Cross-posted at DailyKos.
Robert McNamara in this month’s Foreign Policy:
On Thursday night’s Charlie Rose Show, Mohamed Elbaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), asserted that the reduction of the nuclear threat comes first — even before human rights, economics, and the rest. “Humanity deserves no less,” Elbaradei told the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on Monday.
Helen Caldicott told TomPaine.com: “[The Bush] administration is violating almost every single nuclear arms control treaty that has been negotiated by the wisest statesmen in the world over years of negotiation.” McNamara joins in:
More Below:
From Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb:
General “Buck” Turgidson: Mr. President, we are rapidly approaching a moment of truth both for ourselves as human beings and for the life of our nation. Now, truth is not always a pleasant thing. But it is necessary now to make a choice, to choose between two admittedly regrettable, but nevertheless *distinguishable*, postwar environments: one where you got twenty million people killed, and the other where you got a hundred and fifty million people killed.
President Merkin Muffley: You’re talking about mass murder, General, not war!
General “Buck” Turgidson: Mr. President, I’m not saying we wouldn’t get our hair mussed. But I do say no more than ten to twenty million killed, tops. Uh, depending on the breaks.
These are NOT our grandpappies’ nuclear bombs, McNamara points out:
How destructive are these weapons? The average U.S. warhead has a destructive power 20 times that of the Hiroshima bomb. Of the 8,000 active or operational U.S. warheads, 2,000 are on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched on 15 minutes’ warning. How are these weapons to be used? The United States has never endorsed the policy of “no first use,” not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so. For decades, U.S. nuclear forces have been sufficiently strong to absorb a first strike and then inflict “unacceptable” damage on an opponent. This has been and (so long as we face a nuclear-armed, potential adversary) must continue to be the foundation of our nuclear deterrent.
In my time as secretary of defense, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) carried with him a secure telephone, no matter where he went, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. The telephone of the commander, whose headquarters were in Omaha, Nebraska, was linked to the underground command post of the North American Defense Command, deep inside Cheyenne Mountain, in Colorado, and to the U.S. president, wherever he happened to be. The president always had at hand nuclear release codes in the so-called football, a briefcase carried for the president at all times by a U.S. military officer.
The SAC commander’s orders were to answer the telephone by no later than the end of the third ring. If it rang, and he was informed that a nuclear attack of enemy ballistic missiles appeared to be under way, he was allowed 2 to 3 minutes to decide whether the warning was valid (over the years, the United States has received many false warnings), and if so, how the United States should respond. He was then given approximately 10 minutes to determine what to recommend, to locate and advise the president, permit the president to discuss the situation with two or three close advisors (presumably the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and to receive the president’s decision and pass it immediately, along with the codes, to the launch sites. The president essentially had two options: He could decide to ride out the attack and defer until later any decision to launch a retaliatory strike. Or, he could order an immediate retaliatory strike, from a menu of options, thereby launching U.S. weapons that were targeted on the opponent’s military-industrial assets. Our opponents in Moscow presumably had and have similar arrangements.
The whole situation seems so bizarre as to be beyond belief. On any given day, as we go about our business, the president is prepared to make a decision within 20 minutes that could launch one of the most devastating weapons in the world. To declare war requires an act of congress, but to launch a nuclear holocaust requires 20 minutes’ deliberation by the president and his advisors. But that is what we have lived with for 40 years.
“With very few changes,” McNamara says, “this system remains largely intact, including the ‘football,’ the president’s constant companion.”
Elbaradei began his address on Monday:
McNamara concludes his Foreign Policy essay:
We are at a critical moment in human history—perhaps not as dramatic as that of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but a moment no less crucial. Neither the Bush administration, the congress, the American people, nor the people of other nations have debated the merits of alternative, long-range nuclear weapons policies for their countries or the world. They have not examined the military utility of the weapons; the risk of inadvertent or accidental use; the moral and legal considerations relating to the use or threat of use of the weapons; or the impact of current policies on proliferation. Such debates are long overdue. If they are held, I believe they will conclude, as have I and an increasing number of senior military leaders, politicians, and civilian security experts: We must move promptly toward the elimination—or near elimination—of all nuclear weapons. For many, there is a strong temptation to cling to the strategies of the past 40 years. But to do so would be a serious mistake leading to unacceptable risks for all nations.
I remember reading Henry Kissinger’s book on nuclear proliferation when I was a high school debater. All these years later, the issues remain the same, except that the bombs are even more destructive.
Recently, I heard Helen Caldicott say on an indepth interview on CSPAN2 that she felt her life had been a waste because she’s failed to end the threat of nuclear weaponry.
Do you think we’ll ever get rid of the damnable things?
Or are we condemned to debate the maddeningly trivial while the gorilla-in-the-room nuclear threat goes ignored or dangerously abused by Bush’s hegemonic drive?
NOTE: Apocalypse Soon? is the title of McNamara’s <a href="“>essay in Foreign Policy.
