Ramzy Mardini knows a hell of a lot more about the Middle East than I do, but he and I have the exact same opinion about what our proper policy should be on Syria. We should not take sides in a sectarian civil war. We should not introduce a higher level of violence by sending in more weapons. We should refuse to think of the conflict as a proxy war with Russia and Iran. And we should use the impossibility of Bashar al-Assad winning the May 2014 election to our advantage.
We should also consider all the downsides of arming the rebels.
The Syrian revolution isn’t democratic or secular; the more than 90,000 fatalities are the result of a civil war, not a genocide — and human rights violations have been committed on both sides.
Moreover, the rebels don’t have the support or trust of a clear majority of the population, and the political opposition is neither credible nor representative. Ethnic cleansing against minorities is more likely to occur under a rebel-led government than under Mr. Assad; likewise, the possibility of chemical weapons’ falling into the hands of terrorist groups only grows as the regime weakens.
And finally, a rebel victory is more likely to destabilize Iraq and Lebanon, and the inevitable disorder of a post-Assad Syria constitutes a greater threat to Israel than the status quo.
Not since the 2003 invasion of Iraq has American foreign policy experienced a strategic void so pervasive.
Mr. Mardini is also correct that the president made a mistake when he said that Mr. Assad had lost all credibility (he hadn’t) and said he had to resign (apparently, he didn’t). But if the policy is to get rid of Assad, it is better to let the ballot box take care of it.
How does that fit into current policy? Well, the cat is out of the bag in terms of not escalating the violence, but it should be done in a limited way that keeps the resistance strong enough to compel Assad to keep his promise to stand for election next May.
Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts should continue to reduce the sectarian tensions that are growing in the region at a dangerous pace. We should avoid anti-Iranian rhetoric that will be heard as anti-Shi’a rhetoric. We actually should be talking about how to protect religious minorities (including the Shi’a) in a post-Assad Syria. We should be thinking about it, too, because it’s a potential genocide that we’re talking about.