The Bush Plan Book

The Threat

The most pressing threats of the new security environment are violent reactions to the world’s movement toward a single international system
marked by the free movement of people, investment,goods, and ideas.

The attacks of September 11th
and the overt hostility toward what is perceived to be a heavily American globalization make it plain that this evolution will be neither easy nor without significant peril. Yet, this movement is not so much a function of American efforts to promote any ideology as it is due to the attraction that many aspects of the Western economic model hold.

Not withstanding recessions and inequities, the complex adaptive economic system that we call free enterprise has proven to be a much more efficient producer of goods and services than command economies or more traditional economies, an efficiency that manifests itself in the increased quantity of goods and services available. It is the promise not of mass
consumption but of consumption by the masses, the idea that everyone can aspire to material goods and a better life, that is attracting support for change.

In addition, the introduction of new information
technologies stands to further enhance this
productivity and attraction. America may aspire to influence the direction and timing of this change, but it cannot control it.

Democratic government, the complex adaptive
political system, is the necessary complement to this complex adaptive economic system. Again, the
reason is practical rather than ideological.

Responsive government is needed to cope with the accelerating pace of political and social change that accompanies the free market and information-driven globalization, both to curb the potential abuses of the free market system and to enforce the competition that drives increased efficiency. In essence, it is the “feedback loop” that focuses the economic effort and ensures that efficient free enterprise does not sink into inefficient monopolies or corrupt oligarchies.

The movement toward a new international system
has also been marked by an expanding information
revolution and the spread of the free, mass culture of the West, abetted by a pervasive global media whose reach has been further expanded by the revolution in information technology (embodied in
Effects-Based Operations 4
the Internet).

This media revolution has not only heightened demand for the goods that a more efficient free market economy can bring, but also increased demand for more open and flexible government.

Again, the information revolution is not the result of any American effort to create democratic bastions, support the free press, or promote information technology.

Rather, it results from the spread of the information itself and the resulting increased awareness around the world of how life might be different and how governments might be better.

This awareness lends force to the entire movement for change, political and economic, as well as social.

The course of this internationalization has not and will not be smooth.

Expectations raised by the expanding media will exceed the ability of governments and economies to deliver.

There will be violent reactions and often destabilizing changes in established cultures and institutions. And, those who oppose change will see conflict as a way to disrupt the movement toward globalization.

The anti-Western violence of al-Qaida is only one manifestation of a problem that is likely to continue as long as the process of globalization continues.

Herein lies the threat to American security. The United States can control neither the movement toward a new international system nor the violent reactions to it, yet the United States, its citizens, and its interests will clearly be a principal target. To make
matters worse, the free trade and travel that are part of globalization make the United States and the West vulnerable in ways that they have never been before. Ocean barriers are no longer protection against terrorism in an era of mass air travel and still more massive trade.

Amidst this turmoil, a strategy of “forward defense” takes on a new meaning, and the traditional military missions of deterrence, presence, and crisis response take on a new significance.

Over the past 50 years, the United States’ forward defense strategy has rested on three pillars: the economy, politics and culture, and the military.

Since September 11, 2001, this strategy has taken on a new urgency. The pace of the transition in which we are engaged is likely to be at least in part a function of the internal and regional stability surrounding it.

The greater the instability and conflict, the slower the pace is likely to be and the more prolonged the threat to the United States. By aiding the transition to a successful and speedy conclusion, we therefore lessen the danger to ourselves at home and abroad.

The forward strategy thus rests on a paradox. It must seek both stability and highly-disruptive change.

How then do military forces contribute?

The Military Role-

The lasting solutions to the unrest wrought by
globalization are political, social, and economic in nature, not military. This is because the root causes of the instability are themselves political, social, and economic in nature. Thus, the United States and the West can influence global evolution only to the
degree that their businessmen, teachers, diplomats, and journalists are free to play a role. But, these varied roles, like the change as a whole, demand a basic local stability in order to succeed.

While our Effects-Based Operations forward military forces certainly may have a role in influencing local militaries, their crucial role is not as an agent of change. Their real role is to create and/or reinforce the stability that political, social, and economic change requires.

The role of military
forces is not to solve all of the social, political, and economic dilemmas; it is to buy time.

Military forces buy time in a very immediate sense by dealing with the symptoms of unrest: meeting threats to American and Western nationals; containing crises; supporting local efforts to handle unrest; and countering opportunistic threats from other local states.

However, perhaps the most significant military contribution is not dealing with the symptoms of instability, but acting as the forward deterrent that underpins long-term stability, a force whose presence and capabilities support an enduring peace within which change can occur.

We can conceive of the economic, socio-political,
and military roles in forward defense as a series of
overlapping circles, depicted in Figure 1. Each
element has a distinctively different function in the
strategy. Each overlaps and supports the other
elements. These overlaps are instructive. For
example, by opening new markets, businessmen
also engage in people-to-people contacts that help
to expand the cultural and political frontiers.

Yet, despite the overlap, the role of the businessman clearly remains economic. Similarly, a diplomat might aid business in opening new markets or
expanding investments while continuing to execute
U.S. policy. This overlap of functions is also
apparent in the military domain.

One role of military forces in forward defense, for example, may be to keep the seas safe for commerce. Another may be to engage people-to-people contacts, e.g. exercises with local militaries.

However, while each of the latter roles may be important, they describe only those areas in which the military role overlaps and directly
supports the economic and political elements.

In this sense, they are missions that are peripheral to the actual and most critical military role of creating and maintaining the basic local stability.

It is this role of deterrence and crisis response that is the true contribution of the military pillar.

In describing this role and the context of effects based operations, our problem is complicated by
Effects-Based Operations  

Forward Defense the fact that we tend to look at military efforts in terms of reactive operations such as the evacuation of American nationals threatened by
local terrorism, or crisis responses to block local
aggression.

Such operations deal with the symptoms of the instability and the incipient failures of local deterrence. As such, they are but one part of the real contribution of constructing and acting as the guarantor of local stability.

Strategic Deterrence and the New Security Environment Post-September 11th strategic deterrence has two dimensions: homeland defense and forward
defense, deterrence and containment.

During the Cold War, strategic deterrence tended to be defined predominantly in terms of strategic
nuclear deterrence. This is certainly understandable given the stakes involved in a nuclear conflagration, however this strategic nuclear deterrence was paralleled by a broader dimension that might be termed conventional or non-strategic nuclear deterrence. Both remain a fundamental part of our security, but the latter dimension in particular lies at the heart of our post-September 11th problem and the need for effects-based operations.

Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

The nuclear deterrence of the Cold War rested on
the threat of retaliation. It worked because each
nuclear-armed power could threaten opponents…

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