by Patrick Lang (bio below)
Michael Ware of Time magazine told Christopher Matthews this evening that after next week’s election in Iraq the US policy will be to force the inevitable government of Shia clients of Iran to accept Sunni nationalists into the government in positions and numbers that will insure a “peace-making” acceptance of that government by the people the president described as “rejectionists” at Annapolis a few days ago. Perhaps Ware did not say “force” but that was the idea.
Ware says that US military intelligence assures him that the American government has now accepted the idea that the Baath Party must be revived (without Saddam’s clique) because it represents the nationalist interests of the Sunni Arabs and many among the secular Shia Arabs. The neocon “agitprop” machine sold the American people the notion that the Baath Part was the reincarnation of the Nazi Party. In fact, the Baath exists all over the Arab World as a unifying force that spans religious differences, espouses modernism, and promotes the rights of women against traditionalism. Where did the image of the Baath as Nazi Germany reborn come from? Go ask the high neocons and their image maker operators. Go ask them. Don’t bother to talk to the fraudulent “little people” like Paul Vallely (See blog No Quarter).
This is the policy that we should have had from the beginning. I hope that it is not too late. The process of Shia political consolidation is now far advanced, and it may be that developments in Iraq are now beyond our ability to determine or significantly affect the end game. Why did we go down the “suicidal” road of seeking to bring our long term enemies to power as a satellite government of Iran? Simple. Read the works of Reuel Gerecht and his friends at AEI and the Weekly Standard. The neocon Jacobin crowd believed and still believe that Sunni Muslims are the “root of evil” in the Middle East and that the grip on power that they have maintained for centuries everywhere in the region but Iran must be broken to insure a transition to “democracy.” Rubbish. “Democracy” used as code by these people means a forcible transition to a secular, Western way of life antithetical to everything in the majority tradition of the Islamic peoples. This is beyond our strength unless we are to accept the administration’s exhortation to a “generational” mission to do so.
Howard Fineman earlier told Matthews that it is the intention of the administration to begin to withdraw from Iraq after the election next week. Everything I hear from the military indicates to me that this is so. … continued below:
We will attempt a withdrawal from many areas in the contested Sunni Zone. What remains to be seen is whether or not the “Iraqi” forces will then face an empowered, stronger guerrillas movement operating in bigger units. If this is so, then we will have a test as to whether or not these “Iraqi” forces,which have not fought very well thus far and which are lightly equipped, can hold towns “vacated” (by us) against the rebels. Oops! (rejectionists). I suspect that they can not without considerable US support.
What happens then? Bob Behr told Matthews (good show tonight) that he thinks:
(a) The Shia government is going to ask us to leave. (quite possible) He also said that if that happens, he thinks that the ultimate arbiters of the situation as it develops will be the government of Iran with its armed forces as a possible determinant. Behr said that he had been in Tehran this year and that the “Mullahs” spoke openly of their intention to intervene if necessary to protect Shia rule in Iraq.
(b) Bob also gave his opinion that the Iraqi Shia would prevail in a struggle against the Sunni Arabs on the Sunni Arabs’ own ground. I think he is mistaken. A Shia triumph in the Sunni Zone would require the intervention of the Iranians. Numbers only count “so much” against nationalist fervor, popular support and a lot of prior military experience and skill.
How much can we influence the future in Iraq?
Some, but less every day.
Pat Lang
Col. Patrick W. Lang (Ret.), a highly decorated retired senior officer of U.S. Military Intelligence and U.S. Army Special Forces, served as “Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, South Asia and Terrorism” for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and was later the first Director of the Defense Humint Service. Col. Lang was the first Professor of the Arabic Language at the United States Military Academy at West Point. For his service in the DIA, he was awarded the “Presidential Rank of Distinguished Executive.” He is a frequent commentator on television and radio, including MSNBC’s Countdown with Keith Olbermann (interview), CNN and Wolf Blitzer’s Situation Room (interview), PBS’s Newshour, NPR’s “All Things Considered,” (interview), and more .
Personal Blog: Sic Semper Tyrannis 2005 || Bio || CV
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Novel: The Butcher’s Cleaver (download free by chapter, PDF format)
“Drinking the Kool-Aid,” Middle East Policy Council Journal, Vol. XI, Summer 2004, No. 2
Fineman, Ware and Robert Behr were really great on Matthews tonight; all 3 very informative and rational and Matthews himself not interfering too much to dilute the essence.
Sunday I saw PNAC founder William Kristol’s performance on FoxNews and he predictably echoed the Neocon rubric, at one point saying if it were up to him he’d put as many troops in there as possible and just press on at maximum force.
I even saw the increasingly pompous but hapless Gerecht pontificating on another show yesterday I think. If ever there was an academic fraud masquerading as a courageous advocate for liberty and democracy it’s this shameless and predictable hack.
As one who never believed the Cheney gang had any intention of completing a war in the Middle East, my sense is that they’ll be working hard to sabotage any real progress that threatens to create conditions favorable to a withdrawl.
I suspect the real battle with resect to the immediate future of Iraq is being fought between the neocon delusionals and the more pragmatic Scowcroft,Powell,Baker, Carlyle Group gang within the GOP here at home. And that the president will wind up taking direction from whoever it is that wins that battle.
Reading Pat Lang’s piece here, it struck me forcefully that in all this time I myself never really seriously questioned the propaganda as to the generally demonic nature of “Baathists”. While I knew that many in Iraq were members of the Baath party in order that they’d be able to get the “professional” jobs, (Is this even true, I wonder), I fell for the bullshit demonizing them generally and never questioned it even in my own mind. (It always shocks me when I discover I’ve been so easily taken in by elementary propaganda.) I assumed the Baath Party was basically inimical to whatever might be good in a society, and I thank PL for deconstructing that bit of illusion.
Somehow I have difficulty believing that BushCo will miraculously show sufficient competence to pull off either an efficient withdrawl process or an effective diplomatic process that might lead to a more successful outcome for Iraq in the forseeable future. If Cheney and his gang, along with Rumsfeld’s band of Pentagon suits were all rounded up and detained somewhere, perhap[s some progress might be possible, but as long as the VP is on the loose I fear the worst for Iraq.
…regarding the outcome of the battles twixt NeoCons and “Realists” in the GOP. Either way it goes, that ain’t good.
Yes! It’s sort of like a turf battle between the Mafia and the Columbian drug cartel. Whoever wins, the people lose.
You know things are really bad when people like Scowcroft, Odom and the Carlyle group look like the “good guys” next to the Cheney gang.
re: /Numbers only count “so much” against nationalist fervor, popular support and a lot of prior military experience and skill. /
The media focus seems to be on training iraqi forces, by which we are meant of think of grunts. I suppose that can be done in a short time, or should be. But how do you get a general staff of Shia trained up in a few months or years? Can’t be done, and all the experienced generals are Sunnis and Baathists. Or Iranians. This is also a balancing element which will lessen the liklihood that the Shia can take the Sunni on the ground.
And, how does it work if we get other Arab forces involved if they are Sunni? Thanks for the post. Circumstances are evolving, or our conception (my understanding) of them, well beyond the question of American withdrawal.
…the basics, like shooting, in short order. But what can’t be brought about in short order is unit cohesiveness in a land where loyalty goes first to family and clan. Thus, what we’re training right now are future militias.
Thus, what we’re training right now are future militias
Or insurgents. Mention was made a few months ago that out of 40 trainees, only one showed up to be assigned to a unit. I just can’t imagine what the other 39 are up to right now.
if Iran invaded and occupied the US, how successful they would be in “training” Americans to exterminate other Americans according to the orders of the Iranian gunmen…
for 25% of Americans.
The issue is really the total dismantling of all political structures in Iraq. By doing that the Bush-administration in effect destroyed the Iraqi nation. From the country’s independence in 1923 and up until 2003, there haven’t really been anything that united the country besides it rigid regime checkmating the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. The national glue has been the nations long standing and coercive political institutions like the Baath Party and the Iraqi military.
When both the Iraqi military and the only political instrument in Iraq, the Baath party, were dissolved the country was booted back to the days before its independence, opening up old ethnic and religious differences. I expect that was the reason for Bush sr. reluctance to invade Baghdad back in 1991.
Sorry a bit tired…eh…Iraq was granted independence in 1932 of course….
It is debatable as to the date of Iraq
s independence. I am inclined to think that the Hashemite government had a lot more “reality” to it than is often credited. That would make a difference as to your view of the date of independence.
1991? I was around the govenment at that time. The first Bush administration did not invade Iraq becasue it did not want to risk the responsibility for creating a situation like this. Pat Lang
Interesting. A few things to add though.
Firstly, it’s clear that the Shia religious parties have the upper hand in the equation, and were very well organised from the beginning, with a coherent plan to translate their majoritarian status into power both at the centre and at the devolved level. The SCIRI-DAWA-Sistani axis have also successfully coopted nativist-nationalist groupings such as the Sadrists, Fadila and IH into the overall strategy. Whilst there are tensions between the groups, they are still able to maintain coherence as they share the same broad objectives – local Shia autonomy, central power, the removal of the US military, sovereign autonomy.
It needs to be stressed that the Sunni will never again be able to reassert central control over Iraq – the Shia have successfully asserted their local dominance in the South and there is little Sunni or AQ insurgent activity going on. The same applies to the Kurdish areas. Whilst it is likely that both these regions will suffer from the occasional suicide bombing spectacular, there is little chance that the Sunni can reclaim what is essentially hostile territory. It should also be noted, that whilst the Shia are perfectly capable of doing so, they have yet to deploy there own, very large, cohort of potential suicide bombers against either the US military, or more pertinently, against the Sunnis.
In contrast to this, the Sunni community has been unable to develop a coherent political approach, and whilst the objective of ending the occupation is shared, as it is with the Shia, there is no agreement as to how the Sunni will negotiate at the centre. The US may try to shoehorn in “their” Sunnis, but this is unlikely to be successful – as there is no guarantee that those that the US finds palatable will actually have any real influence on the ground. Considering that the US were promoting figures such as Adnan Pachachi and Ghazi al Yawar as credible representatives as little as a year ago, they clearly have a lot to learn.
It strikes me that the US has really fucked itself up in this respect. The only credible Sunni figure that I can think of who might have been able to “gain traction” is Aamer el Sadi, who currently languishes in Camp Cropper, having made the mistake of telling the UN the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth regarding Iraq’s WMD; there are no charges against him, so his continued detention can only be to spare political blushes in Washington and London. Foot meet bullet.
Now the Shia, having shown themselves to be fucking smart in their “civil” Jihad approach, are not so stupid as to think that they can accomplish in Anbar, Ninewah and elsewhere what the US has failed to do; they are, however, content to let the US and the Sunnis weaken each other for a whiles longer, the better to assert their bargains down the road – this is one of the more brilliant perversions of the old colonial tactic of divide and rule. However, the Shia will not reach out to those that the US would promote – they will use Sadr to reel in the Sunni religious nationalists with the promise of regional autonomy, bye bye USA and a share of revenues.
The zones of contestation in Baghdad, Diyala, Babil and At Taamim will “Lebanise” to some degree, and will remain unstable for a good while to come. But the Iraqis will eventually work something out once the new balances of power become clear in the post-occupation environment.
It’s hard to determine what the role of Iran will be – I’m sure that they have given last resort guarantees to the Shia, but I suspect that they will avoid direct military intevention. It hasn’t exactly been a great success for the US, and they will not be keen to repeat the folly.
The US’s real problem has always been that the train and equip strategy only works if you’re prepared to do the equipping part too – if the US is not prepared to give the Iraqi army humvees, bradleys, Apaches and the kind of weaponry that is required for the job, then the job won’t get done. If the US is seen to be heading for the exits, it is likely that the Shia will decide to interdict some of this equipment to continue the fight and secure their dominance. As the initial strategy was to invade and not exit, the US military has dug itself into an unsustainable position; exiting will be extremely difficult and painful.
Londan, etc.
Brilliant stuff. I am not sure the Iranians would not send “volunteers” into Iraq if the issue hung in the balance.
I wonder to what extent the Iranians have manipulated us throughout this thing.
Pat Lang
I wonder to what extent the Iranians have manipulated us throughout this thing.
I am so glad to hear you say this. I have often thought that the link from neo-cons to Chalabi to Iran would be worth investigating. Has anyone looked into this? Certainly, other than the Haliburtons of the world, Iran has gained more from this fiasco in Iraq than anyone else.
It’s an outlier. If we accept the Pape construction regarding suicide bombing, the Iraqi Shia might be tempted down that path as a retaliatory option if circumstances warrant it; it’s possible that there might be some Iranian volunteers, but I suspect that the Iranian government would be very reluctant to be seen to be providing bodies for this – as it would have negative repercussions with other front-line states ( Saudi Arabia ), and would risk an unneccesary escalation. At any rate, I’m pretty sure that between them, SCIRI and the Sadrists could find plenty of local volunteers for martyrdom operations, particularly if Sistani came out with a fatwa decreeing an “uncivil” Jihad.
It’s possible that the Iranians have penetrated the highest reaches of the Heritage/AEI/Republican party/Neocon establishments in a way that would make AIPAC vomit in envy; I’m dubious. IIRC, the Iranians were very public in their opposition to the invasion, although the reverse psychology buffs might suggest that this was to provoke Washington into its usual ‘if Iran’s against it, we’d better be for it’ mode.
It strikes me that the Iranians have thought through the consequences of an invasion in a very rigorous fashion, developed a plan that had a chance of succeeding, and implemented it as flawlessly as possible. The key was flipping Sistani into interventionism in June of 2003, with his decreeing of a civil jihad against the occupation, and the subsequent fatwa demanding one-person, one-vote elections…or else. My impression is that under Bremer the US was utterly clueless as to where the real power lay, and had precious little idea of what was actually going on. Washington is still playing catch-up on this – and Khalilzad’s attempt to seek audience with the Iranians is indicative of the relative strenghts of the parties.
My default assumption prior to the invasion was that Iran would win the peace – they’ve outperformed my expectations thus far, and have set the Iran-Iraq entente cordiale into some firm foundations. You’d almost think that the government in Baghdad was exercising sovereign autonomy over its foreign policy! It’s also very notable how backwards and incoherent the approach of the other frontline states has been.
We have made a mess in the backyards of Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Oleogarchy, so we’d better skedaddle before the fireworks go off.
The cavalry of a pan-Arabic Ba’ath movement that is distinctly Sunni may be a nice new fantasy for Bob Hope and Bing Crosby to sell to the crowd as they pack their bags, but the Russians and the Turks would hang fire anyway. The Iraqi territories will supply no major forces to the next battles, and they don’t like the look of the Chinese junk headed into the Persian gulf…
And as for the House of Saud: who needs national security when you have American securities? They’ve got enough left over to fund the next new thing in energy.