I’m not a counterinsurgency expert and I disagreed with Obama’s decision to escalate our commitment to Afghanistan. But if you asked me how to defeat the Taliban, I’d probably come up with a plan that is nearly identical to the one currently being pursued in Helmand Province. In fact, the plan there is very similar to what I had hoped we would do back in 2001 when we first invaded the country.
Gen. McChrystal is making a major effort to avoid the loss of civilian life (including taking the counterintuitive decision to announce the invasion well in advance); he’s letting the Afghan Army take the lead; he’s putting the focus on winning over the local population; he’s recruited a pre-fab Afghan government to take over on short notice; and he’s got development projects lined up to begin immediately after the area is cleared.
I have been skeptical that we can succeed in even limited goals in Afghanistan because the Karzai government is epically corrupt, because the Afghans have been fighting each other for so long, and because we are terrible at operating as a benevolent occupying army. We’ve spent nine years in Afghanistan and we have not succeeded on almost any level at achieving our own goals or goals that the Afghans might set for themselves. But I will say that we have a strategy now that makes sense, that has its priorities right, and that ought to work if there is anything that can work.
The administration has crafted a plan that I would have been cautiously willing to support in 2001. In 2010, the best I can say is that I wish them well. If we’re going to continue our effort, this is the way to do it. But I wish I could say that intelligence experts think this will work. I think people with access to the analysis give it a 50% chance of meeting our minimum desires. At least, that’s my sense of it.
