It’s easy to forget how much energy went into Pan-Arabism in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. How many people remember that Syria and Egypt were one country between 1958-1961, called the United Arab Republic, and that it was loosely aligned with North Yemen? How many people remember that Iraq and Jordan formed an alliance/country in 1958 called the Arab Federation which was basically a Hashemite Kingdom? It only lasted six months until a military coup removed the Iraqi king from power. I think we should keep this history in mind when we think about the possible attitude of a future democratically elected government in Egypt.
Personally, I don’t think Egypt will be much friendlier towards Iran than the Mubarak was during his reign. But they probably will be friendlier towards Syria. And, while I don’t expect any revival of the United Arab Republic, I do think there is a possibility of more Arab unity, which could mean a big reduction in how much influence Iran has over Syria. I think it’s hard to overestimate how much disdain there is among most Arabs, especially the elites, for Shi’ites. So, to a large degree, Arab unity translates as Sunni unity. Certainly, that is the sentiment that the Saudis will try to exploit. The Saudis have been losing influence in Syria and Lebanon, and the wave of democratic reforms sweeping North Africa and parts of the Arabian Peninsula are threatening to their regime. What better distraction than to ramp up the Sunni/Shi’a divide?
Syria, of course, is run by Alawites, which is an offshoot of Shi’a Islam, but which is seen as heretical by the Iranian clerics who run that country. Yet, according to the CIA World Factbook three-quarters of Syrians are Sunnis, while only 16% are Alawites or some other non-Sunni Muslim. It’s a Sunni majority country run by an Alawite elite. It’s almost a mirror image of Bahrain, which is Shi’ite majority country run by a Sunni elite. If democratic reforms come to Syria, the first change we’re likely to see is a Sunni elite reestablishing control of the country.
This is basically what I predict will happen, especially because it is in the interests of all major parties in the region (excepting Iran and Iraq), including Israel. Pretty much everyone would like to see Iran have less influence over Syria and, by extension, Hizbollah have less control over Lebanon. Even in the case of Hamas and the Gaza Strip, I think Egypt will want more direct control and less influence from Iran.
The situation in Jordan also bears watching. The King and Queen there enjoy more popularity and legitimacy than most other regional leaders, but they certainly have a lot of detractors and a lot of internal problems. There will be a lot of pressure on the monarchy, especially if change comes to Syria. A real threat to their rule would put the principles that Obama laid out yesterday to their truest test.
“The United States also strongly supports the universal rights of the Libyan people. That includes the rights of peaceful assembly, free speech, and the ability of the Libyan people to determine their own destiny. These are human rights. They are not negotiable. They must be respected in every country. And they cannot be denied through violence or suppression.”
It’s very hard to sort out all the competing interests and how they might combine, but it seems to me that the democratic wave will be incomplete for a time, and that the democratic nations will align themselves somewhat with the surviving monarchies to check the power of Iran. In this effort I expect a miniature revival of a kind of pan-Arabism, but with a certain degree of Sunni chauvinism attached. And I expect the first target to be the Alawite regime in Syria.
Iran will react, of course, and they will seek to draw closer to Iraq while exploiting the democratic wave where it might benefit them, as in Bahrain or in the oil-producing Shi’a-majority regions of Saudi Arabia.
And, throughout all of this, we’ll be witnessing something new and exciting, which is the realization within the Arab world that there is route to empowerment and a better life that is not built on the Iranian model, nor on terrorism, nor even on anything strictly anti-Western. It’s called democracy and human rights, won through superior organization, patience, and non-violence.
The challenge for the West will be to deftly decide when to keep their hands off, and to be very disciplined about defining what is in our essential interests. The most sober thing to do would be to begin making contingencies for a sustained interruption of oil flow from the region, particularly from both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Because the world economy, our jobs, our prosperity, and even our way of life still depend on the availability of affordable energy sources from the region. But the stability genie is out of the bottle, and future good relations with the region will depend a lot on whether we were friends or enemies of the reformers.
Obama’s principles are a good place to start, but living up to them will be challenging in practice.
