I don’t know how clean the election results in Iran are, but regardless I am disappointed with Ahmadinejad’s reelection. I see that the other side is not exactly accepting the result and (unlike in this country when that happens) there are some street demonstrations breaking out. I have no way of assessing the truth of the matter, and am left to ponder what it will mean for our foreign relations and the peace process.
The trust level we have with Iran will certainly not improve now, and may well deteriorate dramatically. Our media has never shown Iran’s democracy much respect. In fact, our media normally denies that Iran even has elections. But, this time, it is a good number of Iranians who feel their democracy is a sham. That can only further degrade Iran’s international reputation.
Now, the first thing to watch is what happens internally in Iran. Will these demonstrations peter out, or will they build and be met with steadily increasing force? The Revolutionary Government is well aware of how they came to power in 1979. They will seek to avoid the kinds of mistakes the Shah made when he ordered his police forces to open fire on demonstrators. That led to a cyclical escalation, as every forty days a new, larger protest erupted in honor of the martyrs from the last protest. The Shah attempted to make concessions, but eventually he alienated a critical mass of people and had to flee to Sadat’s Egypt.
I think that these demonstrations will be broken up or tolerated without the use of deadly force. Mass arrests, however, are not unlikely. It is too early to make bold predictions, but I would be surprised if the Iranian government is in any real jeopardy. Assuming that they weather this storm, things will settle down and we’ll have to face the prospect of more of the same from the Iranian government.
A change in presidents was never going to change much in and of itself because the president of Iran is not in control of the armed forces or the nuclear energy program, or foreign policy. But, Mr. Moussavi ran on a platform that was highly critical of Ahmadinejad for his lack of diplomacy. Moussavi argued that Adhmadinejad’s crazy, provocative talk was harmful to Iran’s image and resulted in international isolation and economic hardship. A Moussavi victory would have vindicated that judgment and put pressure on the Supreme Leader and the Council of Guardians to change their approach. Now, at least ostensibly, the opposite has occurred.
Israel probably has mixed feelings about this result. It must be discouraging to see Iranians reelect a man who is so provocatively opposed to their existence. On the other hand, that same provocativeness helps Israel focus the world’s attention of their fears of an eventual nuclear weapons capability in Iran.
However, from Obama’s point of view, the first priority is restarting the peace process between Israel and Palestine, and Iran is an unwelcome distraction from that effort.
On the whole, the reelection of Ahmadinejad, combined with the disputed nature of the result, is an unfortunate complication to an already nettlesome set of problems. I wish we had seen a different result.
I also feel badly for the students, intellectuals, and liberals who put so much hope into this election only to see those hopes crushed once again.
