When the history of our misadventure in Iraq is written, scholars will focus
on our failure to mount a counterinsurgency strategy while wasting our resources
on counterterrorism operations that inadvertently fed the insurgency. 
During my recent trip to Iraq I saw firsthand that US forces in Iraq are focused
on four principle missions:

  • Counterterrorism operations
  • Force Protection (securing US personnel and their bases)
  • Keeping Logistics supply routes open
  • Training Iraqi military forces

U.S. military forces are conducting an impressive number of counterterrorism
operations every day. The term, “counterterrorism operations”, refers to
activities designed to identify, locate, and kill or capture terrorist
operatives.  It is an offensive rather than defensive tactic. 
Although we are capturing and killing extremist jihadist terrorists every day,
the number of insurgent attacks and terrorist incidents in Iraq has continued to
increase.   Last year, for example, there were about 70 insurgent
attacks a day.  Now, there are more than 75 a day.  Despite killing
Zarqawi and others like him, the trend line is up, not down.

U.S. forces not involved in counterterrorism operations are involved with
defensive operations — force protection and supply route protection.  The
United States does not have enough military forces in Iraq to conduct and
sustain an effective counterinsurgency campaign.  As a result, we are
forced into a defensive mode, with the exception of our counterterrorism
operations, that has essentially made us spectators to the escalating civil
war.

How about the training of the Iraqi military?  Unfortunately, we are not
creating a genuine national, non-sectarian force.  We are forming a largely
Shia Army that operates more as a local militia.  The Sunnis who we have
trained operate in a similar fashion.  They have acquired military skill
with the expectation of being able to protect their local communities from other
Iraqis.  Our training comes with strings attached.  For example, we
are not equipping the new Iraqi Army with the type of helicopter and fixed wing
aerial platforms required to conduct both counterterrorist and counterinsurgent
operations.

What is Counterinsurgency?  According to the Department of the
Army: