Our Strategy Towards Iran

With events spiraling out of control in Iran, it is probably a good time to ask ourselves what our country’s strategic interests are there and how different outcomes might impact them.

Iran is the prototypical crossroads, and it’s territory has been fought over for all of recorded history. Its trade routes are famous and its ports are strategic. It’s rich with oil and gas, and borders Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (all of which are of particular interest to the United States). It also borders Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and Turkmenistan. All of that is important. But, even more important, is Iran’s role as a threat to Israel.

When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, Iran began a long and complicated relationship with the people there. They exported Revolutionary Guards who mobilized the local Shi’a community and created what is now known as Hizbollah. Throughout the 1980’s the Iranians waged a proxy war with American intelligence services during Lebanon’s darkest days. Throughout the 1990’s, Hizbollah bled Israel dry before finally forcing their almost complete withdrawal. It is not important that we place the appropriate amount of blame on each side of the scale. What’s important is that Israel has come to see Iran’s sponsorship of Hizbollah as a major threat to their security. In 2006, Israel launched a second invasion of Lebanon to try to destroy Hizbollah’s ability to menace them. Israel failed.

This failure badly damaged the Israeli psyche, as they had never before been defeated in war. It made the Israelis feel more insecure and, thus, less willing to make concessions according to the Road Map or any other previous agreements. Meanwhile, a major split opened up between the Palestinians who support Fatah and the Palestinians who support Hamas. Hamas, which enjoys some support from Iran, won parliamentary elections in Palestine and subsequently took control of the Gaza Strip. From there, they began bombarding Israeli towns with rudimentary rockets. The rockets caused little damage and few fatalities, but the Israelis inability to stop them made them feel even more insecure and less inclined to make concessions.

The combination of the defeat in Lebanon and the ceaseless bombardment from Gaza, convinced the Israelis that peace was impossible so long as Iran was financing these efforts at resistance. Seeing Iran as belligerent and provocative, Israel also became extremely fearful of Iran’s efforts to enrich uranium, and began pressuring the United States to effect a regime change there before Iran mastered the nuclear fuel-cycle that can be converted for use in weapons.

It’s unclear just how much of a legitimate threat Iran poses to Israel. No doubt, their money and expertise is put to use killing Israelis. But it’s a big leap to thinking that Iran would confront them directly with their military or with nuclear weapons through proxy. It’s important to keep the facts straight about Iran’s capabilities and intentions, but it’s more important to deal with the plain fact that Iran makes Israel extremely nervous and provides them with an excuse not to restart the peace process. It has not helped, at all, that President Ahmadinejad has a proclivity for inflammatory Holocaust-denying sabre-rattling.

Every bit of this is of intense interest to the United States. The peace process is at the top, but Iran is important for our policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Caspian Basin, for oil and gas, and for the shipping lanes though the Persian Gulf. Even our policies towards Russia and China are heavily implicated.

The simplest way of looking at this is that on every piece of policy concern, we would prefer to have the reformists in Iran prevail. Musavi ran on a less belligerent foreign policy, and a possible opening to the West. That would have been nice, but we’re dealing with bigger fish now. An Iran that rids itself not only of Ahmadinejad, but the Mullahocracy, and that is willing to keep its nuclear program contained for energy purposes, is an Iran that the United States can deal with. It’s an Iran that no longer is trying to expand their revolutionary agenda throughout the Middle East, and one that no longer provides an excuse for Israel to postpone peace negotiations.

I understand that many people have sympathy for anyone who menaces Israel, and sees this as a defeat for those that resist the Israeli occupation. The fact of the matter is that the United States wants a peace agreement. Anything that stands in the way of that is not in our interests. For that reason, we should hope that the Reformers prevail.

We should not be under any illusions that a popularly elected Iranian government is going to abandon nuclear science or be pro-Israeli. But, we know that the status quo is an endless cycle of violence.

We don’t want or need to be enemies of Iran. We will always have our differences, but we can work them out if we get the right conditions. Those conditions are taking shape on the streets of Tehran, right now.

Yet, in spite of our interests in a Reformation in Iran, we should not step on the scales. The only really beneficial change will be a wholly indigenous one.