t/don’t feel bound by such legal niceties. They’ll drag this country through endless mud if a speck of it can stick to their opponent. Political prosecutions are bad politics. That black stain on Wilson for the prosecution and imprisonment of Debs will never wash out.
Whether LBJ left documentation on this issue beyond his audio recording with Dirkson for future use by political allies or historians may never be known. I agree with Robert Parry that Nixon feared that LBJ had done so. Difficult not to imagine that LBJ wished he’d had more evidence and/or could make use of what he had. OTOH, he wasn’t well and was tired, so maybe he let it go.
Didn’t the FBI/CIA have Nixon/his campaign men on tape trying to arrange the interference? That usually constitutes sufficient indictable evidence. As to whether it was illegal, well the old national security should have covered it. And his long-time friend FBI Director Hoover would have helped sell the indictment.
My sense of it was that Lyndon by many accounts was not entirely upset at the prospect of Nixon winning the election. Primarily because he felt Nixon, more than his own VP Humphrey, would act in a way so as not to embarrass Lyndon (in fact, Nixon in a previous WH visit said about that directly to LBJ). Meanwhile, Lyndon was still ornery paranoid about Hubert, given the 1965 memo and the 68 late-campaign moving away (moderately) from Johnson’s rigid VN policy.
He probably thought (rightly imo) that HHH would quickly move to withdraw, making Johnson and his policy look stupid and disastrous in the eyes of history.
Disagree about LBJ. He had already set up the mechanism for ending the VN war with the peace talks. He would have preferred that they came to fruition during his tenure — and had HHH won, they could have as there wouldn’t have been any better deal for S VN.
LBJ and Nixon were both ruthless and had insecurities. But those shared characteristics weren’t at all similar in the two men. Their individual experiences as VP also informed them. Agnew’s role under Nixon was similar to what his had been under IKE — an attack dog but not integral player in the administration. They and LBJ had been chosen for electoral votes and not on their merits. Reasonable in the cases of Nixon and Agnew but not LBJ. Not forgivable that LBJ then turned around and treated HHH as shabbily as he’d been treated by the Kennedys. The all lacked the vision to appreciate that a VP can be a partner. Clinton did get the form right but not the practice. (He already had his partner.)
For all my criticisms of Obama, he does get the value of being supportive, courtly, polite, and generous towards those he’s chosen to be on his team. (Many of those he’s chosen is another matter.)
BBC write-up is a good summary based on the last LBJ tapes to be released.
It was FBI wiretaps and LBJ had ordered wiretaps on Nixon. HHH was informed but made the same call as LBJ did.
Didn’t know that LBJ considered putting his name back in for the nomination as the convention was in progress. But it was probably more wishful thinking (longing?) out loud than anything he honestly thought was feasible. (weak tickers can affect thinking at least intermittently)
I wouldn’t put it off to a weak ticker — after all, since his massive near-fatal heart attack in 1955, at that point thereafter he could be considered to have a weak ticker.
But the story is consistent with the Johnson I’ve read about in so many books — scheming, duplicitous (here wrt his VP), power hungry.
As I recall the story, he’d asked one of his loyal aides (was it Connally or Marvin Watson or ?) at the start of the convention to go out to Chicago to see if he, Lyndon, had the votes if delegates were told he was interested in another nomination after all. The answer he got back, quickly and decisively, was no.
He and Daley, but mostly Lyndon coordinating w/the mayor, ran that convention. He prevented the antiwar plank, and even the Humphrey-RFK delegates compromise plank, from passing. And his congratulating Daley on the police riot just confirms for me what type of low character Lyndon had.
Ah, but can’t discount the Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, Medicare/Medicaid, and War on Poverty.
He was a young enough man to overcome the cognitive/emotional effects of his heart attack in 1955. But degenerative health conditions don’t stop. In his case he had the added and profound stress of a monumental screw-up and an awareness that he would not live to see/enjoy an old age. Chronologically he was 60 years old in 1968, but biologically he was closer to 80.
Question:
What percentage of the American population do those 47 senators represent?
All those not in CA, CT, DE, HI, IN, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, NJ, NM, NY, OR, TN, VA, RI, VT, and WA.
IN? You mean IL?
I’m just guessing it’s not close to 50%. Might be wrong.
Nope. Kirk signed on. None of the IN, ME, and TN Senators did.
Population of the non-signatory states is 140 million. 44% of the total US population of 318 million.
(You owe me one for add this up.)
Jane Fonda.
She didn’t interfere with peace negotiations. The intent of her actions was to further peace. The 47% don’t want peace with Iran. They and some of their major financial supporters want war with Iran.
I was referring to how the GOP would react – like you said, Jane Fonda didn’t even interfere with official statecraft.
As there was an active war with N. Vietnam, this isn’t a strong counter-factual historical scenario analogy to the Iran letter. Not sure there is one where it would have been Democratic Senators interfering with a Republican administration’s negotiations for a peace agreement. Further complicated by the fact that the 47% were acting in concert with a foreign government, Israel, and both of those parties would like to destroy Iran.
unless you believe the expression of disagreement with the President regarding foreign policy constitutes treason.
It may be a violation of the Logan Act, though I doubt the Logan Act is constitutional if applied to these facts.
It’s a calculated move to increase the chances of war, and plenty evil, but treason it is not.
There is not a parallel situation comparable to what the Republicans have done. That is because the 47 Republicans were not offering a peace deal independently nor were they offering a separate channel for diplomacy. The 47 Republican Senators were seeking to scuttle ongoing negotiations toward reducing the threat of nuclear war and laying a foundation of trust for moving toward normal diplomatic relations with Iran.
If an agreement and normal relations are in place before President Obama leaves office, the US will be on its way to having an embassy again (and a CIA station as well) in Tehran. What that brings is the possibility of fewer misunderstandings of actions and motives between the US and Iran. And no regime change. Republicans cannot have that frustration of the PNAC plan.
The 47 Republicans were acting to move to war. That has rarely occurred behind the President’s back in US history. Maybe Aaron Burr was heading down that path when the Jefferson administration took him on. But that case is very murky all around.
So the gambit of the freshmen duo of Cotton and Perdue seems to be truly unprecedented. Not to mention clueless.
There are no exact parallels. This is more in the line of getting people to think about what would be the media reaction and political fallout if 47 Democrats had done something similar. There may be better past historical situations where one party held the Presidency and the other controlled Congress but I couldn’t think of any others off the top of my head.
Unfortunately, the larger point I was trying to make, that Democrats are judged more harshly and held more accountable than Republicans for similar actions has gotten lost with my choice of Vietnam as an example. Vietnam is somewhat sui generis and still a very polarizing event today, more so even our recent misadventures such as the war in Iraq. Nonetheless, it was the closest historical moment I could think of at the time I wrote this.
A time when Democrats were more warhawks than Republicans was just prior to World War II. Republican isolationism was the rap on them up to the McCarthy era. McCarthy and Nixon seemed keen to out-war the Democrats during the Eisenhower administration. And Goldwater laid the isolationist charge to rest entirely with his “tactical nuclear weapons”, which the Tea Party crowd still echo–although I get the impression that they don’t know what tactical nuclear weapons are except bigger boom.
I remember those days in late ’72 and early ’73.
In March of ’73 I was going to turn 15, and saw that my future might include fighting, and maybe getting wounded or dying, is some rice field or the hills of Vietnam.
So, needless to say, I wanted there to be a lasting peace treaty!
Back in those days, both parties respected the Presidency, and kept their criticism within the boundaries of the US.
And if the Democrats did something like this to Nixon, Reagan, or W, they would have faced some serious ramifications for taking that action.
But, the white-hot hatred of a billion-million suns that conservatives have for that “Ni-CLANG!” in the White (people’s) House, has metastasized into a political cancer that borders on treason, and makes the MFing signers of Cotton’s stupid/ignorant/disrespectful letter borderline traitors.
And no, sadly, nothing will happen to Cotton or his cabal of “TEH STOOOOOOOOPID!”
More’s the pity…
From Telsur NED Official Meets with Venezuelan Opposition Figures
Getting very tired of ignoring all the US advance teams sent into countries around the world to foment conflict, regime change/coups, etc. All well and good to read history for lessons (Overthrow is a good primer), but worthless if we continue not to stop this crap in its tracks.