Bush Seeks His Enemies’ Help in Iraq
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by Gareth Porter
Anti-War.com
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/porter.php?articleid=8402
January 17, 2006
To avoid the failure of its mission in Iraq, the George W. Bush
administration has been driven to seek the help of two major enemies –
the
Sunni insurgents and the government of Iran – but both initiatives have
failed to make progress because officials were not given any real
negotiating authority.
U.S. officials in Baghdad are now pursuing contacts with both declared
enemies, with the aim of obtaining their cooperation in overcoming
otherwise
seemingly insurmountable obstacles to success in Iraq. In both cases,
however, the White House has been unwilling to approve concessions
required
to reach a deal benefiting both sides.
Administration policymakers have apparently recognized that, without
the
help of Iran and the Sunni insurgent leaders, it faces the likelihood
of
spiraling sectarian violence, undiminished Sunni armed resistance,
al-Qaeda
terrorist havens, and predominant Iranian political influence.
Some U.S. officials came to realize in 2005 that U.S. policy was
leading to
consequences that contradicted its larger interests. Its main Iraqi
allies,
the militant Shi’ite parties, were aligned with its main enemy, Iran,
while
U.S. forces were fighting against Sunni insurgent organizations whose
longer-term interests lay in opposing both al-Qaeda and Iran.
Iran held a strong and possibly decisive influence in Iraq because of
its
close ties with militant Shi’ite political-military groups. The extent
of
that influence was driven home last July when Iraq’s Defense Minister
Saadoun Dulaimi, on a visit to the Iranian capital, discussed possible
military cooperation between the two countries, only to back away under
U.S.
pressure.
But U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad recognized that it might be
necessary
to use Iran’s influence to induce more moderate behavior by the Shi’ite
parties.
Meanwhile, U.S. officials figured out, belatedly, that Sunni insurgent
organizations could actually help advance U.S. interests in eliminating
terrorist havens in Iraq, as well as limiting Iranian influence.
They recognized that the secular and Ba’athist Sunni insurgent leaders
are
strongly opposed to the Zarqawi organization’s ideology and tactics,
and
have even clashed with the al Qaeda-related groups on some occasions.
Furthermore, like the Sunni political leaders who ran in the December
parliamentary elections, the leaders of Sunni insurgent groups are
strongly
opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq. Thus, the Sunnis fighting against
the
occupation actually represented potential allies.
Last autumn, Khalilzad pushed for significant adjustments in U.S. Iraq
strategy on both Iranian and Sunni insurgent fronts, with partial
success.
He revealed in an interview with Newsweek in late November that he had
been
authorized by the White House to “engage the Iranians,” and described
it as
“an adjustment” in policy.
A few days later, Khalilzad told ABC News that he would talk to any
insurgent groups except for the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi group and those
who
were still loyal to former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.
Two months later, an Iraqi delegation to Tehran carried a letter from
Khalilzad proposing U.S.-Iranian cooperation on Iraq.
But Khalilzad was not allowed to negotiate with Tehran. State
Department
spokesman Sean McCormack pointed out to reporters that the ambassador
had “a
very narrow mandate … and it deals specifically with issues related to
Iraq.”
Iranian Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki immediately said Iran had no
intention of negotiating with the United States. However, it is clear
that
Iran is willing to reach agreement on ways of stabilizing Iraq,
provided a
broader range of issues is also on the table.
On May 4, 2003, according to a Financial Times story 10 months later, a
Swiss diplomat conveyed to the State Department an Iranian proposal for
a
“grand bargain” that would result in coordination of Iranian and U.S.
policy
toward Iraq, support for a two-state Palestinian-Israeli solution, and
an
end to Iran’s nuclear enrichment program in return for U.S.
normalization of
relations and dropping “regime change” from U.S. policy.
But neoconservatives in the administration, led by Defense Secretary
Donald
Rumsfeld, hoped for the collapse of the Iranian regime, and the White
House
rejected the proposal.
Despite the fact that he has nothing to offer the Iranians, Khalilzad
continues to seek Tehran’s help in stabilizing Iraq. The London-based
Al-Hayat newspaper quoted both Iranian and Iraqi sources Jan. 4 as
saying
that Khalilzad had sent a letter to Iran with an Iraqi defense ministry
delegation proposing that the two countries coordinate policy with
regard to
Iraq.
The implication of the present U.S. diplomatic policy is that the White
House feels it can still coerce the Iranians to do their bidding on
Iraq.
The Iranian government, however, clearly believes it holds the stronger
bargaining chips in dealing with the United States, despite continuing
U.S.
military threats, because of the seriousness of the situation in Iraq.
On Jan. 14, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that the
United
States deals with Iran “in a very harsh and illegal language, but
ultimately
they need us more than we need them.” This was apparently a reference
to the
U.S. need for Iran to help stabilize Iraq.
The Iranian statement, coming a few days after Shi’ite leader Abdul
Aziz
al-Hakim decisively rejected any possibility of changes in the Iraqi
constitution, suggests that Iran may have gotten its Iraqi Shi’ite
allies to
support its effort to pressure Washington into serious negotiations
with
Tehran. Such negotiations would cover both Iraq and a more fundamental
bargain over the nuclear fuel cycle issue and the U.S. policy of regime
change.
The administration’s overtures to the Sunni insurgents have suffered
from a
similar lack of decisiveness. A front-page story in the New York Times
on
Jan. 6 reported that U.S. officials had opened “face-to-face
discussions
with insurgents in the field” and were “communicating with senior
insurgent
leaders through intermediaries.”
The message being conveyed to those groups, according to one insurgent
leader, is that Washington wanted their help in the fight against
al-Qaeda.
Abu Amin, a former Iraqi army officer who commands Sunni guerrillas in
Yusefiya, told the Times that U.S. officials were asking, “Do you have
a
relationship with al-Qaeda? Can you help us attack al-Qaeda? Can you
uproot
al-Qaeda from Iraq?”
The report made it clear, however, that U.S. officials had no mandate
to
suggest any accommodation with the insurgents. The leader of the Iraqi
Islamic Party, Tariq al-Hashimy, told the Times that he did not think
the
new U.S. contacts with insurgents had made any progress, because the
U.S.
would not discuss the insurgents’ demand for a timetable for
withdrawal.
A subsequent article in the Times said, “American and Iraqi officials
believe that the conflicts present them with one of the biggest
opportunities since the insurgency burst upon Iraq nearly three years
ago.”
But the story made it clear that the insurgents will not cooperate
without a
sign of U.S. willingness to negotiate with them on withdrawal. “It is
against my beliefs to put my hand with the Americans,” one Iraqi
insurgent
leader said.
Despite its need for the cooperation of Sunni insurgents and Iran, the
White
House has not yet accepted the reality that it cannot simply command
such
cooperation. Given this contradiction, further “adjustments” in U.S.
strategy must eventually be forthcoming.
