COINTELPRO

I don’t have a lot to say today. Call it a snark-out. But everyone should know about COINTELPRO. Not a whole lot has changed.
FINAL REPORT

OF THE

APRIL 23 (under authority of the order of April 14), 1976

THE FBI’S COVERT ACTION PROGRAM TO DESTROY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY

INTRODUCTION

In August 1967, the FBI initiated a covert action program — COINTELPRO — to disrupt and “neutralize” organizations which
the Bureau characterized as “Black Nationalist Hate Groups.” 1 The FBI memorandum expanding the program described
its goals as:

1. Prevent a coalition of militant black nationalist groups….

2. Prevent the rise of a messiah who could unify and electrify the militant nationalist movement … Martin Luther King,
Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position….

3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups….

4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting them….

5. . . . prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth. 2

The targets of this nationwide program to disrupt “militant black nationalist organizations” included groups such as
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), and the Nation of Islam (NOI). It was expressly directed against such leaders
as Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokley Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Maxwell Stanford, and Elijah Muhammad.

The Black Panther Party (BPP) was not among the original “Black Nationalist” targets. In September 1968, however,
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover described the Panthers as:

“the greatest threat to the internal security of the country.

“Schooled in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the
teaching of Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, its members have perpetrated numerous assaults on police
officers and have engaged in violent confrontations with police throughout the country. Leaders and representatives of
the Black Panther Party travel extensively all over the, United States preaching their gospel of hate and violence not
only to ghetto residents, but to students in colleges, universities and high schools is well.” 3

By July 1969, the Black Panthers had become the primary focus of the program, and was ultimately the target of 233
of the total authorized “Black Nationalist” COINTELPRO actions. 4

Although the claimed purpose of the Bureau’s COINTELPRO tactics was to prevent violence, some of the FBI’s
tactics against the BPP were clearly intended to foster violence, and many others could reasonably have been
expected to cause violence. For example, the FBI’s efforts to “intensify the degree of animosity” between the BPP
and the Blackstone Rangers, a Chicago street gang, included sending an anonymous letter to the gang’s leader
falsely informing him that the the Chicago Panthers had “a hit out” on him. 5 The stated intent of the letter was to
induce the Ranger leader to “take reprisals against” the Panther leadership. 6

Similarly, in Southern California, the FBI launched a covert effort to “create further dissension in the ranks of the
BPP.” 7 This effort included mailing anonymous letters and caricatures to BPP members ridiculing the local and
national BPP leadership for the express purpose of exacerbating an existing “gang war” between the BPP and an
organization called the United Slaves (US). This “gang war” resulted in the killing of four BPP members by members
of US and in numerous beatings and shootings. Although individual incidents in this dispute cannot be directly traced
to efforts by the FBI, FBI officials were clearly aware of the violent nature of the dispute, engaged in actions which
they hoped would prolong and intensify the dispute, and proudly claimed credit for violent clashes between the rival
factions which. in the words of one FBI official, resulted in “shootings, beatings, and a high degree of unrest in the
area of southeast San Diego.” 8

James Adams, Deputy Associate Director of the FBI’s Intelligence Division, told the Committee:

None of our programs have contemplated violence, and the instructions prohibit it, and the record of turndowns of
recommended actions in some instances specifically say that we do not approve this action because if we take it it
could result in harm to the individual. 9

But the Committee’s record suggests otherwise. For example, in May 1970, after US organization members had
already killed four BPP members, the Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles FBI office wrote to FBI
headquarters:

Information received from local sources indicate that, in general, the membership of the Los Angeles BPP is
physically afraid of US members and take premeditated precautions to avoid confrontations.

In view of their anxieties, it is not presently felt that the Los Angeles BPP can be prompted into what could result in
an internecine struggle between the two organizations. . . .

The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings harbored between the organizations and the first
opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized. It is intended that US Inc. will be appropriately and
discreetly advised of the time and location of BPP activities in order that the two organizations might be brought
together and thus grant nature the opportunity to take her due course. [Emphasis added.] 10

This report focuses solely on the FBI’s counterintelligence program to disrupt and “neutralize” the Black Panther
Party. It does not examine the reasonableness of the basis for the FBI’s investigation of the BPP or seek to justify
either the politics, the rhetoric, or the actions of the BPP. This report does demonstrate, however, that the chief
investigative branch of the Federal Government, which was charged by law with investigating crimes and preventing
criminal conduct, itself engaged in lawless tactics and responded to deep-seated social problems by fomenting
violence and unrest.

A. The Effort to Promote Violence Between the Black Panther Party and Other Well-Armed, Potentially Violent
Organizations

The Select Committee’s staff investigation has disclosed a number of instances in which the FBI sought to turn
violence-prone organizations against the Panthers in an effort to aggravate “gang warfare.” Because of the milieu
of violence in which members of the Panthers often moved we have been unable to establish a direct link between
any of the FBI’s specific efforts to promote violence, and particular acts of violence that occurred. We have been
able to establish beyond doubt, however, that high officials of the FBI desired to promote violent confrontations
between BPP members and members of other groups, and that those officials condoned tactics calculated to
achieve that end. It is deplorable that officials of the United States Government, should engage in the activities
described below, however dangerous a threat they might have considered the Panthers; equally disturbing is the
pride which those officials took in claiming credit for the bloodshed that occurred.

1. The Effort to Promote Violence Between the Black Panther Party and the United Slaves (US), Inc.

FBI memoranda indicate that the FBI leadership was aware of a violent power struggle between the Black Panther
Party and the United Slaves (US) in late 1968. A memorandum to the head of the FBI’s Domestic Intelligence
Division, for example, stated:

On 11/2/68, BPP received information indicating US members intended to assassinate Leroy Eldridge Cleaver …
at a rally scheduled at Los Angeles on 11/3/68. A Los Angeles racial informant advised on 11/8/68 that [a BPP
member] had been identified as a US infiltrator and that BPP headquarters had instructed that [name deleted] should
be killed.

During BPP rally, US members including one [name deleted], were ordered to leave the rally site by LASS members
(Los Angeles BPP Security Squad) and did so. US capitulation on this occasion prompted BPP members to decide
to kill [name deleted] and then take over US organization. Members of LASS . . . were given orders to eliminate
[name deleted] and [name deleted]. 11

This memorandum also suggested that the two US members should be told of the BPP’s plans to “eliminate” them
in order to convince them to become Bureau informants. 12

In November 1968, the FBI took initial steps in its program to disrupt the Black Panther Party in San Diego,
California by aggravating the existing hostility between the Panthers and US. A memorandum from FBI Director
Hoover to 14 field offices noted a state of “gang warfare” existed, with “attendant threats of murder and reprisals.”
between the BPP and US in southern California and added:

In order to fully capitalize upon BPP and US differences as well as to exploit all avenues of creating further dissention
in the ranks of the BPP, recipient offices are instructed to submit imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence
measures aimed at crippling the BPP. 13

As the tempo of violence quickened, the FBI’s field office in San Diego developed tactics calculated to heighten
tension between the hostile factions. On January 17, 1969, two members of the Black Panther Party — Apprentice
“Bunchey” Carter and John Huggins — were killed by US members on the UCLA campus following a meeting involving
the two organizations and university students. 14 One month later, the San Diego field office requested permission from
headquarters to mail derogatory cartoons to local BPP offices and to the homes of prominent BPP leaders around the
country. 15 The purpose was plainly stated:

The purpose of the caricatures is to indicate to the BPP that the US organization feels that they are ineffectual,
inadequate, and riddled with graft and corruption. 16

In the first week of March, the first cartoon was mailed to five BPP members and two underground papers, all in the
San Diego area. 17 According to an FBI memorandum, the consensus of opinion within the BPP was that US was
responsible and that the mailing constituted an attack on the BPP by US. 18

In mid-March 1969, the FBI learned that a BPP member had been critically wounded by US members at a rally in Los
Angeles. The field office concluded that shots subsequently fired into the, home of a US member were the results of
a retaliatory raid by the BPP. 19 Tensions between the BPP and US in San Diego, however, appeared to lessen,
and the FBI concluded that those chapters were trying “to talk out their differences.” The San Diego field office
reported:

On 3/27/69 there was a meeting between the BPP and US organization. . . . Wallace [BPP leader in San Diego] . . .
concluded by stating that the BPP in San Diego would not hold a grudge against the US members for the killing of
the Panthers in Los Angeles (Huggins and Carter). He stated that lie would leave any retaliation for this activity to the
black community. . . .

On 4/2/69, there was a friendly confrontation between US and the BPP with no weapons being exhibited by either
side. US members met with BPP members and tried to talk out their differences. 20

On March 27, 1969 — the day that the San Diego field office learned that the local BPP leader had promised that his
followers “would not hold a grudge” against local US members for the killings in Los Angeles — the San Diego office
requested headquarters’ approval for three more cartoons ridiculing the BPP and falsely attributed to US. One week
later, shortly after the San Diego office learned that US and BPP members were again meeting and discussing their
differences, the San Diego field office mailed the cartoons with headquarters’ approval. 21

On April 4, 1969 there was a confrontation between US and BPP members in Southcrest Park in San Diego at
which, according to an FBI memorandum, the BPP members “ran the US members off.” 22 On the same date, US
members broke into a BPP political education meeting and roughed up a female BPP member. 21 The FBI’s Special
Agent in Charge in San Diego boasted that the cartoons had caused these incidents:

The BPP members … strongly objected being made fun of by cartoons being distributed by the US organization (FBI
cartoons in actuality) … [Informant] has advised on several occasions that the cartoons are “really shaking up the
BPP.” They have made the BPP feel that US is getting ready to move and this was the cause of the confrontation at
Southcrest Park on 4/4/69. 24

The fragile truce had ended. On May 23, 1969, John Savage, a member of the BPP in Southern California, was shot
and killed by US member Jerry Horne, aka Tambuzi. The killing was reported in an FBI memorandum which staked
that confrontations between the groups were now “ranging from mere harrassment up to and including beating of
various individuals.” 25 In mid-June, the San Diego FBI office informed Washington headquarters that members of the
US organization were holding firearms practice and purchasing large quantities of ammunition:

Reliable information has been received … that members of the US organization have purchased ammunition at one of
the local gun shops. On 6/5/69, an individual identified as [name deleted] purchased 150 rounds of 9 MM ammunition,
100 rounds of .32 automatic ammunition, and 100 rounds of .38 special ammunition at a local gun shop. [Name deleted]
was tentatively identified as the individual who was responsible for the shooting of BPP member [name deleted] in Los
Angeles on or about 3/14/69. 26

Despite this atmosphere of violence, FBI headquarters authorized the San Diego field office to compose an
inflammatory letter over the forged signature of a San Diego BPP member and to send it to BPP headquarters in
Oakland, California. 27 The letter complained of the killing of Panthers in San Diego by US members, and the fact
that a local BPP leader had a white girlfriend. 28

According to a BPP bulletin, two Panthers were wounded by US gunman on August 14,1969, and the next day
another BPP member, Sylvester Bell, was killed in San Diego by US members. 29 On August 36, 1969, the San
Diego office, of US was bombed. The FBI believed the BPP was responsible for the bombing. 30

The San Diego office of the FBI viewed this carnage as a positive development and informed headquarters: “Efforts
are being made to determine how this situation can be capitalized upon for the benefit of the Counterintelligence
Program …. ” 31 The field office further noted:

In view of the recent killing of BPP member Sylvester Bell, a new cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will
assist in the continuance of the rift between BPP and US. 32

The San Diego FBI office pointed with pride to the continued violence between black groups:

Shootings, beatings, and a, high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of southeast San Diego.
Although no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this overall situation, it is felt
that a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to this program. [Emphasis added.] 33

In early September 1969, the San Diego field office informed headquarters that Karenga, the Los Angeles US leader,
feared assassination by the BPP. 34 It received permission front headquarters to exploit this situation by sending
Karenga a letter, purporting to be from a US member in San Diego, alluding to an article in the BPP newspaper
criticizing Karenga and suggesting that he order reprisals against the Panthers. The Bureau memorandum which
originally proposed the letter explained:

The article, which is an attack on Ron Karenga of the US organization, is self-explanatory. It is felt that if the following letter
be sent to Karenga, pointing out that the contents of the article are objectionable to members of the US organization
in San Diego, the possibility exists that some sort of retaliatory action will be taken against the BPP . . . . 35

FBI files do not indicate whether the letter, which was sent to Karenga by the San Diego office, was responsible for
any violence.

In January 1970, the San Diego office prepared a new series of counterintelligence cartoons attacking the BPP and
forwarded them to FBI headquarters for approval. 36 The cartoons were composed to look like a product of the US
organization.

The purpose of the caricatures is to indicate to the BPP that the US Organization considers them to be ineffectual,
inadequate, and [considers itself] vitally superior to the BPP. 37

One of the caricatures was “designed to attack” the Los Angeles Panther leader as a bully toward women and
children in the black community. Another accused the BPP of “actually instigating” a recent Los Angeles Police
Department raid on US headquarters. A third cartoon depicted Karenga as an overpowering individual “who
has the BPP completely at his mercy . . . .” 38

On January 29, 1970, FBI headquarters approved distribution of these caricatures by FBI field offices in San Diego,
Los Angeles, and San Francisco. The authorizing memorandum from headquarters stated:

US Incorporated and the Black Panther Party are opposing black extremist organizations. Feuding between
representatives of the two groups in the past had a tendency to limit the effectiveness of both. The leaders and
incidents depicted in the caricatures are known to the general public, particularly among the Negroes living in
the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco.

The leaders and members of both groups are distrusted by a large number of the citizen within the Negro
communities. Distribution of caricatures is expected to strengthen this distrust. 39

Bureau documents provided to the Select Committee do not indicate whether violence between BPP and US
members followed the mailing of this third series of cartoons.

In early May 1970, FBI Headquarters became aware of an article entitled “Karenga King of the Bloodsuckers” in the
May 2, 1970, edition of the BPP newspaper which “vilifies and debases Karenga and the US organization.” 40 Two field
offices received the following request from headquarters:

[s]ubmit recommendation to Bureau . . . for exploitation of same under captioned program. Consider from two
aspects, one against US and Karenga from obvious subject matter; the second against BPP because, inherent in
article is admission by BPP that it has done nothing to retaliate against US for killing of Panther members attributed
to US and Karenga, an admission that the BPP has been beaten at its own game of violence. 41

In response to this request, the Special Agent in Charge in Los Angeles reported that the BPP newspaper article had
already resulted in violence, but that it was difficult to induce BPP members to attack US members in Southern
California because they feared US members. 42 The Los Angeles field office hoped, however, that “internecine
struggle” might be triggered through a skillful use of informants within both groups:

The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings harbored between the organizations and the first
opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized. It is intended that US Inc. will be appropriately and
discretely advised of the time and location of BPP activities in order that the two organizations might be brought
together and thus grant nature the opportunity to take her due course. [Emphasis added.] 43

The release of Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, from prison in August 1970 inspired yet another
counterintelligence plan. An FBI agent learned from a prison official that Newton had told an inmate that a rival group
had let a $3,000 contract on his life. The Los Angeles office presumed the group was US, and proposed that an
anonymous letter be sent to David Hilliard, BPP Chief of Staff in Oakland, purporting to be from the person holding the
contract on Newton’s life. The proposed letter warned Hilliard not to be around when the “unscheduled appointment”
to kill Newton was kept, and cautioned Hilliard not to “got in my way.” 44

FBI headquarters, however, denied authority to send the letter to Hilliard. Its concern was not that the letter might
cause violence or that it was improper action by a law enforcement agency, but that the letter might violate a Federal
statute:

While Bureau appreciates obvious effort and interest exhibited concerning anonymous letter … studied analysis of
same indicates implied threat therein may constitute extortion violation within investigative jurisdiction of Bureau or
postal authorities and may subsequently be embarrassing to Bureau. 45

The Bureau’s stated concern with legality was ironic in light of the activities described above.

2. The Effort To Promote Violence Between the Blackstone Rangers and the Black Panther Party

In late 1968 and early 1969, the FBI endeavored to pit the Blackstone Rangers, a heavily armed, violence-prone,
organization, against the Black Panthers. 46 In December 1968, the FBI learned that the recognized leader of the
Blackstone Rangers, Jeff Fort, was resisting Black Panther overtures to enlist “the support of the Blackstone
Rangers.” 47 In order to increase the friction between these groups, the Bureau’s Chicago office proposed sending an
anonymous letter to Fort, informing him that two prominent leaders of the Chicago BPP had been making disparaging
remarks about his “lack of commitment to black people generally.” The field office observed:

Fort is reportedly aware that such remarks have been circulated, but is not aware of the identities of the individual
responsible. He has stated that he would “take care of” individuals responsible for the verbal attacks directed against
him.

Chicago, consequently, recommends that Fort be made aware that [name deleted] and [name deleted] together with
other BPP members locally, are responsible for the circulation of these remarks concerning him. It is felt that if Fort
were to be aware that the BPP was responsible, it would lend impetus to his refusal to accept any BPP overtures to
the Rangers and additionally might result in Fort having active steps taken to exact some form of retribution toward
the leadership of the BPP. [Emphasis added.] 48

On about December 18, 1968, Jeff Fort and other Blackstone Rangers were involved in a serious confrontation with
members of the Black Panther Party.

During that day twelve members of the BPP and five known members of the Blackstone Rangers were arrested on
Chicago’s South Side. 49 A report indicates that the Panthers and Rangers were arrested following the shooting of one
of the Panthers by a Ranger. 49a

That evening, according to an FBI informant, around 10:30 p.m., approximately thirty Panthers went to the
Blackstone Rangerss’ headquarters at 6400 South Kimbark in Chicago. Upon their arrival Jeff Fort invited Fred
Hampton, Bobby Rush and the other BPP members to come upstairs and meet with him and the Ranger
leadership. 49b The Bureau goes on to describe what transpired at this meeting:

. . . everyone went upstairs into a room which appeared to be a gymnasium, where Fort told Hampton and Rush that
he had heard about the Panthers being in Ranger territory during the day, attempting to show their “power” and he
wanted the Panthers to recognize the Rangers “power.” Source stated that Fort then gave orders, via walkie-talkie,
whereupon two men marched through the door carrying pump shotguns. Another order and two men appeared
carrying sawed off carbines then eight more, each carrying a .45 caliber machine gun, clip type, operated from the
shoulder or hip, then others came with over and under type weapons. Source stated that after this procession Fort
had all Rangers present, approximately 100, display their side arms and about one half had .45 caliber revolvers.
Source advised that all the above weapons appeared to be new.

Source advised they left the gym, went downstairs to another room where Rush and Hampton of the Panthers and
Fort and two members of the Main 21 sat by a table and discussed the possibility of joining the two groups. Source
related that Fort took off his jacket and was wearing a .45 caliber revolver shoulder holster with gun and had a small
caliber weapon in his belt.

Source advised that nothing was decided at the meeting about the two groups actually joining forces, however, a
decision was made to meet again on Christmas Day. Source stated Fort did relate that the Rangers were behind the
Panthers but were not to be considered members. Fort wanted the Panthers to join the Rangers and Hampton wanted
the opposite, stating that if the Rangers joined the Panthers, then together they would be able to absorb all the other
Chicago gangs. Source advised Hampton did state that they couldn’t let the man keep the two groups apart. Source
advised that Fort also gave Hampton and Rush one of the above .45 caliber machine guns to “try out.”

Source advised that based upon conversations during this meeting, Fort did not appear over anxious to join forces
with the Panthers, however, neither did it appear that he wanted to terminate meeting for this purpose. 49c

On December 26, 1968 Fort and Hampton met again to discuss the possibility of the Panthers and Rangers working
together. This meeting was at a South Side Chicago bar and broke up after several Panthers and Rangers got into an
argument. 49d On December 27, Hampton received a phone call at BPP Headquarters from Fort telling him that the
BPP had until December 28, 1968 to join the Blackstone Rangers. Hampton told Fort he had until the same time for
the Rangers to join the BPP and they hung up. 49e

In the, wake of this incident, the Chicago office renewed its proposal to send a letter to Fort, informing FBI
headquarters:

As events have subsequently developed . . . the Rangers and the BPP have not only not been able to form any
alliance, but enmity and distrust have arisen, to the point where each has been ordered to stay out of the other
territory. The BPP has since decided to conduct no activity or attempt to do recruiting in Ranger territory. 50

The proposed letter read:

Brother Jeff:

I’ve spent some time with some Panther friends on the west side lately and I know what’s been going on. The brothers
that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there’s supposed to be a hit out for you. I’m not a
Panther, or a Ranger, just black. From what I see these Panthers are out for themselves not black people. I think you
ought to know what they’re up to, I know what I’d do if I was you. You might hear from me again.

(sgd.) A black brother you don’t know. [Emphasis added.] 51

The FBI’s Chicago office explained the purpose of the letter as follows:

It is believed the above may intensify the degree of animosity between the two groups and occasion Forte to take
retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership.

Consideration has been given to a similar letter to the BPP alleging a Ranger plot against the BPP leadership;
however, it is not felt this would be productive principally because the BPP at present is not believed as violence
prone as the Rangers to whom violent type activity — shooting and the like — is second nature. 52

On the evening of January 13, 1969, Fred Hampton and Bobby Rush appeared on a Chicago radio talk show called
“Hot Line.” During the course of the program Hampton stated that the BPP was in the “process of educating the
Blackstone Rangers.” 52a Shortly after that statement Jeff Fort was on the phone to the radio program and stated
that Hampton had his facts confused and that the Rangers were educating the BPP. 52b

Oil January 16, Hampton, in a public meeting, stated that Jeff Fort had threatened to blow his head off if he came
within Ranger territory. 52c

On January 30, 1969, Director Hoover authorized sending the anonymous letter. 53 While the Committee staff could
find no evidence linking this letter to subsequent clashes between the Panthers and the Rangers, the Bureau’s intent
was clear. 54

B. The Effort To Disrupt the Black Panther Party by Promoting Internal Dissension

1. General Efforts to Disrupt the Black Panther Party Membership

In addition to setting rival groups against the Panthers, the FBI employed the full range of COINTELPRO techniques
to create rifts and factions within the Party itself which it was believed would “neutralize” the Party’s effectiveness.”

Anonymous letters were commonly used to sow mistrust. For example, in March 1969 the Chicago FBI Field Office
learned that a local BPP member feared that a faction of the Party, allegedly led by Fred Hampton and Bobby Rush,
was “out to get” him. 56 Headquarters approved sending an anonymous letter to Hampton which was drafted to exploit
dissension within the BPP as well as to play on mistrust between the Blackstone Rangers and the Chicago BPP
leadership:

Brother Hampton:

Just a word of warning. A Stone friend tells me [name deleted] wants the Panthers and is looking for somebody to get
you out of the way. Brother Jeff is supposed to be interested. I’m just a black man looking for blacks working together,
not more of this gang banging. 57

Bureau documents indicate that during this time an informant within the BPP was also involved in maintaining the
division between the Panthers and the Blackstone Rangers. 57a

In December 1968, the Chicago FBI Field Office learned that a leader of a Chicago youth gang, the Mau Mau’s,
planned to complain to the national BPP headquarters about the local BPP leadership and questioned its loyalty. 58
FBI headquarters approved an anonymous letter to the Mail Mau leader, stating:

Brother [deleted] :

I’m from the south side and have some Panther friends that know you and tell me what’s been going. I know those
two [name deleted] and [name deleted] that run the Panthers for a long time and those mothers been with every black
outfit going where it looked like they was something in it for them. The only black people they care about is
themselves. I heard too they’re sweethearts and that [name deleted] has worked for the man that’s why he’s not in
Viet Nam. Maybe that’s why they’re just playing like real Panthers. I hear a lot of the brothers are with you and want
those mothers out but don’t know how. The Panthers need real black men for leaders not freaks. Don’t give up
‘brothers. [Emphasis added.] 59

A black friend.

The FBI also resorted to anonymous phone calls. The San Diego Field Office placed anonymous calls to local BPP
leaders naming other BPP members as “police agents.” According to a report from the field office, these calls,
reinforced by rumors spread by FBI informants within the BPP, induced a group of Panthers to accuse three Party
members of working for the police. The field office boasted that one of the accused members fled San Diego in
fear for his life. 60

The FBI conducted harassing interviews of Black Panther members to intimidate them and drive them from the
Party. The Los Angeles Field Office conducted a stringent interview program

in the hope that a state of distruct [sic] might remain among the members and add to the turmoil presently going on
within the BPP. 61

The Los Angeles office claimed that similar tactics had cut the membership of the United States (US) by 50 percent. 62

FBI agents attempted to convince landlords to force Black Panther members and offices from their buildings. The
Indianapolis Field Office reported that a local landlord had yielded to its urgings and promised to tell his Black
Panther tenants to relocate their offices. 63 The San Francisco office sent in article from the Black Panther
newspaper to the landlord of a BPP member who had rented an apartment under an assumed name. The article,
which had been written by that member and contained her picture and true name, was accompanied by an
anonymous note stating, “(false name) is your tenant (true name)” 64 The San Francisco office secured the eviction
of one Black Panther who lived in a public housing project by informing the Housing Authority officials that she was
using his apartment for the BPP Free Breakfast Program. 65 When it was learned that the BPP was conducting a
Free Breakfast Program “In the notorious Haight-Ashbury District of San Francisco,” the Bureau mailed a letter to
the owners of the building:

Dear Mr. (excised):

I would call and talk to you about this matter, but I am not sure how you feel, and I do not wish to become personally
embroiled with neighbors. It seems that the property owners on (excised) Street have had enough trouble in the past
without bringing in Black Panthers.

Maybe you are not aware, but the Black Panthers have taken over (address deleted). Perhaps if you drive up the
street, you can see what they are going to do to the property values. They have already plastered a nearby garage
with big Black Panther posters.

— A concerned property owner. 66

The Bureau also attempted to undermine the morale of Panther members by attempting to break up their marriages.
In one case, an anonymous letter was sent to the wife of a prominent Panther leader stating that her husband had
been having affairs with several teenage girls and had taken some of those girls with him on trips. 67 Another
Panther leader told a Committee staff member that an FBI agent had attempted to destroy his marriage by visiting his
wife and showing photographs purporting to depict him with other women. 68

2. FBI Role in the Newton-Cleaver Rift

In March 1970, the FBI initiated a concerted program to drive a permanent wedge between the followers of Eldridge
Cleaver, who was then out of the country and the supporters of Huey P. Newton, who was then serving a prison
sentence in California. 69 An anonymous letter was sent to Cleaver in Algeria stating that BPP leaders in California
were seeking to undercut his influence. The Bureau subsequently learned that Cleaver had assumed the letter was
from the then Panther representative in Scandanavia, Connie Matthews, and that the letter had led Cleaver to expel
three BPP international representatives from the Party. 70

Encouraged by the apparent success of this letter, FBI headquarters instructed its Paris Legal Attache to mail a
follow-up letter, again written to appear as if Matthews was the author, to the Black Panther Chief-of-Staff, David
Hilliard, in Oakland, California. The letter alleged that Cleaver “has tripped out. Perhaps he has been working too
hard,” and suggested that Hilliard “take some immediate action before this becomes more serious.” The Paris Legal
Attache was instructed to mail the letter:

At a time when Matthews is in or has just passed through Paris immediately following one of her trips to Algiers. The
enclosed letter should be held by you until such an occasion arises at which time you are authorized to immediately
mail it in Paris in such a manner that it cannot be traced to the Bureau. 71

In early May, Eldridge Cleaver called BPP national headquarters from Algeria and talked with Connie Matthews,
Elbert Howard, and Roosevelt Hilliard. A Bureau report stated:

Various items were discussed by these individuals with Hilliard. Connie Matthews discussed with Hilliard “those
letters” appearing to relate to the counterintelligence letters, which have been submitted to Cleaver and Hilliard
purportedly by Matthews ….

It appears … that [Elbert Howard] had brought copies of the second counterintelligence letter to David Hilliard with him
to Algiers which were then compared with the … letter previously sent to Cleaver in Algiers and that … discussed this
situation …. 72

The San Francisco Field Office reported that some BPP leaders suspected that the CIA or FBI had sent the letters,
while Others suspected the Black Panther members in Paris. A subsequent FBI memorandum indicated that
suspicion had focused on the Panthers in Europe. 73

On August 13 1970 — the day that Huey Newton was released from prison — the Philadelphia Field Office had an
informant distribute a fictitious BPP directive to Philadelphia Panthers, questioning Newton’s leadership ability. 74
The Philadelphia office informed FBI Headquarters that the directive:

stresses the leadership and strength of David Hilliard and Eldridge Cleaver while intimating Huey Newton is useful
only as a drawing card.

It is recommended this directive … be mailed personally to Huey Newton with a short anonymous note. The note
would indicate the writer, a Community Worker in Philadelphia for the BPP, was incensed over the suggestion Huey
was only being used by the Party after founding it, and wanted no part of this Chapter if it was slandering its leaders
in private. 75

Headquarters approved this plan on August 19,1970. 76

FBI officials seized on several incidents during the following months as opportunities to advance their program. In an
August 1970 edition of the BPP newspaper, Huey Newton appealed to “oppressed groups,” including homosexuals, to
“unite with the BPP in revolutionary fashion.” 77 FBI headquarters approved a plan to mail forged letters from BPP
sympathizers and supporters in ghetto areas to David Hilliard, protesting Newton’s statements about joining with
homosexuals, hoping this would discredit Newton with other BPP leaders. 78

In July and August 1970, Eldridge Cleaver led a United States delegation to North Korea and North Vietnam.
Ramparts editor Robert Scheer, who had been a member of the delegation, held a press conference in New York and,
according to the Bureau, glossed over the Panther’s role in sponsoring the tour. 79 The New York office was
authorized to send an anonymous letter to Newton complaining about Sheer’s oversight to strain relations between
the BPP and the “New Left.”’80 On November 13, 1970, the Los Angeles field office was asked to prepare an
anonymous letter to Cleaver criticizing Newton for not aggressively obtaining BPP press coverage of the BPP’s
sponsorship of the trip. 81

In October 1970, the FBI learned that Timothy Leary, who had escaped from a California prison where he was serving
a sentence for possessing marijuana, was seeking asylum with Eldridge Cleaver in Algiers. The San Francisco field
office, noting that the Panthers were officially opposed to drugs, sent Newton an anonymous letter calling his
attention to Cleaver “playing footsie” with Leary. 82 In January when Cleaver publicly condemned Leary, FBI
headquarters approved sending Newton a bogus letter from a Berkeley, California commune condemning Cleaver for
“divorcing the BPP from white revolutionaries.” 83

In December 1970, the BPP attempted to hold a Revolutionary Peoples’ Constitutional Convention (RPCC) in
Washington, D.C. The Bureau considered the convention a failure and received reports that most delegates had left it
dissatisfied. 84 The Los Angeles FBI field office suggested a letter to Cleaver designed to

provoke Cleaver to openly question Newton’s leadership … It is felt that distance and lack of personal contact
between Newton and Cleaver do offer a counterintelligence opportunity that should be probed.

In view of the BPP’s unsuccessful attempt to convene a Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention (RPCC), it
is suggested that each division which had individuals attend the RPCC write numerous letters to Cleaver criticizing
Newton for his lack of leadership. It is felt that, if Cleaver received a sufficient number of complaints regarding Newton
it might . . . create dissension that later could be more fully exploited. 85

FBI headquarters approved the Los Angeles letter to Cleaver and asked the Washington field office to supply a list of
all organizations attending the RPCC. 86 A barrage of anonymous letters to Newton and Cleaver followed:

Two weeks later, the San Francisco office mailed Newton an anonymous letter, supposedly from a “white
revolutionary,” complaining about the incompetence of the Panthers who had planned the conference. 86a The New
York office mailed a complaint to the BPP national headquarters, purportedly from a black student at Columbia
University who attended the RPCC as a member of the University’s student Afro-American Society. 86b The San
Francisco office sent a letter containing an article from the Berkeley Barb to Cleaver, attacking Newton’s leadership
at the RPCC. Mailed with the article was a copy of a letter to Newton criticizing the RPCC and bearing the notation:

Mr. Cleaver,

Here is a letter I sent to Huey Newton. I’m sincere and hope you can do something to set him right and
get him off his duff. 86c

In January 1971, the Boston office sent a letter, purportedly from a “white revolutionary,” to Cleaver, stating in part:

Dear Revolutionary Comrade:

The people’s revolution in America was greatly impeded and the stature of th Black Panther Party, both nationally
and internationally, received a major setback as an outcome of the recent Revolutionary People’s Constitutional
Convention. . . .

The Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention did little, if anything, to organize our forces to move agains

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