Thomas Ricks, author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, is definitely not optimistic about Iraq’s chances now that the deadline has arrived for American troops to leave the cities. Basically, he assumes that a power vacuum will be created into which will rush the same toxic brew of militias, inter- and intrasectarian and ethnic fighting we witnessed in 2006-2007.
My worry is that I don’t see the political situation as being much different than it has in the past. Nothing much has changed from the previous rush to failures. As readers of this blog have seen me say before: the surge succeeded tactically but failed strategically. That is, as planned, it created a breathing space in which a political breakthrough might occur. But Iraqi leaders, for whatever reason, didn’t take advantage of that space, and no breakthrough occurred. All the basic issues that faced Iraq before the surge are still hanging out there: How to share oil revenue? What is the power relationship between Shia, Sunni and Kurd? Who holds power inside the Shiite community? What is the role of Iran, the biggest winner in this war so far? And will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what happens when all the refugees outside the country and those displaced inside it, who I think are majority Sunni, try to go back to their old houses, now largely occupied by Shiites and protected by Shiite militias?
Maybe a better series of questions would revolve around how long it will take Iraq to work its way through these problems and how badly these problems will reflect on the job the Americans have done there. One school of thought is that Iraq will move through a period of deep disequilibrium, but they will reach a balance more quickly with the Americans out of sight than they would with another year of the status quo. Another school of thought is that the training and equipment and stability being provided by America’s security-presence in the cities is working but hasn’t reached a sufficient point yet. More time might not be a guarantee of anything, but pulling back now puts what has been gained at unnecessary risk.
I don’t know which school of thought is more accurate, to be honest. And I don’t think I would even trust our best experts to know either. I do know that the Iraqis are celebrating today and taking pride in the notion that Iraq’s cities will be policed solely by Iraqis. They want us to leave. They have their fears, too, but it appears that a nearly unanimous majority are willing to take their chances. And that is the best sign I know of for guiding our policy.
