Not under Eisenhower – Kennedy – Johnson – [blank – Vietnam War] upto and included Bill Clinton – George Bush – Barack Obama – Donald Trump.
Telegram From the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State Beirut , July 25, 1958--5 p.m.
It was agreed by Chamoun, Chehab and ourselves that contemplated plan of operations initiated today against Basta, even though it did not contemplate taking entire area, would have salutary political effect prior to elections scheduled July 31. We also agreed it essential that such action be taken at once if position of our own forces in respect to public opinion here and elsewhere were not to be jeopardized as well as for need to reinforce respect for authority of Lebanon Government.
Upshot of a two-hour interview in which President Chamoun took minutes of the meeting were following three conclusions:
- Starting at 1400 today, Lebanon army would commence its operation to curtail size of Basta but not to take Basta.
- US forces would so far as possible replace Lebanese forces in static positions. Lebanese troops thus relieved would be used in Chehab’s striking force to be used against the Basta or elsewhere.
- US to respond affirmatively for Lebanon military request for matériel. This would include equipment for psy war, such as loudspeaker trucks, teargas, and other necessary arms or munition. [Page 397]
Secretary Murphy added a fourth point that as this was a police action, there should be cooperation to improve psychological warfare efficacy.
Chehab was emphatic that a joint operation by American and Lebanon troops would bring about the immediate dissolution of his army as an effective instrument.
====1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7-2558. Secret; Niact. Holloway sent a separate report on this meeting to Admiral Burke in CINCSPECOMME telegram 6238 to CNO, July 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files: CCS Lebanon (5-13-58) Sec. 4; included in the microfiche supplement)
2. See Document 229 .
More below the fold …
U.S. Marines in Lebanon – 1958
This is a history of the Marine Corps participation in the Lebanon Crisis from July-October 1958. It is published to show the role of the U. S. Marine Corps in carrying out American foreign policy and the pacification of a country through a successful show of force. The account is based on the records of the U. S. Marine Corps and selected records of the U. S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Department of State. In addition appropriate published accounts have been utilized.
The Political Background
The waning British and French influence in the Middle East after World War II gave rise to constant strife in this area of the world. The region was not only stirred by the growth of local nationalism but also by the conflict between the East and West in the Cold War. Crisis followed crisis as the newly independent states attempted to adjust to the post war world.
In 1948, after the British had given up the attempt to pacify Palestine, Jews and Arabs clashed in the short Arab-Israeli War of that year. The antagonism between the Jewish state of Israel and its Arab neighbors has become a permanent feature of Middle East relations. This hostility was intensified by the 1952 revolution in Egypt and the subsequent rise to undisputed power in 1954 of its strongest figure, Gamal Abdul Nasser. Sparked by his leadership, there arose a new mutant pan-Arab movement over which Egypt attempted to gain hegemony. “This Arab Nationalism contributed to a series of events–the Egyptian arms deal with Russia, the withdrawal of the U. S. offer to assist the Aswan Dam project, and Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal–that culminated in the Suez crisis of 1956, when the Israelis attacked Egypt and the British and French intervened.” This intervention, though blocked by the United Nations, served to reinforce Arab anti-Western sentiments. The Arab unrest led to civil strife in Lebanon, and the overthrow of a Western aligned government in Iraq in 1958.
The Western Powers feared the complete disintegration of the peace in the Middle East and the possibility of Soviet exploitation of the crisis. The overt American reaction was to send U. S. Marines to Lebanon on 15 July 1958 at the request of that government. This Marine landing was a practical example of the use of amphibious forces to support U. S. foreign policy by the application of military strength and mobility.
In historic times, its geographical location at the eastern end of the Mediterranean made Lebanon the crossroads to Africa, Europe, and Asia. The country has been an important commercial and trading center since the time of the ancient Phoenicians. Its mountainous barrier has enabled the nation to maintain a distinctive identity throughout the centuries. In the 20th century, the construction of pipelines from the oil fields of Iran and Saudi Arabia to the Lebanese port cities of Tripoli and Sidon increased the strategic importance of the country.
Heart of Beirut – tradition of western values by citizens living alongside Muslims in Arab and Islamic culture … stop intervention and the proxy wars of bloodshedding.
- [photo downtown Beirut]
Assad’s Syria as US Ally and Base for Torture
A former spy has described the debate within the CIA over the arrest, rendition and torture of Canadian Maher Arar, saying multiple colleagues warned against it because they were convinced they were punishing an innocent man.
The account from former CIA officer John Kiriakou sheds new light on decade-old events that caused a public inquiry in Canada, a $10 million payout from the federal government, and unsuccessful lawsuits in the U.S.
It’s a rare peek into discussions within the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency — whose role in the 2002-03 events has never been publicly examined, having remained off-limits in Canada’s inquiry.
It came during an interview at the ex-spy’s Virginia home, where he described how he went from being the head of counterterrorism operations in Pakistan after 9-11, to becoming the first CIA employee to publicly question the use of torture, to eventually spending two years in jail for leaking agency secrets.
During that interview, Kiriakou declined to discuss whether he’d interacted with Canada’s spy services — because, he said, revealing details about a foreign partner remains a cardinal sin in the world of espionage.
○ U.S. official key to sending Maher Arar to Syria torture appointed law professor
○ U.S. House Hearing on Foreign Affairs: Torture and the Case of Maher Arar
- Arar’s story also demonstrates how a democracy should respond when such a wrong has been done. Canada undertook an extensive high-level official investigation of Arar’s treatment, and Canada’s complicity in it. It issued a lengthy report fully exonerating Mr. Arar and harshly criticizing Canadian authorities. And it paid Arar a substantial damages award for its complicity in the wrongs that the United States and Syria inflicted on him. By contrast, the United States argues that Arar’s claims cannot even be heard in court, claiming that its interest in secrecy trumps even the prohibition on torture.
○ Obama’s pledge to “look forward” on torture doesn’t apply to John Kiriakou
○ How [Sunni] Arab states helped the CIA with its torture-linked rendition program
○ Delivered into Enemy Hands: US-Led Abuse and Rendition of Opponents to Gaddafi’s Libya | HRW |
