When the history of our misadventure in Iraq is written, scholars will focus
on our failure to mount a counterinsurgency strategy while wasting our resources
on counterterrorism operations that inadvertently fed the insurgency.
During my recent trip to Iraq I saw firsthand that US forces in Iraq are focused
on four principle missions:
Counterterrorism operations
Force Protection (securing US personnel and their bases)
Keeping Logistics supply routes open
Training Iraqi military forces
U.S. military forces are conducting an impressive number of counterterrorism
operations every day. The term, “counterterrorism operations”, refers to
activities designed to identify, locate, and kill or capture terrorist
operatives. It is an offensive rather than defensive tactic.
Although we are capturing and killing extremist jihadist terrorists every day,
the number of insurgent attacks and terrorist incidents in Iraq has continued to
increase. Last year, for example, there were about 70 insurgent
attacks a day. Now, there are more than 75 a day. Despite killing
Zarqawi and others like him, the trend line is up, not down.
U.S. forces not involved in counterterrorism operations are involved with
defensive operations — force protection and supply route protection. The
United States does not have enough military forces in Iraq to conduct and
sustain an effective counterinsurgency campaign. As a result, we are
forced into a defensive mode, with the exception of our counterterrorism
operations, that has essentially made us spectators to the escalating civil
war.
How about the training of the Iraqi military? Unfortunately, we are not
creating a genuine national, non-sectarian force. We are forming a largely
Shia Army that operates more as a local militia. The Sunnis who we have
trained operate in a similar fashion. They have acquired military skill
with the expectation of being able to protect their local communities from other
Iraqis. Our training comes with strings attached. For example, we
are not equipping the new Iraqi Army with the type of helicopter and fixed wing
aerial platforms required to conduct both counterterrorist and counterinsurgent
operations.
counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, economic,
psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency
(JP 1-02). It is an offensive approach involving all elements of national
power; it can take place across the range of operations and spectrum of
conflict. It supports and influences an HN’s IDAD program. It includes
strategic and operational planning; intelligence development and analysis;
training; materiel, technical, and organizational assistance; advice;
infrastructure development; tactical-level operations; and many elements of
PSYOP. Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and
development programs. Leaders must consider the roles of military,
intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance, and economic
elements (MIDLIFE) in counterinsurgency.
Without a draft or a substantial increase in coalition forces on the ground
in Iraq, we do not have the resources to conduct a counterinsurgency
campaign. If we decided to go this route we must be ready to accept that
the process will endure several years and that casualty rates for coalition
forces would, at least over the short run, increase dramatically. Talking
about this is pure fantasy. No political leader in the United States has
the stomach or courage go down this road.
It is becoming clearer everyday that the Iraqi Shia are consolidating their
power and the fight with the Sunnis will continue for several years. The
United States has succeeded in creating a Shia religious state in Iraq; an
accomplishment that has horrified Iraq’s Sunni neighbors.
If you want to learn more about counterinsurgency in Iraq, take a look at the
following:
The one thing you will learn after reading this mountain of material is that
we are not doing what the experts recommend we do. When we finally leave
Iraq and the war there continues we will only have ourselves to blame for
ignoring history and not applying the lessons of
counterinsurgency.
……………………………………………………..
Larry C. Johnson is CEO and co-founder
of BERG Associates, LLC, an international business-consulting firm
that helps corporations and governments manage threats posed by
terrorism and money laundering. Mr. Johnson, who worked previously
with the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. State Department’s
Office of Counter Terrorism (as a Deputy Director), is a recognized
expert in the fields of terrorism, aviation security, crisis and risk
management. Mr. Johnson has analyzed terrorist incidents for a variety
of media including the Jim Lehrer News Hour, National Public Radio,
ABC’s Nightline, NBC’s Today Show, the New York Times, CNN, Fox News,
and the BBC. Mr. Johnson has authored several articles for
publications, including Security Management Magazine, the New York
Times, and The Los Angeles Times. He has lectured on terrorism and
aviation security around the world. Further bio
details.
