Bob Woodward has started rolling out teasers for his new book in the Washington Post. The first one explains how the military refused to provide Obama with the alternatives to escalation in Afghanistan that he sought. The options they gave him would have resulted in more troops in Afghanistan in 2016 than were there when he took office.
It’s worth a read, because it contextualizes what Obama eventually decided to do. I don’t agree with Obama’s decision, but at least it was closer to what I’d advise than anything he was provided by the Pentagon. One interesting fact is that Obama had to consider the implications of Defense Secretary Bob Gates deciding to resign in protest if he didn’t escalate by at least 40,000 troops (he eventually settled for 30,000).
Obama was strongly considering limiting the escalation to 10,000 military trainers, despite the fact that all his military advisers had rejected that strategy at the beginning of the process.
The 30,000 was a “hard cap,” [Obama] said. “I don’t want enablers to be used as wiggle room. The easy thing for me to do – politically – would actually be to say no” to the 30,000.
The president gestured out the Oval Office windows, across the Potomac River, in the direction of the Pentagon. He said, “They think it’s the opposite. I’d be perfectly happy . . .” He stopped mid-sentence. “Nothing would make Rahm happier than if I said no to the 30,000.”
There was some subdued laughter.
The military did not understand, he said. “It’d be a lot easier for me to go out and give a speech saying, ‘You know what? The American people are sick of this war, and we’re going to put in 10,000 trainers because that’s how we’re going to get out of there.’ “
It was apparent that a part of Obama wanted to give precisely that speech. He seemed to be road-testing it.
[Deputy National Security Adviser Tom] Donilon said Gates might resign if the decision was 10,000 trainers, an option the military leaders had all rejected in the early stages of the review.
“That would be the difficult part,” Obama said, “because Bob Gates is . . .there’s no stronger member of my national security team.”
No one said anything more about that possibility.
Obama wanted something his National Security team could support with unanimity, not something that would divide them into hostile camps.
“We’re not going to do this unless everybody literally signs on to it and looks me in the eye and tells me that they’re for it,” Obama said.
The president was as animated as most in the room had ever seen him. “I don’t want to have anybody going out the day after [the speech] and saying that they don’t agree with this.”
He did accomplish that task, but the problem was that no one provided any real strategies. For example, the Pentagon gave him a plan with flawed assumptions:
“Mr. Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs, Mike Mullen], the president really wants another option,” [Army Lt. Gen. Douglas E.] Lute said. “You’re on the hook.”
Three days later, Mullen and the Joint Chiefs produced a new version of its “Alternative Mission in Afghanistan” graph. The revised chart showed a faster drawdown beginning in 2012, when Obama would be running for reelection. The then-current level of 68,000 would be reached by spring of 2013. Then the shift to an “advise/assist” mission would begin.
The new timetable relied on four “key assumptions,” none of which the strategy review had suggested was likely. The assumptions were that Taliban insurgents would be “degraded” enough to be “manageable” by the Afghans; that the Afghan national army and police would be able to secure the U.S. gains; that the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan would be “eliminated or severely degraded”; and that the Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai could stabilize the country.
So, part of the problem is that the Pentagon has no solution but doesn’t want to face an accountability-moment. The president was not given anything to work with, and he faced the prospect of a mutiny if he did anything less than he wound up doing.
This is another example of the risks of war. They are easy to start, but nearly impossible to end.
What is left unsaid in Woodward’s piece is the situation in Pakistan. Concern about instability there is a huge part of the reason that no one wants to take responsibility for drawing down promptly in Afghanistan. But that’s a subject for another post.
Of course the obvious uselessness of this war in “fighting terrorism” can never come up for discussion. If Obama felt as strongly about his view as Woodward seems to suggest, it was a mistake not to stand up to the military. He’s the COC, not them. Presidents always forget that and eventually pay a high price for it.
Boo, re: DaveW’s comment, do you think Obama ever really had the choice to go with the 10,000 troops option (or a complete Afghanistan pullout, for that matter)? What do you think it would have meant for his Congressional, military, or public support had Gates resigned and unity between his military advisors fallen apart? My (very) limited understanding of Kennedy’s relationship with the military suggests to me that he faced a similar problem regarding Vietnam, and that, had he lived, he may have had to deal with some sort of epic constitutional crisis/standoff with the military over it.
If he wanted to be a one-termer he could do anything he wanted to.
There’s no doubt that they made sure he understood the high price he would pay if he went outside certain parameters.
Yeah, I agree. He pretty clearly wants to be a two term president and to be seen as having inaugurated a new progressive era in the way we now see Reagan as having inaugurated a new conservative era.
And, he was completing the Afghanistan policy review at the same time he was trying to get health care through the Senate—which required all 60 Democratic votes. I’d be surprised if that didn’t play at least a small role in his decision making about how much he could afford to push back on the Pentagon.
It brings to mind (for me anyway) Bruce Springsteen’s song “Long Walk Home”. The Bush years did enormous damage to our country and it will be the work of many years (not half a presidential term) to repair that damage—let alone work through the list of “deferred maintenance”.
That`s when you man up & do what`s right.
Assert your power as CIC & shut that war down.
A one term president who does the right thing may soon become a two termer.
If not, then no one can blame him.
He shouldn`t have even started to look forward.
He should have made decisions on first cleaning up the mess behind, while asserting the power in his hands, the majority of power in both houses & the abysmal record of the past administration. He had the power to make the needed changes, but deferred to Gates??
Helloooooeee
Have you noticed the fates of McChrystal and Petraeus?
Not following, please explain (probably missing the obvious – I’m pretty sleep deprived and stressed out about upcoming deadline, not thinking clearly either- but I’m curious)
TD might consider that Petraeus replacing McChrystal involved a demotion for both, given that Petr had a larger jurisdictional command before Obama picked him to step in to run Afghanistan. That’s my take on some of the above comments anyway, though I don’t agree that Petraeus was demoted in any real sense.
He was demoted.
He was head of Central Command, the single most important job in our military. Now he’s stuck with the most thankless job, and he isn’t even being allowed to pursue his own strategy. He should have retired if he has any political ambitions, but, to his credit, he took the job the president asked him to do.
Compared to Obama, JFK had a few advantages: namely a totally loyal SecDef (McNamara, also like Gates a Repub, but a JFK-for-president type Repub) who while privately having argued to send in combat units to Nam in Nov ’61, took the proper, democratic attitude that he was there to serve the president and carry out his policy to the best of his ability which, on VN and the rest, he did, and very well, for Kennedy. No threats to resign over policy differences, no disloyal leaking to the press.
Ditto for Kennedy’s handpicked CJCS, Gen Max Taylor, a moderate hawk on VN who agreed to loyally carry out the CinC’s policy on no combat troops/withdrawal despite his own disagreement. (Some of the other remaining Chiefs, however, like LeMay, not so loyal.)
JFK was also smarter than Obama in acting pre-emptively in dealing with the brass and public opinion: in ’61, knowing the Pentagon would soon formally recommend sending in US combat troops, Kennedy arranged for a planted story in the NYT saying the Pentagon was cool to the idea of sending in troops. Of course they formally reported a few weeks later to the contrary, but the original planted story had the effect of keeping the whole issue of VN on the media backburner for quite a while, which is where Kennedy wanted it.
Kennedy had the cojones to stand up to all his military/nat’l security advisors on Nam and tell them No (and later, not just No, but that we’d be withdrawing!). He took similar lone contrarian stances during the BoP, and over the question about sending troops into Laos, and during the Cuban missile crisis. In each instance of course the military grumbled but went along, though at least during the CMC, the Kennedys were at one point quite concerned about a potential Seven Days in May situation.
Of course, some would contend that a year later there was payback …
Interesting analysis. I would also add that Kennedy was a combat veteran, and to the extent that it gave him more confidence/credibility with the military brass it might have been helpful. He also, obviously, had Establishment connections up the wazoo – hence he could do things like plant stories in the NYT and control the media message much more fully than Obama is able to.
I’ve heard that explanation of his assassination as payback for standing up to the military on Vietnam. And I’ll be honest, it always seemed more plausible to me than all those mafia/Cubans/lone gunman theories that still get tossed around.
Well, Kennedy used his connections, but even with that, and being prez, he had limited ability to control the media spin. Take 1963 for instance, when the NYT reporter David Halberstam was reporting from Nam and sending back front-paged reports that our advisory effort there was going badly — with a clear implication that we should be doing more to save that country from going commie. This greatly annoyed Kennedy, who, again, wanted to keep the war and US involvement very low key, as he was about to announce his withdrawal policy (which happened Oct ’63); his well-intended efforts at getting the NYT brass to send a replacement for DH went for naught.
Re Kennedy’s own combat experience, no question it made him more confident dealing with the brass, giving him a built-in skepticism about their expertise and smarts. Certainly Clinton felt self-conscious and defensive about his non-military/draft avoidance background, which greatly hampered him early on as he failed to lay down the law with CJCS Powell over gays. Obama seems a bit Clinton-like in not dealing forcefully with the brass over his Afghan policy, as I read the backstory from Woodward.
Come July of next year though, he’s going to have to toughen up if he wants a real withdrawal from Afghan.
Bet on it.
Obama’s too smart to make the same mistake. Too much to live for. No delusions of grandeur. Not really. Coming up black rather than Irish nouveau riche‘ll do that for you.
Bet on that as well.
AG
Presidents who stand up to the military (indeed the entire national security apparatus) too strongly and too soon pay a bigger price. The military did not like the fact that Carter granted amnesty to draft-dodgers, and the intelligence community did not like that the Church Committee trimmed their wings. Who guards the guardians has always been a political contradiction.
Obama had to make a decision early. Because of the furor over his Islamic name, Obama was likely stuck with having Gates continue on. Otherwise the shitstorm would have started sooner. After he was read into the situation, Obama saw how effed we were. And Gates had to hold him hostage through a threat to resign in order to get him to do a surge.
When the situation did not improve, McChrystal tried the same stunt and was reassigned from Afghanistan, replaced by Petraeus, a demotion by Petraeus. Obama seems to have gotten agreement on a strategy, said go do it, provided the resources the military asked for, and amazingly expected them to deliver those results. When McChrystal refused to be held accountable for results and instead went to the media, Obama made an example of him. Petraeus has not gone public, but he has gone to Republican members of Congress; you can tell by the nature of his questioning in hearings.
It’s time to stop harping on the fact that responding to 9/11 with war in Afghanistan was a stupid idea and focus on what it will take to get us out of there. And the key point is that when we leave there must be no grounds for the right-wing to come back with a stab-in-the-back argument about how Democrats cannot be trusted with national security. That was the narrative after Vietnam and that was the narrative after the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran.
In the latter case, the reason that we failed is that there were too many services involved, they were coordinated only through Washington because they had neither the equipment nor the command structure to talk to each other. Delta Force was overconfident. And the element of surprise was hard to coordinate and caused accidents in the landing area. Finally, the whole premise of the operation was stupid, no matter how much Carter wants to dispel that notion. It was a failure caused mainly by inter-service rivalry, poor command, and incompatible equipment. And Ronald Reagan (or more properly George H. W. Bush and William Casey) exploited it with behind-the-scenes negotiating with the Iranians.
So, based on this reporting, Obama took Gates’ threat to resign if Obama didn’t approve a “surge” of 40,000 troops, and approved a “surge” of 30,000—in effect daring Gates to resign over the difference and, when Gates didn’t resign, showing—at least in a small way—that Obama was in charge.
Obama also demanded his entire national security team publicly support the policy—which they did, and which included a troop withdrawal beginning in July 2011. We’ll see if he can pull it off. If he does, it’s a victory for re-establishing civilian control of the military.
I think this kind of victory is a small victory indeed.
True that.
At a time when we seem to have very few victories (and a number of defeats) on the horizon, I find myself calling to mind whatever victories we can claim—not as a way of avoiding reality, but as a way of “keeping hope alive” to continue the struggle.
Agree. BFD, a few thousand difference.
And Obama demanding his nat’l security team sign on to the policy: an odd request, almost betraying a lack of self-confidence in his leadership. Normally one would think that policy disagreements end with the CinC’s final decision, at which point it’s assumed everyone either gets on board or, in rare cases, quietly tenders his/her resignation. Obama seems very defensive here.
An old organizing tactic. Obama not only got them all to “sign on”; he got them to make public statements (if I recall correctly) in support of his decision.
It doesn’t mean they can’t change their position come next summer, or try to make him change his mind. It just makes it harder for them.
Not so strange, given his commitment to give them the resources that they needed (not wanted) and putting them under a definite withdrawal schedule. By having all of the strategy, timing, and resources clearly stated and getting unanimous agreement, Obama is able to hold them accountable. And if they go off after failure and ask for more troops, Obama can legitimately relieve them of duty or use that fact to request results.
No general wants to be the one to tell the President point-blank that it’s time to leave, that the mission can no way, no how be accomplished. So they depend on getting a protracted war hoping to leave that task to a bigger fool of a general.
Whatever happened to people taking responsibility for their decisions? Isn’t that part of the military ethos too?
That’s what light colonels are for…
Much smaller than it had to be.
One of these days, a Dem president is going to learn all the relevant lessons of recent history in dealing with the Pentagon brass, and do everything right.
Obama I thought, early on, might have wanted to keep Gates in place as political cover for a more robust withdrawal policy from Afghan/Iraq, or to generally engage in the battle against AQ on a more limited special forces basis. But basically to continue the predecessor’s approach, shifting from one country to another in military emphasis, you don’t need a Repub Gates in there.
But to actually withdraw by the timetable set down, it looks like Obama chose badly by keeping Gates in there, though he has time to make a change for the better before July 2011. I might recommend it — a mighty internal battle is shaping up, and Gates looks to be one who will be arguing the hawkish side of the issue, and possibly causing political problems for Obama if he doesn’t get his way.
Obama needs a loyal but firm and smart McNamara type, strange as that sounds, to help him through the beginning of withdrawal period.
Even if you’re right, I think it’s important to remember that Gates also gave Obama the political cover to make those unprecedented cuts in military spending. The F-22 and all that. So there is an upside to having him there.
Well, I’m not overly impressed by one program being eliminated when, as I understand it, the overall Pentagon budget keeps going up each year, while we pay through the nose for the escalation in Afghanistan. Pretty small victory, sort of like the 30k vs 40k difference in troops for Afghan “victory” he scored over Gates.
Imo, as the Woodward reporting suggests, Obama is probably getting much more downside with Gates in there than he’d have with, say, just a solid but loyal Dem that he’d carefully chosen.
Just part of dealmaking IMO
Woodward’s account makes a lot of sense, so I have little reason to doubt it. Part of me was wary, as I thought perhaps the purpose of it was to alleviate contempt held for Obama over this issue. Maybe that’s what it is in a way.
Nonetheless, if anyone paid close attention to the speech he gave at West Point, you could see the pain and hurt in his eyes, you could hear it in his voice. As a matter of fact, that’s the day I changed my support for the effort to opposition.
Easily one of his worst speeches ever, if not the worst. It seemed like he hardly believed even half of what he was saying. Just warmed over bushisms and neo-conservative horseshit.
Totally agree. People often talk about how he never expresses emotion (which is more or less bullshit to anyone who pays attention), but this was one of those moments because he didn’t believe it.
You knew he didn’t believe what he was saying, and it hurt him to his very bone. I especially remember one part where he stared at one particular individual, and I thought he may have started to cry.
Shocking news: we’re in Afghanistan because the war-machine can’t countenance it’s own impotence and incompetence.
Essentially yes. And Congress is intimidated and bribed into covering up these failings.
More specifically is the hubris and 20th century American resort to military action rather than diplomacy (with a few exceptions).
We keep shooting ourselves in the foot. Or Afghan civilian’s heads when we get stoned and bored:
http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/09/27/background-u-s-soldiers-charged-with-murder/?hpt=T1
What is it about the hash from over there that makes people assassins?
I’ll stick to the Moroccan blonde, TYVM.
Our choppers (versus drones) are making regular incursions in Pakistan. The Bad Guys are literally drawing us into Pakistan. Not that we have any problem with that.
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/09/27/afghanistan.pakistan.raid/index.html?hpt=T2
I am thinking our military is not giving up on the whole pan-Asian war for resources thing at all.. Pakistan has a nice coastline where a pipeline could terminate nicely. To get that done, we need to stay in Afghanistan and expand the pacified zone to include pipeline routes, and basically take over Pakistan or pacify it by other means.
The upside is if we dominate and pacify Pakistan (and build said pipeline), we have one major reason for attacking Iran off the table and one less nuclear state that we don’t/shouldn’t trust.
Yay.
Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium, and revenge. It has no other exports, not now, and all those rare earths found by the Soviets, and re-found by us, aren’t being developed any time soon. When they are, they’ll go out thru China.
Any petro-giant who’d route a pipeline through there gets what they deserve. There’s a dozen better ways to get the gas out – better than a shared Indo-Pakistani one.
I think in this case you’ll have to find another villain.
In one sense, I agree and even extend your thought: there is no ONE villian here.
BUT..
There are many groups with a common interest in us playing in central Asia. Some want a forever war. Some want resource control during and or after. Some want religious war.
If we can defeat or change those interests, one by one, piece by piece, then the ‘coalition of the willing’ falls apart and no mo’ War.
Sorry, Big Fossil is a villian indeed. Pre-War, they were paying off the Taliban in hopes of building this very pipeline in this very unstable place. So, I’ll have to beg to differ.
Ever heard of “Mega Oil”?
Oh, and there are also those folks who might not like a nuke in Pakistani hands and are willing to do a lot to either change that or take control of said nukes..
All of the routes that bypass Afghanistan are economically more feasible than the ones going through Pakistan.
Iran, China, and Russia are the players. And Afghanistan has likely been frozen out because it neither has customers nor resources. And the idea that any pipeline going to India will go through Pakistan is at the moment laughable. India most likely will deal with Iran or continue to import from a variety of places, including the Persian Gulf. Pakistan most likely will continue to be supplied from the Persian Gulf.
The pipeline through Afghanistan was rumored to be part of Cheney’s secret energy plan. But it seems to have been as well thought out as other parts of that plan. But watch for a scramble as US firms seek to cut deals with Iran for transport and sale. And service firms like Halliburton seek to deliver oilfield and pipeline services, most likely with indigenous workers and management.
“Iran, China and Russia are the players” simply bolsters my point that there are crazy neo-con/energy security types that can’t live with that idea.
Planned (still) pipeline in question goes through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Western Afghanistan is just a place to put a pipe through, not one to serve or supply anything.
Or we just pretend that everyone agrees with your (perhaps valid) assessment, despite evidence, statements, plans and actions to the contrary.
And then wonder “why aren’t we leaving??”
Have you looked at the topography of Afghanistan? It is very expensive to construct a pipeline through there.
The answer to why aren’t we leaving is that (1) we have not completely evicted foreign fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan; (2) we have not begun consolidated troops in a defensible position to permit withdrawal; (3) we have not achieved a political solution that will guarantee safe passage during withdrawal (like the Status of Forces Agreement in Iraq); (4) we have a general in command who is not yet willing to admit that the US cannot ever conduct counter-insurgency in a failing state; (5) we have a general who has been used to playing the media and Congress to get advancement and who now has to win a war that he claimed he could win; (6) we have a general who doesn’t want to be stuck with a citation in history books that he lost a war; (7) the politics of withdrawal are complicated by a movement that will claim that Obama stabbed America in the back by cutting and running; (8) it takes a hell of a lot of planning and logistics to remove 140,000 troops from a country.
If there was ever an idea of a pipeline, it was a pipe dream of the last administration. It ain’t gonna happen in 50 years, and given that it’s not likely to happen at all.
Seems that Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India know something that you don’t. They just signed a pipeline agreement for the routes I am discussing.
Hope you aren’t investing based on your analysis!
Looks like we won the war! Yay.
This is a project being financed by the Asian Development Bank. The US is not a party to this agreement. This is information that I had not seen. But it argues for more rapid withdrawal of US troops instead of their continued presence. And it requires greater cooperation between Pakistan and India than has yet been seen. It will be very expensive to complete for all the reasons I noted above; the Asian Development Bank is apparently willing to finance that expense; it apparently is transport natural gas to Pakistan and India; Afghanistan might have an agreement for supply of natural gas as well.
And the Indian energy minister had this comment:
That does not sound like a permanent US presence to me, nor a motivation for continued war.
BINGO!!
The map I provide shows the pipeline in question and a planned oil pipeline that follows the same route through Afghanistan and terminates on the coast of Pakistan instead of swerving to India at the last moment (the TAPI pipeline actually follows a more southern route in Pakistan than the image has). The “plan” worked.. so far.
Remove or satisfy the interests of the various members of the ‘coalition’ that still wants war.. and.. NO MORE WAR.
It shows me that Obama made a big mistake keeping Gates instead of replacing him with someone like Wesley Clark or Jim Webb or even Colin Powell if he felt he needed a Republican. True, bigots would go berserk over the darkness of the cabinet, but so what? Powell still has a lot of credit with a lot of people, including white Republicans. He lost a lot when he lied about Iraqi WMD, but I and many others think he was sandbagged (more like blackjacked) by Cheney.
Instead he caved and is now hostage to a neocon.
Voice, we’ll have to see what happens. Gates has already said he’s leaving next year, so Obama will have some options for that position.
It’s worth recalling some of what Obama gained by keeping Gates:
Unfortunately, iirc, the timing of Gates scheduled departure is months after what is shaping up as a major battle over the extent of the planned July 2011 withdrawal. Perhaps Obama can arrange to have Gates exit the scene a little earlier than planned. SecDef Wes Clark?
My 2¢ on your other points:
I’m not sure any of the names you mentioned could do what needed to be done at DoD. Powell is now too old and would probably not want to go back. Webb opens up a Senate seat at a critical time. I’m not sure how long uniformed military have to be away from DoD before they are considered sufficiently civilian to be Secretary DoD; Clark might be a possible replacement for Gates.
It takes someone who knows all of the games that the military plays with Congress but who is loyal to the success of the President. Gates has fulfilled that role pretty well. Now it’s time for a strong Democrat, even a progressive Democrat to lead DoD. It’s gonna be tough figuring out who that should be. Tougher to get them confirmed. Might require shuffling the folks at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some of which has been going on already over DADT–the change in the Marine Corps Commandant, for example.
I think the rule is 10 yrs removed from the military in order to be SecDef. Wesley Clark “retired” in 1999, iirc, after Clinton’s last SecDef Bill Cohen (another Repub, natch) gave him constant grief over his command in the Kosovo action.
Clark would seem much more likely to be loyal to Obama than Gates, imo, even though he was a Hillary supporter in the primaries.
But if you want an absolute loyalist who knows something about the Pentagon, who’s a Dem preferably, smart and tough, who’s also in 2011 going to be confirmable with a more conservative Congress, well that’s probably not a very long list, and it could even be someone outside of the usual circles, someone unexpected — again, like the effective (for JFK) McNamara was.
Hmm … Hillary Clinton perhaps?
If I understand correctly, I’m pretty sure Clark was not qualified to serve at the time an appointment needed to be made.
You could be right. Strange that he was qualifed to serve as President, but not SecDef.