I think Bob Dreyfuss is rather badly off the mark with his analysis. The starting point for understanding President Obama on Syria is that he has never wanted to get involved in the civil war and he has resisted all efforts to get embroiled there, making at each step the minimum amount of commitment he felt he could get away with. He has faced a lot of criticism from our Sunni allies in the region, from Israel and their domestic lobbyists, from liberals concerned about the humanitarian crisis, and from Republicans who seize on any sign of weakness or unwillingness to use the military to solve problems. That things have deteriorated badly in Syria over the last several years is unfortunate, but if you want to blame the president, you are talking about sins of omission, not commission.
When he felt his “red line” had been crossed, he authorized lethal aid to the rebels. And then he delayed its delivery. When the August 21 attacks occurred, he delayed by asking for congressional authority. As to the Russian gambit, the administration had discussed the possibility of disarming the Assad regime of its chemical weapons for a year without results. Letting the Russians know that the offer was still on the table was an astute move which promptly paid off.
I think what Dreyfuss is missing is that the president has to deal with a foreign policy establishment that feels that the only way to stop the civil war in Syria and get a tolerable outcome is to tilt the battlefield in favor of the rebels and force Russia and the Assad regime to cut a deal that might protect the Alawites from Sunni reprisals in a post-Assad environment. That’s probably not bad analysis, but achieving it without a large military commitment is nearly impossible. And Obama (not to mention, the American people) has not wanted to make a large military commitment to Syria. He hasn’t even wanted to make a small military commitment.
Nevertheless, events and his own rhetoric led him slowly down that path until the August 21st attacks left him with no option but to respond. But how would he respond?
Initially, he responded by acceding to his own foreign policy establishment and calling for limited punitive strikes that would have actually been designed to tilt the battlefield in the rebels’ favor (although not to the point that they would force an abdication). The policy was nonsensical, which was plain to almost everyone, but something had to be done.
For Vladimir Putin, a refiguring of the battlefield in Syria was not in his interests. So, suddenly, it became preferable to offer the deal Obama had been asking for for a year.
The downside is that the battlefield will remain tilted in Assad’s favor. That is what Russia gets out of it. What Obama gets out of it is the avoidance of deeper commitment to a complete quagmire, a total solution to the chemical weapons problem, an effective enforcement of the norm against the use of chemical weapons, the gratitude of a war-weary public, and one more example of the charmed life he leads, this time with almost a magician’s twist.
The hawks will be unhappy. Anyone who wants a quick end to Syria’s civil war will be unhappy, but they were relying on mission creep to get the job done. And that is exactly what Obama has been fighting against from Day One.
You may find reasons to disagree with the man’s policies. You may think he bears some responsibility for the tragedy in Syria because he has refused to make it America’s responsibility to solve, but he’s fought off everyone, including in his own cabinet, and come out the other side with a way out that is hard to criticize. Raise your hand if you saw it coming.
