David Ignatius tries…he really does. But his problem is that the Establishment’s foreign policy goals are incoherent, suffer from fatal internal contradictions, and are inconsistent with our own intelligence. I’m going to begin here with Ignatius’ conclusion. After noting that our new policy of Iran-containment is a return to our policy in the 1980’s, Ignatius notes the obvious:
The problem with “back to the future,” of course, is that we’ve been there before. Arms deals won’t provide lasting security for Saudi Arabia; supporting authoritarian Sunni regimes won’t stem the appeal of Islamic radicalism; and a fractured Iraq will keep the region in a permanent state of tension. But the new approach has the virtue of realism — preparing for the worst in Iraq rather than hoping for the best.
How does the ‘virtue of realism’ enter into this? Have we reached the point where we pursue a policy that will not work as a way to prepare for the worst, and we call that ‘realism’? Actually…yes…we have. Although, it would be much more accurate to say that we are pursuing a strategy that will makes things worse as a way of postponing the worst.
Here’s the approach:
A simple shorthand for this approach might be “back to the future,” for it is strikingly reminiscent of American strategy during the 1980s after the Iranian revolution. The cornerstone is a political-military alliance with the dominant Sunni Arab powers — especially Saudi Arabia. The hardware will be new arms sales to Israel, Egypt and the Saudis. The software will be a refurbished Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
“The message to Iran is, ‘We’re still powerful, we protect our friends, we’re not going away,’ ” explains a senior State Department official.
Ignatius thinks that the Bush/Cheney administration is going to ‘refurbush’ the Israeli-Palestine peace process? Let’s review the record. First the administration did everything they could to undermine Barak and help Sharon get elected. Then they stood by and clapped as Sharon dismantled the Palestinian Authority. Then they pushed for Palestinian elections, publicly backed Fatah, and watched Hamas sweep to victory. Then they gave a green light to a disastrous invasion of Lebanon. And this led to a total victory of Hamas in Gaza.
Now the Palestinians are divided, Israel is weak, and the prospects of a peace process lie in ashes. How can this administration ‘refurbish’ a peace process that lies in cinders? Is this ‘realism’?
We have ‘liberated’ the Arab Shi’ites of Iraq and backed a Shi’a dominated government there for the last four years. Our new strategy is to make a ‘political-military alliance with the dominant Sunni Arab powers — especially Saudi Arabia’? If this is ‘realism’ then what have we been laboring under for the better part of the new century?
But, perhaps, this is realism. We’ll go back to page one. We’ll install a Ba’athist backed by the Sunni Arab powers, and say this isn’t inconsistent because our new puppet is technically a Shi’ite.
The Sunnis increasingly see U.S. troops as their best ally for containing the power of Iran and its proxies in Iraq. As the leverage of America’s new Sunni friends grows, there has been increasing interest in a coalition to replace the feeble Maliki.
In “back to the future” mode, the name being mentioned these days is Ayad Allawi, a former Baathist who was interim prime minister and has strong support among Sunnis, even though he’s a secular Shiite. Allawi has bundles of money to help buy political support, but it comes from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, rather than the United States.
Let me translate this for you. The Sunnis back Allawi, a Shi’ite, because he is a Ba’athist. He will oppose the religious fervor of the Shi’a parties that currently dominate Iraq. How will he do this? Moqtada al-Sadr and Ayatollah Sistani can put hundreds of thousands of armed men in the streets anytime they want to. Allawi can’t do anything. If he is going to defeat the Shi’ites he is going to have to use the U.S. military, or he is going to have to use Sunnis. And how will Allawi’s campaign significantly differ for the campaigns Saddam Hussein used to win and sustain his power?
We are calling this ‘realism’.
The real ‘realism’ is that we have utterly failed in our Mideast policies, and we better start facing up to the consequences. Permawar is not the answer. We don’t have the money.
We need to start planning for a future where we do not dominate the Middle East. This will involve significant economic risks…especially for the availability of cheap and readily available energy. It also suggests that Israel should start getting serious about a permanent, sustainable accommodation with the Palestinians and their neighbors. Keeping a few of their most ardent and unquestioning supporters, like Joe Lieberman, in the U.S. Senate is not going to be enough to sustain an acceptable level of security. We cannot continue to take on the blowback risks and international hit to our moral standing that our support for Israel currently entails.
That’s ‘realism’.
