Haaretz offers good advice, with one significant caveat.
Until the final moments of his rule, Mubarak championed “security and stability,” and Israel saw his regime as a vital strategic pillar. His adherence to the peace treaty gave Israel prosperity, a quiet border, energy supplies, and the basis for joining the region as a welcome neighbor. Now Israel has to get used to Egypt’s new rulers.
The dramatic change over the border naturally gives rise to fears, but Israel must not interfere in its southern neighbor’s affairs. Egypt has no conflict with Israel and must not be presented as an enemy. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must demonstrate restraint and self-control. His warnings that Egypt could turn into a new Iran, and the talk about increasing the defense budget, merely create destructive tension and put Israel on the side of the ousted regime. The revolution in Egypt did not stem from the ties with Israel, and Netanyahu would do well to keep quiet and give this neighboring country a chance to establish a democracy.
I agree with all of that, except the too pat assertion that the revolution in Egypt did not stem from ties with Israel. Technically, that’s true. But it’s simply sticking your head in the sand to not look closer. Mubarak was unpopular because he ran a police state and because the economy has stagnated. But why did he have to run a police state? Why did he have to suppress free speech? Why deny freedom of assembly? Why govern using unconstitutional “emergency powers” for thirty years? Let us not forget that Mubarak was seated next to Sadat when he was assassinated. And Sadat was assassinated because he made peace with Israel. From its very inception, Mubarak’s rule has been tied like a tether to Israel and the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty. The U.S. had other concerns, including winning Egypt over from the Soviet bloc in the early 1970’s. We obviously wanted to keep Egypt in our camp. We are always concerned about the Suez Canal, and we enjoy preferential treatment there. We have strong business ties to Egypt, especially in armaments. We have had a lot of compelling reasons to look the other way at Mubarak’s human rights record. Under Bush, we even made use of Mubarak’s torture chambers, to our everlasting regret. So, yes, the revolution in Egypt did not stem from their relationship to Israel, but it another way, the unpopularity of Mubarak’s regime is inseparable from the unpopularity of Israel in Egypt.
My theory is that Mubarak and the peace process were given a grace period, as people waited to see what would come of them. But when the peace process collapsed and Israel went right on building new settlements, and when Mubarak delivered more repression than opportunities, things began to sour.
I expect that a representative government in Egypt won’t start clamoring for a war that they cannot win, but they will force a reexamination of the language of the Camp David Accords that served as peace’s predicate. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing. The agreement should be updated to reflect new realities. For example, how did the first part of the accords work out?
The first agreement had three parts. The first part or preamble was a framework for negotiations to establish an autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza strip and to fully implement SC 242. The Accords recognized the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”, a process was to be implemented guaranteeing the full autonomy of the people within a period of five years. Begin insisted on the adjective “full” to confirm that it was the maximum political right attainable. This full autonomy was to be discussed with the participation of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza was agreed to occur after an election of a self-governing authority to replace Israel’s military government.
SC 242, passed unanimously in the aftermath of the 1967 war, calls for “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” It’s forty-four years later now, and it’s thirty-three years since the signing of the Camp David Accords. The peace was based on the understanding that Israel would withdraw from all lands conquered in the 1967 war and that the Palestinians would be given full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. That has not happened, and Israel, under its present and recent leadership, does not appear to have any intention of letting that ever happen. I do not believe that this is a good reason for Egypt to tear up the peace treaty and go to war, but they have good reason to renegotiate the terms and understandings to reflect the reality on the ground. Mubarak paid a price for the fact that Israel did not keep its end of the deal. It made him look foolish and ineffectual. It made him unpopular.
So, keeping that in mind, the Haaretz advice is sound. But more complete advice would include a warning that Israel should get out in front of the situation and not wait to see what comes of Egyptian elections. They need to pivot, just as the U.S. made a pivot in its relations with Egypt.
I keep picturing Mubarak as a drowning man hanging onto the hand of the United States. The pinkie on America’s hand is our military relations, the ring finger is our commercial relations, the middle finger is Israel and our Arab allies, the pointer finger is stability, and the thumb is the president of the United States. One by one, the fingers were peeled back, until Mubarak slipped into the Red Sea.
