You know you are in trouble when your best friend starts to criticize your military performance (from Toronto’s Globe and Mail):
WASHINGTON — A senior British military officer has lashed out at the U.S. Army’s performance in Iraq, accusing it of cultural insensitivity that “amounted to institutional racism” and a predisposition to offensive operations that proved counterproductive when it was faced with a growing insurgency.
Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who served alongside the Americans in Iraq in 2004, made the scathing assessment in an article in the latest issue of Military Review, published by the U.S. Army itself.
First, kudos to the US Army and, in particular, the editors of Military Review for publishing this critique. It’s not always easy to deal with criticism, especially when that criticism is so harsh. Nonetheless, they clearly felt the issues raised by Brigadier General Aylwin-Foster deserved a hearing, despite knowing that his views would be decidedly unpopular among officers in the US military. It is to their credit, that they did so. The link to General Aylwin-Foster’s article (pdf file format), by the way, is here.
For more on Aylwin-Foster’s critique of US tactics in Iraq, follow me below the fold.
Cross posted at Daily Kos
Once you get past the explosive (and sensationalistic) claims of institutional racism (resulting from wrong headed and culturally insensitive actions according to General Aylwin-Foster) the real nub of his analysis for the US military’s failure to contain the insurgency in Iraq comes down to this:
Brig. Aylwin-Foster said the U.S. Army concentrated its training on war fighting and was ill trained and ill suited to counterinsurgency operations, in particular when it required gaining and maintaining the hearts and minds of the local population.
Many others have made similar criticisms regarding the use of US forces in Iraq during the period of occupation. Our military is superbly trained, but the principle focus of that training is its war fighting ability, not counter-insurgency operations. We did a magnificent job during the invasion phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Indeed, in straight up army to army combat, the US has no equal at the present time. We have the best equipment, the best training and the best ability to execute combined land, sea and air operations of any nation on the planet. However, it seems clear that our forces do not have the best training or tactics for a post-war fighting environment, particularly if that involves counter-insurgency operations.
An example, according to General Aylwin-Foster, was the US response to the death and mutilation of the four contractors in Fallujah in early 2004. In effect, he says, we overreacted to a situation that was intended to provoke just such a response:
“In classic insurgency doctrine, this act was almost certainly a come on, designed to invoke a disproportionate response, thereby further polarizing the situation and driving a wedge between the domestic population and the coalition forces. It worked,” he wrote, resulting in the U.S. Army’s decision to clear the city of insurgents.
In a way, the idealism of US soldiers and their belief in the moral rightness of their mission, blinds them to the real facts on the ground. US soldiers, he says, both at the operational and command levels, have made erroneous assumptions regarding how their actions would be perceived by the local population, believing that Iraqis would understand our higher purposes (i.e., bringing them “freedom and democracy”) and thus forgive any mistakes that might be made in implementing those purposes. Coupled with the fact that troops were often inadequately trained to deal with cultural differences between themselves and the locals, this became a recipe for disaster that only fueled the insurgency.
Let me quote to you what I find to be the most revealing statement made by General Aylwin-Foster in his article regarding his experience of serving with US forces in Iraq:
My overriding impression was of an army imbued with patriotism, duty, passion, commitment, and determination, with plenty of talent, and in no way lacking in humanity or compassion. Yet it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a stifling hierarchical outlook, a pre-disposition to offensive operations, and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head on.
An army too stratified, too rigid and inflexible, and lacking the cultural knowledge necessary to effectively implement a counter-insurgency strategy once that became a necessity. One wonders if we learned anything at all from Vietnam.
In other words, an army well suited for attacking and defeating other armies is not necessarily the best one for winning the hearts and minds of a defeated populace. I do not fault our military for this. They are what they were trained to be. As Rumsfeld so ironically noted, you go to war with the army you have. This failure was fashioned by our political leadership. We never should have sent them to Iraq in the first place, much less send them there without any plan for dealing with the Iraqi people after invasion turned into occupation.
