One of the more significant decisions of the Supreme Court’s current term passed largely under the radar yesterday, drowned out by the ongoing drama of the democratic presidential primaries.
In a split decision, the US Supreme Court issued a ruling in Medellin v. Texas, a case involving whether or not the State of Texas is obligated to comply with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which the United States is a party.
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas, held categorically that Texas is under no obligation to uphold the terms of the treaty. This holding comes despite the fact that the United States is a party to the treaty, having signed and ratified it nearly forty years ago.
The Court held that in order for an individual state to be bound by a treaty entered into by the Federal government, congress must pass, and the President must sign, a statute which expressly requires that specific state to be thus bound.
The ruling will likely have a far reaching impact on the way the United States enters into treaties, and could cause other Nations to hesitate before entering future treaties with the U.S.
The case has a complex procedural history, several years in the making.
In 2003, Mexico sued the United States in the International Court of Justice, alleging that the US had violated the rights of 54 Mexican Nationals under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, which grants individuals the right to contact their consulate if they are arrested while abroad.
Each of the Mexican Nationals in question had been arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for murder in United States courts, yet none of them had been allowed to contact the Mexican consulate, nor had Mexico been notified of their incarceration by authorities in the U.S.
In what became known as “The Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States)” the International Court ruled that the U.S. had violated the treaty, and that it was required to grant “review and reconsideration” of the cases of 51 of the 54 Mexican Nationals party to the case.
In response to the decision, the Bush Administration officially withdrew from the Vienna Convention’s “Optional Protocol” (the supplemental treaty which grants jurisdiction to the International Court to resolve disputes between parties to the treaty). This prevented Mexico or any of the other parties to the treaty from suing the U.S. over any future violations of the Vienna Convention.
In addition, President Bush issued a memo which ordered the state courts to comply with or “give effect to” the Avena ruling, citing issues of “comity.” Because the rights created by the Vienna Convention also protect American Nationals while they are abroad, the White House clearly had an interest in avoiding at least the appearance of flouting its obligations under the treaty.
The message these actions sent to the international community seems clear: we agree to comply with the ruling of the International Court this time, but we are removing ourselves from the Court’s jurisidction so that we can prevent future Vienna Convention claims from being brought against us.
Jose Medellin re-filed his state habeas corpus petition in light of the Avena decision and Bush’s memo that the states “give effect” to the ruling. When he did this it opened the door for the Supreme Court to rule on the legal issues involved, namely the separation of powers and federalism issues raised by the case.
Though the issue of the president’s memorandum to the states is interesting in its novelty, it is not the central issue of the case, contrary to what headlines in the New York Times or the Associated Press may say. Rather, the central issue is whether or not individual states are obligated to comply with the treaty obligations of the United States. Those treaty obligations exist regardless of whether the president wishes the states to comply or not. In that sense, Bush’s memo is immaterial.
What is material is the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article VI, clause 2), which is clear on this issue. It provides that
“all Treaties … which shall be made … under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”
Since the founding of the country, it has been a bedrock principle of American law that any treaty, once signed and ratified, carries the same authority as if it were a federal statute. The majority opinion in Medellin places a cloud over this longstanding principle.
By ruling that treaties do not carry the weight of law unless congress specifically passes supplemental legislation to “execute” the treaty, the Roberts court significantly undermines the supremacy clause and creates a gaping loophole which the government could use in the future as an excuse to refuse to uphold its international legal obligations, even those it expressly agreed to.
What’s more, by requiring “implementation legislation” above and beyond a treaty itself, the court makes it more difficult for the executive branch to negotiate and enter into treaties with other countries, thus limiting the President’s Article II foreign affairs powers.
Though many progressives may reflexively feel that any limitation on executive power is a good thing, it is important to note the context in which this particular limitation arises.
Arguably, this comes as part of an attempt by an ideologically-driven Supreme Court to limit the foreign affairs authority of the president beneath the threshold originally created by the constitution. By reducing (or at least diluting) the authority of the executive branch to submit the United States to obligations under international treaties, the conservatives on the Roberts court believe they are protecting not only the sovereignty of the United States, but also their own power as the ultimate arbiters of American law.
Put in more simplistic terms, the ruling bears all the hallmarks of a power-grab by the Roberts court.
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The Medellin decision comes as a blow to progressives who would like to see the US play a more cooperative role on the world stage.
For Americans who wish to see greater US compliance with international law, particularly human rights law, it is difficult to view Medellin as anything other than an effort by a highly partisan court to prevent such compliance by tampering with the scope of the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution.
For an international community increasingly frustrated with American exceptionalism, this decision will likely be interpreted as a signal that the United States is not only presently unwilling to abide by its treaty obligations, but that it may be potentially unable to do so in the future. In light of this decision, it is likely that more and more foreign governments will be of the view that agreements entered into by the United States aren’t worth the paper they’re printed on.
