Without meaning to be disrespectful of Islam, I think Islamism as a political phenomenon, grew out of a very constrained set of circumstances where traditional Islamic societies were confronted first with superior Western technology that overwhelmed them militarily, and then with a binary choice of embracing the secular culture of the colonial West of the atheistic ideology or the ostensibly anti-colonial communist powers.
Whether Islam was deemphasized for practical reasons, as in Turkey, or for ideological reasons, as with the Ba’ath parties, it came to be disrespected among elites as a viable all-encompassing way of organizing society. Personal piety was welcome, but a society based on Sharia law alone, was not.
For a devout Muslim, however, the choice between East and West in the Cold War left no satisfactory answer. Communism was a heresy, yet it was the only “anti-colonial” force with any juice. On the other hand, the communist powers were not really anti-colonial at all. Complicating things, the lack of dynamic political systems and debate within most Islamic countries prevented an indigenous modern ideology from taking root. If there was a political middle way, it didn’t have the oxygen to grow. So, instead, we saw the rise of top-down ideologies like Pan-Arabism, which relied more on ethnic solidarity than religious orthodoxy. And, in any case, Pan-Arabism did nothing for Persians and Pakistanis.
Even prior to the collapse of communism, we saw two developments that would foretell the rise of Islamism. The rallying cry for jihad against the Godless communist invasion of Afghanistan was one side of the story. The other was the hijacking, by the Shiite clergy, of the Iranian revolution that overthrew the pro-Western Shah. Both efforts led to at least short-term success, which is more than one could say for Nasser’s confrontation with Israel.
Perhaps better adherence to Islamic law and principles was the key to success. This was certainly the view of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Cold War. Yet, in the aftermath of the Cold War, with the “anti-colonial” side in collapse, there was no political outlet for those who opposed their governments and thought Islamism was the answer. As representative governments flourished in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America, it appeared as if a similar development was precluded in the Middle East.
When Islamists seemed poised to win elections in Algeria, the elections were cancelled. But this was never a natural solution for Islamists, as the following comment from a disgruntled Egyptian makes clear.
After a night of deadly clashes at Cairo University that accompanied the takeover, some ultraconservative Islamists gathered there said their experiment in electoral politics — a deviation from God’s law to begin with — had come to a bad end.
“Didn’t we do what they asked,” asked Mahmoud Taha, 40, a merchant. “We don’t believe in democracy to begin with; it’s not part of our ideology. But we accepted it. We followed them, and then this is what they do?”
It’s easy to laugh at the lack of self-awareness in that comment, as the backlash against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was largely about their lack of respect for fundamental democratic principles like minority rights, and respect for a pluralistic society, and consensus-building. But the Morsi government was also an experiment with channelling traditional Islamist ideology into a democratic form to see if the two could be melded and develop together.
From my admittedly Western point of view, it appears that Islamism is an ideology for a situation in which democracy is not an option. It’s not so much that Islamism isn’t compatible with democracy, because that still remains to be seen. It’s that Islamism isn’t needed in a democratic system. And it hasn’t developed to be consistent with democratic values, so it needs time to evolve as an ideology before it can work within such a system.
Yet, the Islamists are concluding that pursuing politics is fruitless.
Sheik Mohamed Abu Sidra had watched in exasperation for months as President Mohamed Morsi and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood bounced from one debilitating political battle to another.
“The Brotherhood went too fast, they tried to take too much,” Sheik Abu Sidra, an influential ultraconservative Islamist in Benghazi, Libya, said Thursday, a day after the Egyptian military deposed and detained Mr. Morsi and began arresting his Brotherhood allies.
But at the same time, Sheik Abu Sidra said, Mr. Morsi’s overthrow had made it far more difficult for him to persuade Benghazi’s Islamist militias to put down their weapons and trust in democracy.
“Do you think I can sell that to the people anymore?” he asked. “I have been saying all along, ‘If you want to build Shariah law, come to elections.’ Now they will just say, ‘Look at Egypt,’ and you don’t need to say anything else.”
To put this another way, the idea that “building Shariah law” was the correct solution developed over a long period of time in a context where other solutions had either been unavailable, or had been tried and failed. What is needed is an example of something that does work.
For now, the Islamists are convinced that democracy is just one more failure. Political engagement is a dead end. At the same time, for those on the fence, Islamism has never looked less promising. In a period of rising sectarian strife, this is a dangerous development. It’s dangerous but also hopeful. It’s hopeful because one of the main reasons that Egypt’s first try at democracy failed is that too many Egyptians placed their faith in Islamism. Their loss of influence and credibility improves Egypt’s chances for the second go-round.
