Barack Obama has a column in today’s New York Times that lays out his strategy for a phased withdrawal from Iraq. He remains firm in his commitment to withdraw, despite recent remarks that he is going to visit Iraq with an open-mind.
That is why, on my first day in office, I would give the military a new mission: ending this war.
On this crucial point, Obama remains unequivocal. Juan Cole has mostly praise for Obama’s position, but he also has a couple of critiques. I agree with Cole that a residual force to fight Sunni extremists is probably unworkable. I also agree that the Iraqi Interior Ministry will probably develop as the most lethal enemy of al-Qaeda-type operators possible. On the other hand, if the U.S. can develop a good working relationship with the Iraqi intelligence services, it’s possible that some ready strike forces could be maintained in Iraq (probably in Kurdistan). I wouldn’t rule anything out, and Obama is at least partially taking his position as a counterpoint to talk of ‘defeat’ and ‘surrender’.
After this redeployment, a residual force in Iraq would perform limited missions: going after any remnants of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, protecting American service members and, so long as the Iraqis make political progress, training Iraqi security forces. That would not be a precipitous withdrawal.
As a political matter, this is probably smart. As an operational matter, the merits will lie in the details. The important thing is that we have a commitment and a plan to withdraw our occupation forces. When it comes to Afghanistan, however, I think Juan Cole is too glib. I agree with his cautionary advice about following in the steps of the Russian forces and in his skepticism that we are really fighting the Taliban there. I don’t agree that Afghanistan is more ‘unwinnable’ than Iraq.
I don’t know whether Senator Obama really wants to try to militarily occupy Afghanistan even more than is now being attempted. I wish he would talk to some old Russian officers who were there in the 1980s first. Of course, it may be that this announced strategy is political and for the purposes of having something to say when McCain accuses him of surrendering in Iraq.
If the Afghanistan gambit is sincere, I don’t think it is good geostrategy. Afghanistan is far more unwinnable even than Iraq. If playing it up is politics, then it is dangerous politics.
The history of post-Soviet occupied Afghanistan is complex and tragic. In the simplest terms, there has not been a leader that could unify the country that was also acceptable to outside powers. As the most populous ethnic group, the Pashtuns have to consent to any government. They would not consent to being led by the Tajik warlords Ahmed Shah Massoud and Ismail Khan, nor by the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum. And, in any case, those warlords were always more aligned with Iran and Russia than with the United States. Unfortunately, the United States’ Afghan policy, prior to 9/11, was always deferential to the interests of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. And both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported Pashtun warlords at the same time they were pumping an extremely radical and dangerous version of violent Islam into the Talibs (or religious students) that made up the ranks of their armies.
But not all Pashtuns are radicals. Tribal leaders like Hamid Karzai (Durrani Tribe) and Abdul Haq (Ahmadzai Tribe) were allying themselves with the Tajik leader Massoud just prior to Massoud’s assassination on Sept. 10, 2001. This was the only secular (or, at least, moderate) kind of anti-Taliban coalition possible at the time. They had support from Russia and Iran, and they had good relations with the U.S. intelligence community. What they didn’t have is the powerful patrons in DC that could compete with the Saudis and the Pakistanis.
Our mission in Afghanistan is not to occupy the country or to somehow achieve ‘victory’. Our mission is to prevent the Afghan government from reverting back to a Pakistani/vassalage condition, where radical Pashtuns turn the country into a living nightmare for its citizens and a sanctuary from which Pakistan can train terrorists to attack Kashmir and other countries, including the U.S. and Europe. This is not a matter of setting up some puppet government. The only government possible in Afghanistan is a puppet of someone. I’d rather have a regime there that is supported by Russia, China, India, Europe, and Iran, than have one that is supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It’s that simple. And it’s doable. It’s doable because it isn’t America acting alone in defiance of world opinion. Rolling back the surge in radical Islamic terrorism means ending our support (or tolerance) for Saudi/Pakistani dominance of Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is ‘unwinnable’ it’s only because we are too weak and timid to challenge our old allies on their dissemination of a radically dangerous version of Islam.
Invading Iraq and deposing Saddam took away a tyrant, but it also took away a bulwark against radical Islam of both Sunni and Shi’a variety. Even worse, it acted as a major recruitment enticement. Afghanistan is different. Afghanistan desperately needed an international commitment to come in and prop up a multi-ethnic coalition run by a moderate Pashtun leader. It was the only possible way for them to end their nightmare. If we set limited goals and maintain and expand international support, we can succeed in Afghanistan at an acceptable cost. And it is justified by both humanitarian and national security grounds.
