I don’t know quite what to make of this bit of opinion from Charles Krauthammer. In response to Obama stating the following at yesterday’s press conference…
“It is a vital national security interest of the United States to reduce these conflicts because whether we like it or not, we remain a dominant military superpower, and when conflicts break out, one way or another we get pulled into them. And that ends up costing us significantly in terms of both blood and treasure”
…Krauthammer says this:
He is giving the standard answer as to what our interest is in Middle East peace. You could give a utopian answer [that] we want to see everybody happy. The real answer, the one he gave, is [that it is] in our national interest that there be quiet in this area and other areas of the world because, necessarily, if there‘s a break-out of problems in the Middle East or, for example, in the Taiwan straits or as happened in Korea in 1950, we’re going to get sucked in. So yes, that’s the standard answer.
. . .
I think he meant whether we like it or not we’re going to get drawn in. . . . Although I think he exaggerated in saying in relation with the Middle East that it’s a matter of blood and treasure. The United States has never been involved directly in a Middle East war involving Israel, never.
Now, what’s confusing to me is how Krauthammer can say that we were not involved directly in the Yom Kippur War. What does he think the 1973 OPEC Oil Embargo was all about. But don’t listen to me, let’s go to the archives.
Early in the morning of 9 October, Kissinger received a call from Dinitz that Israeli forces were in a more “difficult” position. A counter-offensive launched the previous day had failed with major losses. At 8:20, the two met for a more detailed conversation, with a chagrined Dinitz acknowledging that the Israelis had lost over 400 tanks to the Egyptians and 100 to the Syrians. Egyptian armor and surface-to-air missiles were taking their toll in the air and ground battle and the Israeli cabinet had decided that it had to “get all equipment and planes by air that we can.” Kissinger, who had assumed that Tel Aviv could recapture territory without major infusions of aid, was perplexed by the bad news–“Explain to me, how could 400 tanks be lost to the Egyptians?”–and the diplomatic implications of substantial U.S. wartime military aid was troublesome. As indicated on the record of the 8:20 a.m. meeting, Dinitz and Kissinger met privately, without a notetaker, to discuss Golda Meir’s request for a secret meeting with Nixon to plea for military aid, a proposal that Kissinger quickly dismissed because it would strengthen Moscow’s influence in the Arab world. To underline the urgency of the situation, Dinitz may have introduced an element of nuclear blackmail into the private discussion. While Golda Meir had rejected military advice for nuclear weapons use, she had ordered the arming and alerting of Jericho missiles–their principal nuclear delivery system–at least to influence Washington. (Note 30) Kissinger has never gone on record on this issue and no U.S. documentation on the U.S. Israeli nuclear posture during the war has been declassified. Whatever Dinitz said, Kissinger was responsive to the pleas for more assistance. Later, when the WSAG considered the Israeli position, it recommended the supply of arms as long as Washington kept a low profile. Meeting Dinitz later in the day, Kissinger told him that Nixon had approved the entire list of “consumable” items sought by the Israelis (except for laser bombs) would be shipped. Moreover, aircraft and tanks would be replaced if the need became “acute.” To ensure that the U.S. role had low visibility, Israeli cargo plans would have the El Al markings painted out. Moreover, discussion of arrangements to charter U.S. commercial aircraft for shipping war material began on the U.S. side. During that meeting, Dinitz had better news to report: progress on the Golan Heights and the massive destruction of Syrian tanks.
I highly recommend that you click here (PDF) to see the original Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador Mordechai Shalev.
Efforts to conceal this direct aid failed miserably. And, as this manuscript makes clear, Kissinger thought the Arabs would refrain from punishing us.
Except for this transcript, all the minutes for WSAG meetings during the October War remain classified. At this meeting, the participants discussed key issues: planning for an energy crisis, the Arab-Israeli military situation and problems related to the airlift. During the review of plans for energy conservation in the event of an oil crisis, Kissinger showed some optimism that, during the present war, his diplomatic strategy would avoid Arab oil embargo, as he patronizingly observed: “Did you see the Saudi Foreign Minister come out like a good little boy and say they had very fruitful talks with us?” An hour into the meeting, Nixon called in the WSAG principles for a “pep talk.” Mentioning what he saw at stake–“oil and our strategic position”–Nixon focused on the airlift and sealift of supplies to Israel, which he believed were essential for preserving U.S. “credibility everywhere” as well as for bringing Tel Aviv to a settlement. In a self-congratulatory statement, Kissinger declared this was the “best-run crisis” of the Nixon administration, noting that despite the “massive airlift” TASS had issued only mild complaints while Arab foreign ministers were making “compliments in the Rose Garden.” The congratulatory mood was premature because the Arab oil producers had not announced the oil boycott and production cuts that were a direct response to the airlift.
Original manuscript is here.
Now, the reason I point this out is that whatever point Krauthammer is trying to make (and I presume he means that we didn’t do any actual war-fighting), the president’s point still stands. We did not want to give aid to Israel because we knew it would greatly strengthen the Soviet’s position in the Middle East. But we felt we had no choice in the matter because of Israel’s dire situation. It was in our interests to prevent war from breaking out in the first place, as once the fighting began we were sucked into it and not on our own terms. Not only did our decision to directly aid Israel damage our relations with the Arab world, but it led to a devastating oil embargo. So, I don’t see how you can rebut the president by saying we’ve never been involved directly in a war in Israel. Rather than argue over the semantics of ‘directly’ I’d say that it was a distinction without a difference. We don’t want war in the Middle East. We didn’t want it then, we shouldn’t have wanted it in 2003, and we don’t want it now.
